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P r e f a c e
I began to consider the study of relationships as an intellectual vocation 
in 1970, the result of two years of college teaching that was part of my 
work as a United States Peace Corps volunteer in Bogota, Colombia. After 
another year I began my doctoral training in the D epartm ent o f Education 
at the University of Chicago, working on K enneth Kaye’s m other-infant 
communication studies and struggling to fill the gaps in my knowledge 
of developmental psychology left by undergraduate and master’s degrees 
in physics and mathematics.
I am still struggling, as I believe all professionals struggle, with incompleteness 
and ambiguity, wavering between conviction and uncertainty. T he work that 
follows is part o f an ongoing learning process. Apart from what I have said 
about these limitations in the body of the text I can also add that it feels 
finished enough for now, ready for public scrutiny, but open to revision in the 
future. This book is the product not only of the year over which the writing 
took place, but also of the past twenty years o f my professional development 
and of my personal life histoiy.
Part o f this life history is my relationship with many individuals who 
have in some way contributed to the production o f this book. T h e  m ost 
recent are those who were generous enough to give the time to read 
and critically review earlier drafts: Farrell B urnett, G eorge B utterw orth, 
Steve Duck, Jacqueline Fogel, D onna G elfand, W endy H aight, Penny 
Jam eson, K enneth  Kaye, Andy Lock, Barbara Rogoff, R udolph Schaffer 
and Esther T helen . I accept their support and critiques with gratitude. 
Sandy Som m er’s capable assistance in the preparation o f the m anuscript 
was invaluable. I recognize the m ore historically distant bu t no less 
influential contributions of my teachers and m entors, especially K enneth 
Kaye, Starkey D uncan, D an Freedm an and John  K nobloch. In addition, 
the graduate and postgraduate students with whom I have worked, the 
colleagues whose ideas I borrow ed and those I reviewed, the subjects 
who participated in my research, and my parents, brothers and sisters,
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wife and sons are all part o f me, therefore implicated in the work, and 
entirely without blame for its faults.
I am also grateful for the support of the universities in which I have spent 
significant amounts of productive time -  in reverse and roughly chronological 
order, the University of Utah, the Free University of Amsterdam and the 
University of Groningen (Netherlands), Purdue University (Indiana), Nagoya, 
Kobe and Hokkaido Universities (Japan), the University of Chicago, Universidad 
Javeriana (Bogota), Columbia University, and the University of Miami —  and 
for the major sources o f financial support that have been necessary to sustain 
my research efforts: the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes 
of Health, the Fulbright Foundation, and the Spencer Foundation.
Salt Lake City 
July 1992
F o r  J a c q u e l i n e
P a r t  I
C o m m u n i c a t i o n
p r o c e s s e s
C h a p te r  1
I n t r o d u c t i o n  a n d  p e r s p e c t i v e
T he purpose of this work is to address the problem  o f how individuals 
develop through their relationships with others. Both individuals and 
relationships, in the perspective taken here, are never fully defined; they 
are always dynamically constituted as part o f a process. T h is process is 
described from three points of view -  communication, self, and culture -  
each of which is conceptualized as an aspect of developm ent through 
relationships.
Communicative connections to other people are fundamental to the 
workings of the human mind and self, and to the culture that enriches and 
sustains our spirits and achievements. T he study of personal relationships has 
historically been in the provinces of philosophy, theology, art and literature. 
Contained in this cultural heritage are eloquent and passionate expressions 
of what I view as fundamental in relationships, insights I can only remind 
the reader about with considerably less poetry. M ore recently, the study of 
personal relationships has expanded into the late nineteenth-century scholarly 
upstarts of psychology, communications, sociology, linguistics, anthropology 
and the newly bom  field of cognitive science.
I offer this work at a time when the research and writing on personal 
relationships is already expansive and due to explode with new energy and 
productivity. It is therefore opportune to unite the historical insights about 
relationships with the profound contribution of scientific thought in the 
twentieth century: the concept of the dynamic open system.
T he task I set out to accomplish is to describe relationships and their 
contributions to individual selves that is both humanistic and scientific, both 
philosophical and psychological, both literary and technical. As a field that 
bridges both arts and sciences, the study o f personal relationships provides 
both intellectual challenges and deep personal gratification and I hope this 
is communicated through the writing.
I try to show that an attempt to comprehend the human mind and self that 
is not grounded in a theory of personal relationships may sprout and grow
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but is unlikely to yield edible fruit and attractive flowers. Hum an cognition 
and the sense of self are fundamentally and originally relational.
R e la t io n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e
T hroughout the work I contrast an objectivist perspective on individuals and 
their development with a relational perspective. T he objectivist tradition of 
Plato and Descartes is the basis o f our current scientific methodologies. It is 
the view that perceptions and cognitions are characterized by their contents, 
contents that are more or less a direct copy of the way the world is structured. 
T he cognitive contents are believed to be freed from the context in which one 
learns about the world. I refer to all such objectivist models as discrete state 
models of communication, self, cognition and culture. This work is one of 
several recent attempts to examine the implications of an undue reliance on 
objectivist thinking in various domains o f scholarship.
I believe that cognition and perception are not mirrors of reality, but 
relational processes that reflect the ways in which we have experienced 
the world. O ur initial cognitions and memories are in the form o f direct 
action procedures, as the noted Swiss epistemologist and developmental 
psychologist Jean Piaget pointed out. Babies know objects because they are 
graspable and because of the texture, shape and color that can be perceived 
with the sensory' systems o f their bodies. Knowledge and memory are therefore 
encoded cognitively, not as representations of the abstract physical properties 
of objects, but as the form of the relationship between the individual’s 
perception and action. I trace how such embodied cognitions in infancy lead 
to a sense of self and to the characteristic process of human cognition that 
never escapes its fundamental relational embodiment, even in the midst of 
the most abstract thought.
T he hum an mind and sense o f self must also be understood as evolving out 
o f the historical process o f personal relationship formation between the self 
and other individuals. Upon close examination, one finds that the workings 
of the mind and the ways in which we perceive and understand ourselves is 
remarkably like the form o f our personal relationships. T he life of the mind 
is a dialogue, most typically a verbal dialogue, between imagined points of 
view. T he points o f view o f the mental discourse bear a close resemblance 
to positions taken by two different people in a discussion, or to the physically 
embodied positions of individuals engaged in non-verbal communication (as 
in sport, dance, and battle).
T o  continue treating the mind as a disembodied relationless computational 
machine, as an objective thing inside the head, is to be blind to the evidence 
of one’s own cognitive experience. Cartesian objectivity is the embodied mind 
disguising itself as a ghost; wisps o f thought trapped in a net of rules, floating 
above a sea of troubles.
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T o  bring some life into the mind, life in the form of a bubbling and 
unpredictable dialogue with emotional force, I propose a continuous process 
model of communication, one that has general applicability to any form of 
live interaction between individuals and to the mental discussions we call 
thought. Suggestions are made throughout the book on applications of the 
model to many different forms of communication, including between adults, 
and adults with children, communication within other animal species, and 
communication between species, such as between humans and animals. I also 
discuss communication within the self, between various action alternatives 
and imagined points of view.
As a developmental psychologist I have come to understand that relationships, 
between people and in the mind, are alive and changing. Relationships 
develop by identifiable processes and in concert with the individuals that 
embody them. A theory o f the mind and of personal relationships would be 
incomplete without a consideration of how humans enter into relationships 
early in life and how they develop through relationships.
D e v e l o p m e n t a l  p e r s p e c t i v e
T he perspective taken here is that developmental change arises in everyday 
communication. T he secrets of developmental change are not locked in some 
inaccessible area o f the brain or the cell. Developmental change is as open to 
inquiry as the m undane encounters between individual and environment, and 
between individuals and social partners. A workable model of the process of 
communication between the components of a living system should also be a 
model of developmental change within that system. M odels of communication 
and thought that do not develop are inadequate to the task of explaining the 
mind and its origins.
W hat might such a model of communication and development look 
like? Developmental biologists have discovered growth hormones, genes 
that regulate growth processes, genes that are instrumental in producing 
proteins that create the structure of new developmental forms. Psychologists 
have discovered pathways of developmental change in mind and body that 
seem nearly universal, that occur in a wide range of physical and cultural 
environments. Developmental biologists, however, have not discovered a 
genetic developmental plan or blueprint for the creation of organisms from 
zygotes. O n the contrary, structure is created when particular genes and 
particular cells interact with other micro- and macro-biological entities via 
real embodied processes that take time, that are wet and warm. If any of 
the components of the genes’ or cells’ supportive environment are missing or 
deleterious the result is development that is thwarted or changed, regardless 
o f the abstract contents of the genetic code.
Just because development is patterned, organized and universal does not
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mean that there is a map, plan or scheme for the creation o f those 
patterns. As developmental biologists1 and a small num ber o f developmental 
psychologists2 have been pointing out, developmental patterning can occur by 
means of the local interactions of biological components within the individual 
and between the individual and the environment. Systematic developmental 
change processes can emerge out of the mutual constraints imposed on 
components of the individual-environment system as they interact.
These mutual constraints are discussed in this book with respect to the 
concept o f co-regulation. Co-regulation occurs whenever individuals’ joint 
actions blend together to achieve a unique and mutually created set of 
social actions. Co-regulation arises as part o f a continuous process of 
communication, not as the result of an exchange of messages borne by 
discrete communication signals. Co-regulation is recognized by its spontaneity 
and creativity and is thus the fundamental source of developmental change. 
Co-regulation, in social and mental life, allows the individual to participate in 
the discovery of the unknown and the invention of possibilities. If our genes 
provide us with any developmental guideline at all it is our ability to enter 
into co-regulated discourse.
T he model o f  co-regulated communication proposed in this book is one 
that applies generally to communication between cells and genes, and also to 
social forms o f communication. T he model provides a focal point to answer 
the questions: What are the abstract features o f communication that apply to 
all of its forms? Can these features o f the communication process also be 
generalized to explain development? In particular, how does communication 
begin in infancy and how do infants develop into participants in a culture of 
communication?
C u ltu r a l  p e r s p e c t i v e
A model of communication, mental life and personal relationships would also 
be incomplete without a consideration of culture. I do not mean culture only 
in the sense of belief systems, taboos and customs. Rather, culture is the 
set o f tools, media, communication conventions and beliefs that mediate all 
o f our relational experiences. W hen we think it is usually in words or in 
culturally available imagery. W hen we act alone we are using cultural tools -  
such as hammers, pens, computers, chairs and shoes -  to amplify and extend 
the limits o f the body into wider realms. When we interact with others we 
employ conventional means o f movement and expression.
Cultural systems are not static. Like the mind and like personal relationships 
they develop, they shrink and expand, they are varied in their relation to 
the context and purpose o f action. Cultures are relational and embodied, 
expressed as the actions and products of the participants. We can give a 
computer model o f the mind a kind o f culture: the programming language,
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the rules set forth in the expressions of that language, and the machine 
environment. Yet that mind will never develop in ways even close to what 
a human infant can do unless its links to its culture are co-regulated. T he 
machine’s static environment is a slavish regimen, not a genuine culture. 
Artificial intelligence will never occur in the form of a clever program of 
commands. T he program must have a open relationship to its operating 
system and to the environment outside the machine. At the same time, a 
growing mind is imprisoned and retarded without access to culture in its broadest 
and most dynamic sense: as a complex system of co-regulated relationships.
A b o u t  th i s  b o o k
T he work described in this book is centered in the field o f developmental 
psychology and is directed primarily to an audience o f persons interested 
in issues of hum an developm ent in the social context. T h e  work is unique, 
however, because it weaves together theoretical ideas and empirical 
findings from a num ber o f o ther m ajor disciplines. T hese include 
social psychology, developmental biology, com m unications, linguistics, 
philosophy, cognitive and neural science, ethology, perception, movement 
studies (including training and perform ance, athletics, and rehabilitation) 
and anthropology.
T his book proposes a model that encompasses the forms o f com ­
m unication in which infants can participate. However, the reader will 
not find an outline of the specific developmental changes that one might see 
in infants and children at any given age. This information can be obtained 
from other sources, including my own text on infant development.3 There 
are a num ber of different accounts of the developmental changes in infant 
communication; some that focus on gestural, non-verbal or vocal/verbal 
forms; and some that emphasize the cognitive, emotional or functional 
features of communication.
I shall have a great deal to say that can be applied to the evaluation of such 
accounts of developmental stages in infant communicative competence. I also 
make concrete suggestions for how I think developmental change might best 
be conceptualized and studied. It is my view that a listing of developmental 
changes in infant communicative performance is not a theory of development 
unless it is also founded upon a generative process by which such changes 
come about. In this work, I provide the process, leaving for the future the 
work of evaluating whether the process can explain the observed data of 
communicative development in all its detail. Thus, I am not trying to prove a 
theory. My goal is a more modest one of making a theoretical model plausible 
by the following means.
I use a form of philosophical analysis in which the meanings of scientific 
metaphors are examined for their consistency within the technical language
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system used in developmental psycholog}’. I apply ethnographic and historical 
analysis to examine the values implicit in the W estern scientific culture as 
part o f the heritage o f ideas about communication during the last two 
centuries. I provide many examples of the type of continuous systemic 
communication process that forms the core of the theoretical model. I present 
concrete models, based on the theory, for the workings of communication in 
relationships, selves and cultures. Finally, I generate some implications for 
research and practice that seem to follow from my point o f view.
Contrary to the tradition in psychology, I will not be bolstering my 
arguments with quantitative data and statistical calculations. T he reader 
will find many references to psychological research using the traditional 
inferential methods, including research of my own. I am more concerned 
in this volume with a critical examination of what counts as data when one 
wants to preserve the dynamic integrity o f the system under study. I shall 
focus on finding a consistent language with which to describe phenomena that 
are not fixed but fluid, not objectively specifiable but creatively emergent.
I recognize the difficulty o f creating a science o f relationships that is 
linguistically consistent and systemically open to the currents o f thought 
and multiplicity o f  research m ethods available at the end o f the twentieth 
century. In the novel o f monastic intrigue during the M iddle Ages in 
Europe, Tlie Name o f  the Rose, by U m berto Eco, I found that the character 
m ost like the spirit o f  the last decade o f the tw entieth century -  and 
the message o f  this book -  was not the scientifically m inded sleuth 
bro ther William nor the faithfully accurate reporter Adzo, but Salvatore 
the deform ed polyglot.
Salvatore could not keep his tongues separate, his sentences were 
amalgamated from many languages, none of which he knew well enough to 
use on its own. He was painful to behold and difficult to comprehend. Was 
Salvatore sweeping a profound ignorance under the carpet of his glib patois? 
In a time that presaged the myth of the encompassing know ledge of Leonardo 
da Vinci, was Salvatore mocking the Renaissance ideal of universal thought, 
seen from the writer’s historical vantage? O r was Salvatore a successful 
political strategist, able to make himself understood to many people at the 
linguistic crossroads o f medieval Europe while avoiding words, both sacred 
and profane, that could be used to condemn and to kill? T he brutalities o f w ar 
and inquisition that Salvatore had witnessed in his life were undescribable in 
any single ordinary language.
Perhaps what Salvatore knew' was unutterable in the culture of his time: 
that there is no single truth, no one correct means o f expression, only a 
fluidity o f cultural experience in which one can survive by grasping the 
bits and pieces of convention that surface in the turbulence of the living 
process. T he myth o f scientific objectivity is the m odem  inquisitory power 
that continues to repress this insight. T he attempt in this and other related 
works to offer a non-Cartesian science may be seen by some as heretical.
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N o te s
1. The American Journal of Anatomy, one of the major developmental biology 
journals that publishes on embryological development, has just recently 
been renamed Developmental Dynamics. The purpose of the journal is to 
‘emphasize the dynamic and complex controls that regulate pattern formation 
in development’ (quoted from a recent advertisement for the journal).
2. Butterworth (in press); Fentress (1976); Fogel (1992); Fogel & Thelen (1987); 
Oyama (1985; 1989); Sameroff (1984); Thelen (1989); Thelen & Fogel 
(1989); Thelen, Kelso & Fogel (1987); Thelen & Ulrich (1991).
3. Fogel (1991).
C h a p te r  2
T h e  o r i g i n s  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  
s e l f ,  a n d  c u l t u r e
Laura, aged 12 years, informed her parents during the evening meal ‘I 
never want to go back to school . . .  ever!’. Despite a lengthy discussion 
that evening, Laura could admit to little more than a stubborn unhappiness. 
Although certain o f little else besides her determination to avoid school, her 
parents decided to allow her to stay at home the next day, giving them the 
opportunity to talk more with Laura and to telephone her teacher.
At the next evening meal, Laura’s mother told her of the teacher’s suspicion 
o f Laura’s disagreement with her best friend. They had come back from lunch 
the day before last with an icy silence between their desks, an obvious contrast 
to their more usual exchanges of glances, smiles and secret notes. Laura 
nearly exploded with the tale she had held inside for the past day and amid 
tears explained to her parents what had happened: a broken confidence o f a 
shared intimacy, a chain of unbearable moments o f shame hearing other girls 
talking about her most personal thoughts, and most o f all her disappointment 
in the trust she had placed in her friend. In the ensuing conversation, feelings 
were aired and soothed, strategies were offered, and Laura returned to school 
armed with things to say.
O ne o f the developmental tasks o f children in their early teens in the 
W estern world is the establishment of bonds o f intimacy with others.1 It 
is a world in which personal secrets and revelations occupy long hours of 
talk, in which acceptance o f one’s own and others’ inner feelings dissolve 
suddenly into piercing judgements and just as quickly coalesce back into 
acceptance. In this world one’s personal experience pours into another’s 
consciousness, a flow o f images as water from a broken dam, in the form 
o f a story narrative.
T he teller usually doesn’t just say ‘I’m sad,’ or ‘I’m in love.’ These 
messages are communicated as the narrative unfolds. A meeting is described 
or every word of a telephone conversation is reported. Comments are added. 
T he story is embellished and made dramatic. T he listener asks leading 
questions or conspires in the drama with well-timed sighs and exclamations.
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T he listener takes the floor and reveals a related personal story. T here is 
more elaboration, more discussion, and more intimacy.
This example highlights the themes developed in this book, themes related 
to communication and the self. Laura’s case is an example of breakdown 
and repair o f communication between Laura and her parents, and between 
Laura and her friend. Laura at first refuses to impart the information that 
her parents might need to help her through the crisis. T hat information is 
obtained from the teacher and it proves to be a key to unlock the gate to the 
information that Laura later relates.
G u id in g  p r i n c i p l e s
T h e re la tio n sh ip s  b e tw e e n  c o m m u n ica tio n , se lf , a n d  cu ltu re
Communication illuminates the self’s relationship to others. W hen individuals 
communicate, the actions, ideas and feelings of the individual are made 
known to others. Individuals define themselves to others via communication.2 
In some cases the individual is quite clear about who they are and what they 
believe, but in other cases, the very process of acting and speaking helps the 
individual toward increased self understanding. Laura’s narrative is related to 
personal feelings and social relationships: it is about the boundaries between 
self and other, what Laura knows and what others know, and what they can 
and may tell each other. As she tells her stories to others and observes the 
effect of her stories on them, she understands herself and her relationship 
to others in new ways.
Communication that leads to renewed self-understanding is a creative co­
construction o f the participants. Laura’s telling of her encounter with her friend 
seems to explode into a fully formed story o f anger and disappointment, of 
confidence and betrayal. T hat’s not how it actually happened, however. Laura 
needed to be assured o f her audience’s interest and sympathy before she even 
began to talk. H er parents’ patience, the efforts they made to find out more 
from the teacher, and no doubt their expressed concern at Laura’s sadness 
was what their daughter needed in order to unburden herself. Thus, even 
before the telling, Laura’s tale is partly shaped by the perceived receptivity 
o f the audience.
Laura’s story was not completely formed before it was told; few personal 
stories are complete, save the well-worn tales heard in political speeches. In 
the actual telling Laura rose to the occasion. Supported not only by her 
parents’ empathy, and also by their leading questions, nods, laughs and 
comments, Laura created her story as she told it. H er creation was partly 
spurred by her own experience and ability as a storyteller, and also partly 
attributable to the inventiveness o f the audience in detecting ambiguities and 
following up on particularly meaningful parts o f the unfolding narrative. No
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doubt Laura would have told it differently to another girl friend or to the 
teacher.
Laura comes to understand herself better as she composes the text o f her 
story. She learns about her feelings and what sets them off, she is able to 
examine the meaning o f friendship and how this particular friend relates to 
her values and needs. She could not have done this in the same way without 
the contribution o f her parents. For one thing, they gave Laura the freedom 
to explore her feelings in an emotionally safe situation. M ore importantly 
however, they contributed concretely to the telling by giving Laura tools for 
self-examination: questions to probe with, narrative forms around which to 
bind experiences.
T h e  parents were also creating something with their daughter. On the first 
evening they were unable to induce Laura to speak. How could they help 
her? W hat should they do next? Laura’s pain challenged them to think of 
new ways to open communication with her. Even as Laura began to tell her 
story, it is unlikely that either parent was following a prepared script for being 
a good parent. Although their actions were based in part on personal goals 
and cultural values, their questions and responses were creative compositions. 
Laura was not weaving her own story, nor were her parents acting out a 
parental role. T he story that emerged they created together.3
Communication creates knowledge. If Laura knew in advance how her story 
would come out, would there be much need for telling it? Based on 
prior discussions with her parents, Laura could predict that they would 
be responsive to her and that usually such talks ended on a note of relief, if 
not complete resolution. But could she have predicted exactly how she would 
understand herself after the conversation? Would she have known in advance 
what her parents would say?
For some people the answer to such questions might be ‘yes.’ Often, 
when we can foresee the outcomes o f a social interaction with someone, 
it is usually with someone we wish to avoid. We learn nothing new about 
ourselves or about them, we don’t enjoy the encounter, we perceive it as 
boring, frustrating or painful. In some types o f relationship pathologies, as in 
dysfunctional family systems, ritualized and rigid interaction patterns become 
the norm and require intervention to restore their creative innovation.4
Creativity in social exchanges leads to changes in self-understanding and 
to enhanced feelings of closeness to the partner.5 One might call such 
interactions playful in the sense that there is shared agreement to indulge 
in the freedom to explore the topic at hand. T he topic need not be a happy 
one, but it might be. Feelings o f closeness to others enhances our willingness 
to do things together, our sense of belonging to a partner, a family or a 
community.
Communication depends on community, the existence o f  a adture. Part o f what 
we call culture is the set o f conventions that define the type o f discourse 
possible between individuals.6 T he culture of communication includes tools
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used for communication: the ‘software’ of language, gestures and symbols 
and the ‘hardware’ of books, radios, musical instruments, computers and 
telephones.7 T he culture of communication also regulates who can talk to 
whom and what can be discussed. Laura might tell her story differendy to 
her teacher than to her parents in part because they are different individuals, 
and in part because such intimacies have a different cultural significance at 
home or in school.
T he culture of communication influences the form o f the narrative. In 
some cultures like Laura’s, young people are permitted to engage in playful 
discourse with adults in which the boundaries of status are minimized. Laura 
can tell her story in her own manner, and is encouraged to be inventive 
and verbally skilled. In other cultures, status differences bar children from 
speaking freely to adults.8 Culture regulates whether discourse is permitted 
between the genders or only within; whether topics such as spirituality, 
sexuality, fear, desire or uncertainty are allowed.
Laura’s story o f her friendship problems is also woven from a rich array 
of culturally accepted narratives related to childhood growing pains. These 
cultural narratives are available from adults or in books in the form of standard 
moral tales: Bible stories, fairy tales, popular children’s literature, TV shows 
and movies. C hildren’s self-understanding is enhanced by identification with 
the characters in the story, perhaps through creating an imaginary private 
narrative dialogue with the characters, or perhaps through discussion of the 
story with peers or adults.9
Culture reflects the history of the community. T he tools o f communication 
and the rules that regulate its occurrence have been maintained over time as 
a historical tradition. Cultural history can be very brief, as in a clothing fad 
by which participants communicate their membership in the group, or it can 
be relatively stable like language forms and national myths that can last for 
centuries.
A ssu m p tio n s  o f th is  w o rk
In this book I address the problem of how the micro-culture of the 
parent-infant relationship allows the infant to partake of the macro-culture 
of the larger community. Since parents are already members o f the macro­
culture and act with their infants in ways specified by the community for 
childcare, the m icro-culture is not entirely independent o f the m acro-culture. 
Although all scholars of hum an development acknowledge the parents’ role 
in the child’s acquisition of actions that are acceptable in the m acro-culture, 
this book offers a different view of how that happens.
First, I assume that children develop as part of their everyday interactions 
within the family. Culture does not impose itself on children via broad 
categories like ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’ Culturally accepted behavior arises spon­
taneously as part o f children’s interactions with others.
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Second, I assume that culture does not exist as a codified set o f rules, 
procedures and tools that children acquire and then apply to particular 
situations. Children acquire patterns of action and thought that work for them 
in particular real-life situations, when alone and in the company of others. 
Children discover those patterns of acting and thinking via their own activity 
with others; they are not explicitly learning, nor are they following, rules.
T hird , I suggest that ‘rule-like’ behavior -  such as language, social 
manners, learning to do arithmetic -  emerges from a set of constraints 
available from the child’s transactions with members of the community.10 
None of these constraints is an explicit rule. Rather, given the social 
constraints (I get into trouble if  I do X. I will be understood if I say Y. I 
will feel better if I move like Z.) and the inherent structural constraints of 
the human body and brain, cultural activity will emerge via the child’s own 
creative solutions to everyday problems.
T he unique contribution o f this book is my tracing the roots of communi­
cation, self and culture to their earliest origins. While most scholars begin 
such a search after the child acquires language (the most recognizable and 
historically significant cultural tool), I suggest that cultural communication 
originates much earlier, in the pre-verbal period.
D efin in g  in d iv id u a ls
The relationships between communication, the self and the cultural community 
are fundamental to any understanding of our human nature. Certainly these 
three terms must be at the heart of any enlightened psychology of the 
human mind. People can only be comprehended in the context of their 
community, in the historical time in which they live, and in relation to 
the forms of communication by which they express themselves.11 But are 
individual actions such as an athletic achievement or a musical skill done 
independently o f communication, self and culture? Is a record-setting speed 
in a running race a purely personal achievement?
Self. In setting a racing speed record, talent and personal effort are 
important factors, but it is impossible to measure the scope of this achievement 
outside the historical and current community of runners. O ne’s ‘personal best’ 
is always m easured against some social comparison.
Culture. Running is a culturally constructed means o f self-expression. 
People engage in forms o f athletics as members o f a community o f athletes 
who define the rules of the sport, provide the tools for its execution (race 
tracks, running shoes, clothing, stop-watches). How far and fast one runs 
depends not only on the shape and strength of the body, but also on 
whether one runs barefoot, in leathers and cleats, or in computer-engineered 
ergonomic running shoes made o f synthetic materials.
Communication. It is hard to imagine any kind of race without communication. 
O ne’s pace and place on the track is determined by the speed and location of
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the other runners. Even if  one runs alone, communication is an inescapable 
part o f running. T he runner may talk about running with others, or may 
have learned to run better from a coach or teammate. Running as a 
form o f self-expression is enhanced by communication, communication is 
enhanced by talking about running with others who care about it and both 
self and communication are enhanced by the historical continuity of a cultural 
community that promotes and elaborates the activity.
C o m m u n ica tio n  a n d  d ev e lo p m en t
This book is about developmental change in the relationship between 
communication, self and culture. In particular, I try to answer the following 
questions: How do infants during their first years o f life become participants 
in a culture? How do they acquire culturally acceptable communication skills? 
W hen and how does the self emerge? I believe that communication, self and 
culture are present and inseparable from the beginning of the life course. If this 
is so, it leads to further questions. What is the form of communication, self and 
culture in a 3-day-old infant, in a 3-month-old, in a 3-year-old? How does this 
trinity evolve developmentally? These topics form the core of this book.
Unfortunately, many scholars and clinicians who deal with developmental 
change think that just because communication, self and culture are inseparably 
related for Laura and for athletes it does not necessarily mean that such a unity 
exists from the beginning of the individual’s life. These entities are believed 
to shape children’s action and thinking only later, after a sufficient period of 
acculturation, after the biological needs and functions are met and relegated 
to the background of cultural existence, after the psychological self is freed 
from the tremors and longings of the infantile flesh.
This means that some of my narrative will be created in response to 
and in interaction with these opposing viewpoints. I believe that many of 
these scholars have forgotten that action and thought in adults are lived 
in a real physical body, not only in the mind. Early infancy is important 
to our understanding of development because it is a period in which the 
body is salient, its limits obvious, its desires nearly overwhelming. All later 
action, all manifestations o f culture including the highest forms of art, are 
set within the context of the body as much as they are set within the context 
o f the society. W hat we can learn from babies is a more balanced view of 
humankind in which spirit and matter commingle to achieve recognizable 
forms of civilization.
C o m m u n ic a t io n ,  s e l f ,  a n d  c u l tu r e  in  in f a n c y
I will present research evidence suggesting that infants are active participants 
in a cultural system from the beginning, that newborns have a sense of
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self, and that communication with the environment exists from conception. 
I also intend to show that the dynamic and creative aspects o f interpersonal 
relationships and of self-understanding that were discussed in the Laura 
story can be seen in some form in early infancy. Indeed, it is the creativity 
o f interpersonal transactions from which development springs.
T he assumption of the unity of communication, self and culture in early 
life solves some o f the persistent intellectual problems that have puzzled 
developmental psychologists for some time. If  you assume that the infant 
has no sense of self and does not partake o f culture, you are left with the 
problem o f how to get culture into the baby, and how a self emerges from 
an infantile, autistic-like state.12 If communication is a tool for revealing the 
self, and if it partakes of a cultural system, how can a pre-cultural infant have 
a self? D oesn’t the self have to await the infant’s acquisition of cultural forms 
of communication?
In my perspective, these problems are reframed. I ask, for example, how 
mature forms o f cultural communication evolve from their rudimentary 
origins. In what sense is culture available to a newborn infant? How 
might a newborn’s experience o f itself differ from a 2-year-old’s or from 
an adolescent’s search for personal meaning and values? Do these early 
forms of communication, self and culture embody the seeds of later forms, 
or do later forms arise in discontinuous jumps as new factors are added 
developmentally?
Regardless of how one answers these questions, I begin with the assumption 
that these concepts -  communication, self and culture -  are not separate 
entities. Each one is a facet, a partial portrait o f the developing individual. I 
make the claim that each of these facets develops in relationship to the other: 
each facet defines the other, each facet creates the other. Infants learn to 
communicate as they define themselves. They create culture for themselves 
as they communicate with more culturally skilled individuals. They define 
others in the process of defining themselves. Development arises from being 
a participant in a dynamic discourse with other people.
E xam ple 1
In this example, Paul (a British baby who is 6 months and 19 days old) sits 
alone in the living room of his home. H e begins to cry as his mother enters 
the room.
Mother. Oh, now what’s up, hey? Oh dear, oh dear, what’s the matter? [She 
picks Paul up.]
Mother. Are you thirsty, is that what it is? Do you want a drink? [She goes and 
picks up his botde and offers it to him. He refuses it and continues crying.]
Mother. Hungry? Are you? Do you want something to eat? No? Sleepy then, 
do you want to go to sleep? [She puts him in his pram but he continues to 
cry. She picks him up again and walks about comforting him. She stops at the
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window. Paul apparently looks out but continues crying. Mother tries to attract 
his attention and then to direct it.]
Mother. Look, there’s a pussycat, can you see him? Do you know what pussycats 
say? Do you? They say ’miaow’ don’t they, yes, of course they do. [Paul stops 
crying during this speech.]
Mother. There, that’s better, down you go then. [She places him back on the 
floor.]
This example13 has some obvious similarities to the example of Laura. T he 
child is upset about something and the parent can only guess the nature o f his 
problem. Paul is sitting in the middle of the room with no visible cues about 
what he wants or needs. Perhaps Paul does not have a particular want or 
need. Perhaps like Laura there is a non-specific desire to communicate with 
another person, expressed as a general malaise. Perhaps Paul, like Laura, is 
not entirely certain about what the problem really is.
T he parents play a similar role in these two examples. They operate from 
a state of relative uncertainty. T he child is distressed, but with no visible 
cause. They must proceed with some guesswork, thinking about probable 
causes for the upset and perhaps doing some further investigation. Laura’s 
parents called the teacher. Paul’s mother might have checked the diaper or 
looked at the clock to see the time since the last meal.
Thus, both parties enter the discourse with incomplete information. 
Continuation of the discourse is based upon the subtle changes in the 
cues given by each partner. If  Paul had increased the intensity of his cry, 
m other might have taken other steps. As it was, his gradual calming allowed 
her to settle Paul back down with his toys on the floor. For both Paul and 
Laura, the result was at least a partial resolution of the distress. In what sense 
can we consider this an example of communication, self and culture from the 
infant’s point of view?
Communication occurs because the infant’s cry serves as a source of 
information for the mother to enter the room and to begin asking questions 
about the source of the distress. T he m other behaves as i f  the child were 
actually trying to communicate something to her, although it is highly 
probable that Paul’s cry arises more from his own distress than from his 
intention to communicate about it.14
T he m other’s behavior is also a source o f information for the infant, since 
after a while Paul calms down in her company. T he question here is: if 
Paul doesn’t obtain any information from his m other’s words, what sort of 
information is he picking up? From  the description of this example, it is not 
easy to answer this question. In later chapters will review research studies 
showing that Paul is likely to acquire information from the way his mother 
moves his body when she picks him up and moves him, from the way in 
which she touches Paul, and from the tone and cadence o f her voice rather 
than from the meaning of her words. Some other examples may make this 
more clear.
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E xam ple 2
In this example, a m other reaches out to help pull her 4-m onth-old baby into 
a sitting position.
The child is on his back on the floor and the mother takes hold of his hands, 
pulling gently. She pauses expectandy and the child strenuously pulls himself 
upward against the hands, using his arms and legs to effect this. The mother 
then completes the infant’s actions and pulls him to a sitting position.15
T he type o f information echanged between mother and infant can be seen 
more easily in this example. H ere mother and infant are communicating 
about how much force each has to exert to achieve a sitting position, and 
about when one or the other has to do the pulling. At first both mother and 
infant increase the contraction of their arm muscles and pull together. T hen  
the infant’s effort increases relative to the m other’s, after which the mother 
pulls harder, and finally the pulling of both tapers off as the infant gets into 
a sitting position.
T he information in Example 2 is in the continuously varying level of 
force intensity as a function of time, as shown in Figure 2.1. In this 
case, information about how much force to apply can be obtained from 
the kinematics of the action, that is, the time course of intensity changes. 
In the example, as the m other feels the infant begin to exert himself, she 
reduces her effort in exact proportion to his increase and as the infant’s 
effort wanes, m other compensates by pulling harder. T he result is that the 
total amount of force exerted by both of the partners is a smoothly changing 
function of time (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1 The force exerted by mother and infant in a pull-to-sit episode is 
shown as a continuously changing function of time. In this example, mother and 
infant are continuously exerting force, but the relative amount waxes and wanes in 
a co-regulated manner. Infants can perceive the self-generated contribution to the 
force when the curves diverge.
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In this book, the concept of co-regulation will refer to the dynamic 
balancing act by which a smooth social performance is created out o f the 
continuous mutual adjustments of action between partners. In co-regnlated 
communication, information is created between people in such a way that the 
information changes as the interaction unfolds. Co-regulated communication 
is created as it happens, its process and outcome is partially unpredictable.
As in the other example, neither mother nor infant knows in advance the 
precise outcome of this pulling episode. Perhaps they know that the infant will 
end up sitting, but the way in which that is to be achieved is determined in 
the process of communication. Co-regulated communication is not ritualized, 
perfunctory or over-controlled by one or the other partner. Each time the 
infant is pulled up a different dynamic balance is struck. If  on the other hand, 
the mother exerted a constant force without regard to the infant’s input, the 
interaction would be imposed on the infant who would not be a participating 
communicative partner.
Self. T he pull-to-sit example also suggests a way in which pre-verbal, 
pre-conceptual infants might experience the self. Certainly a 4-m onth-old 
infant cannot recognize herself in the mirror, nor be self-reflective, nor have 
even a rudimentary conceptual understanding of the self.16 H er sense of self 
is rooted in the body and its relationship to the surround. Infants of this age 
can easily feel their own muscular exertion in relation to the m other’s and 
they can detect their own movements in relation to their spatial location. T he 
self is not unitary, but always perceived as related to something.17
I will propose in this book that the original sense of self arises from one’s 
physical and social relationships.18 In Figure 2.1, the infant becomes aware of 
self-exertion and self-movement at the times when the two curves diverge. In 
the first segment, when m other and infant are pulling together with the same
Figure 2.2 The summation of the curves in Figure 2.1. When the forces of the 
partners are added together, the result is a smooth function of time. Thus, even 
though the individuals are changing their own activity, the dyad appears to be 
seamlessly co-regulated.
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force, the infant cannot distinguish self from other. As soon as his exertion 
exceeds that o f the mother, or falls below that o f the mother, there is a 
heightened awareness of precisely those aspects o f the interaction that are 
in his control or not in his control. In other words, the infant becomes 
aware o f self in relationship to another person, as a dialogue between self 
and other.
Looking back to the example of Paul we might presume that he and his 
mother had a co-regulated communication and that as a result Paul could 
experience the self. The ways in which Paul’s mother picked him up and 
carried him probably led to interaction dynamics such as those in the pull- 
to-sit example. Most salient for Paul, however, is the mother’s speech: not 
her words, but the changes over time in the intensity, pitch and timing of 
her speech.
Go back to Example 1 and try to read it imagining that you are talking 
to a real baby. T he speech you are thinking about probably has a lot of 
changes from low to high pitch or from loud to soft intensity. It is lilting, 
somewhat musical in parts, and abrupt and staccato in other parts. Research 
evidence suggests that infants are acutely sensitive to this type of information 
contained in speech. In the company of infants adults from all over the 
world tailor their voice to make these characteristic speech patterns, called 
‘motherese.’19
In Example 1, changes in the mother’s speech dynamics probably interfaced 
with changes in the infant’s cry dynamics -  intensity, pitch and timing -  in 
such a way that the cry was modulated at the same time that the m other’s 
voice changed. Imagine the difference between the staccato, ‘Hungry? Are 
you? W ant something to eat? No?,’ spoken while Paul was crying, and 
the more sweetly flowing, soothing sound o f ‘Look, there’s a pussycat, 
can you see him?,’ spoken while Paul was calming down and stopping 
his cry.
If this episode was co-regulated, as I suppose it might have been, the 
m other’s speech does not direcdy calm the infant. Rather, mother and 
infant mutually alter each other’s vocal dynamics in a creative, exploratory 
manner. T he infant, through such discourse dynamics, may begin to sense the 
boundaries of self-control over cry vocalizations as he perceives the sounds he 
feels him self make in relation to those he hears but does not make himself. 
In effect, he is able to use his perception of the similarity o f the m other’s 
changes in her vocalization with respect to his own as a tool for self-calming 
and self-monitoring.
E xam ple 3
I suggest that even continuously changing forms of information in communi­
cation are inherently cultural, as suggested by this final example in which a 
1 -year-old infant hands an object to the mother. Infants begin taking objects
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from their caregivers earlier in the first year, but have a harder time giving 
away the prizes that they have won. T he series of photographs in Figure 
2.3 shows Andrew, one o f the American infants that my students and I 
videotaped playing with his mother at weekly intervals since the first month 
of life. In the photos, Andrew is seen at 1 year. Note that the images were 
made with two cameras superimposed using a split-screen generator. The 
mother, who is to the right o f the infant in the right-hand portion of the 
frame, is pictured in the left-hand portion of the frame. In our collection of 
tapes, this is the first time this infant voluntarily released an object into his 
mother’s hand.
Andrew’s action has two separate motor components. First, his arm extends 
(frames 1-6) and then he releases the object (frames 7-10). In past weeks, 
Andrew has extended his arm many times toward his mother without releasing 
the object. Once Andrew’s arm is extended his hand remains relatively 
stationary and gradually opens as mother’s hand moves underneath his 
hand. T he fork gendy leaves Andrew’s hand as it is pulled only by the 
slightest contact with the m other’s moving palm.
This object release, therefore, is not entirely due to Andrew’s initiative. 
Since the child does not actually drop the object into the m other’s hand and 
the mother does not actually take hold of the object, the object transfer seems 
to be joindy constructed by both, a genuinely co-regulated activity. Thus, 
communication is present in this example in the form of shared information 
about the position of the object relative to each person’s hand and body, and 
the intensity and timing o f hand opening and closing.
Figure 2.3 First instance of a successful object transfer. (Sourer. Bloch, H. and 
Bertenthal, B. Sensory-Motor Organisations and Development in Infancy and Early 
Childhood, 1990, reprinted by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
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T he self also makes an appearance, as Andrew no doubt feels the 
differences between his own hand opening and his own movement o f the 
fork in relation to those movements of the fork for which he is not responsible. 
Indeed, the relative slowness of this sequence, lasting almost seven seconds, 
may assist Andrew in perceiving the relationship between his own and others’ 
actions. Andrew’s continuing gaze at the object after he releases it, his hand 
poised in space as if still holding on to the object, suggests that although the 
physical contact is broken the infant may perceive the object’s motion as still 
related to his own activity. This is similar to an adult’s follow through upon 
the release of a bowling ball or after hitting a golf ball.
Culture. T here  are several ways in which culture is relevant to the infant’s 
actions as seen in Example 3. T he transfer o f objects in the form of an 
offering gesture (as opposed to just grabbing the object from the infant), 
the type of object transferred, and the smile in the final frame are the most 
obvious cultural aspects o f this sequence.
In the entire sequence in Figure 2.3, the infant is for the first time showing 
a culturally accepted way o f transferring objects, that is, by signalling the offer 
with an extended arm and then letting it go when mother accepts it.20 An 
activity is cultural if the form of the action is similar enough to an accepted 
community standard that it can be recognized and interpreted by other members 
o f the community. Earlier the infant would extend his arm but not release 
the object.
T here are other aspects o f this sequence that are also cultural by this 
definition. For example, sitting in a chair at a table, remaining there for 
the entire fifteen minutes during which the videotaping took place, using 
an object that has a cultural origin (a fork), and participating in cultural play 
with an adult. We could find communities in which none o f these activities 
would be considered culturally acceptable for infants.
Another aspect of culture goes beyond the form of the action to include the 
timing o f the performance of the action with respect to other actions. From 
the perspective o f culture, it is important that Andrew smiled at a particular 
time in the sequence o f activity that a member o f the culture, the mother, can 
recognize as appropriate. T here may be many reasons why Andrew smiled at 
that moment, perhaps as an expression o f accomplishment or to return the 
m other’s smile. Some evidence from studies of the development of infant 
gesture and expression o f emotion suggest that Andrew’s smile could be 
a spontaneous action that results from an inner feeling o f completion and 
that Andrew at 1 year may not be aware o f the communicative function 
and meaning of his smile to other people.21 On the other hand, even at 
the age o f 1 year, infants smile more frequendy and with broader smiles 
in the company o f other people, suggesting that some types of smiles are 
already cultural acts.22
Regardless o f why Andrew smiled, the fact is that the smile occurred at just 
the point in this sequence when a Caucasian adult in North American society
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might expect it to happen. An activity is cultural when one does it at the ‘right’ 
time and place, regardless of whether one means it or not, or whether one even 
understands why one is doing it. Children and adults frequently participate 
in culturally accepted activities without understanding them. For example, 
children learn to sing songs even when some of the words and refrains do 
not make sense to them.
People do not need a shared understanding or a common sense of 
purpose in order to be members o f a community. However, they must 
at least share the means of communication in order to determine if their 
understanding is indeed shared. Community members can differ in their goals 
and ideas so long as they can communicate using commonly accepted means. 
Arguments and fights are typically conducted in culturally specified ways -  
wrestling, duels, debates, arguments -  and a good deal o f communication 
between parents and children involves negotiations of disagreements and 
miscommunications.
Like grammar in a language, there is a culturally acceptable sequence of 
actions, a cultural frame, that assists members of a community to recognize 
the possible meaning of another’s behavior. I f  Andrew had smiled at the 
beginning of the sequence shown in Figure 2.3, this smile might have had 
a different meaning to his m other -  a desire to play, a request for cooperation
-  than the smile that follows the sequence.
An activity is cultural i f  it is done according to a shared intensity-by-time 
contour. Culture defines how loudly or sharply a child or an adult may speak 
to each other, whether drawn-out affectionate tonal patterns are permitted 
or discouraged, and w hether adults should enter into co-regulated ‘dances’ 
with infants around particular childrearing issues.
For example, the soothing sequence in Example 1 would not have occurred 
in this way in a different community. In tribal cultures living in warm climates, 
infants are rarely physically separated from adults and they enjoy nearly 
continuous skin-to-skin contact day and night.23 For a m other in the Fore 
tribe in New Guinea24 the thought o f leaving her infant alone in a room 
(Example 1) would be as bizarre as an urban m other who remains topless 
and carries her baby around on her hip at all times, such as to work or to 
the grocery store.
It is important and culturally accepted for the W estern infant to cry loudly 
and for several minutes or more in order to attract and hold adult attention. 
T he Fore babies rarely cry because during their close physical contact with 
the adult, the slightest movements can be detected by the mother who 
acts quickly to relieve the infant. Among the Fore, and other groups with 
similar infant care patterns, loud and prolonged infant crying is not culturally 
acceptable. One does not expect to hear more than a rustle and a fussy noise 
before the infant is relieved.
In early infancy, neither the British baby in Example 1 nor the Fore baby 
have any idea that their actions are communicative. Yet, from the early weeks
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of life, the intensity-by-time contours of their crying have a culturally specific 
sound: one cries long and loud, the other does not. Not only are their actions 
contoured in culturally recognizable ways, their budding senses of self are 
different. With a heightened level o f crying, the experiences of self-movement 
and self-action are different since the W estern infant must get more aroused 
in relation to the adult than the Fore infant.
From this general perspective, infants are participants in a cultural community 
right from birth, and perhaps earlier. T he tools and devices of infant care 
(cradles, cribs, diapers and the like), what they eat or what their mothers 
eat (prenatally or postnatally if breast feeding), how and when they eat, the 
sights and sounds to which they are exposed, and the ways in which infants 
can be talked to, touched, held and smiled at: these form the culture o f early 
childcare. They are part o f the history o f the community, and by virtue of 
co-regulated communication, become incorporated into the communication 
process and the actions of the infant.
P r o p o s a ls  f o r  a r e la t io n a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  o n  in f a n t  
d e v e l o p m e n t
By way o f summarizing the points o f this chapter, I list below a num ber of 
proposals that guide my own thinking about early human development. These 
proposals will be elaborated in the remainder of this book.
Proposal 1. Culture and self can arise from spontaneous co-regulated 
communicative activity well before the individual is self-consciously cognizant 
o f culture or self. Communication, self and culture arise in the infant’s 
experiences of the body, via feeling and movement. Communication, self, 
and culture are just different ways of talking about relationships, different 
points o f view on the same phenomenon.
Proposal 2 . N o human action is acultural. Cultural frames permeate infant 
activity from before birth and hold people in their grip for the entire life 
course. T he forms o f human cultural action change developmentally. The 
cultural experience of infants is different from later childhood in part because 
o f the differences in the patterning of infant care and childcare in the same 
community.
Proposal 3. Communication has the possibility o f enhancing the perception 
o f the self. Variability across individuals in their experience of the self depends 
on the form o f their communication with others, its cultural basis and the 
extent to which it is co-regulated. Developmental changes in the sense o f self 
emerge from changes in the infant’s body and brain, changes that themselves 
arise from communication with others.
Proposal 4. Hum an developmental changes -  in the self, in action and skill, 
in communication and cognition, in motivation and emotion -  originate in the
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dynamically changing relationship between communication, self and culture. 
Human developmental change springs from social relationships and their 
cultural frames. Culture is not static any more than action or the self. Culture 
changes for us as we develop and it changes historically over generations.
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C h a p te r  3
T h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s y s t e m :  
c o - r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  f r a m i n g
T he usual m anner o f thinking about communication is in terms o f a sender 
and a receiver exchanging information in the form of signals. We know 
that communication has taken place if  the receiver changes its behavior 
following the transmission o f the signal.1 This definition also applies to 
physical communication, such as when a moving ball strikes a stationary 
one, communicating information in the form o f momentum and direction 
o f travel. T he stationary ball leaps into action following the impact.
Biological and social communication can also be described in this way. 
Communicative information travels between neurons in the central nervous 
system via chemical and electrical signals. One dog approaches or avoids 
another depending upon the position and movement o f the first dog’s tail 
and ears. People communicate information to each other via language. In 
the process, the receiver’s feelings, thoughts and behavior may change as a 
result o f that information.
M ost forms o f communication are not simply one-way transmissions. 
Typically, the sender and receiver change roles as communication proceeds. 
As a result o f striking the stationary ball, the moving ball experiences a 
reaction that changes its own speed and direction. Most biological communi­
cation occurs as a series of exchanges of signals going in both directions between 
the sender and receiver. T hus, even the simplest forms of communication 
are composed of sequences o f signals, exchanged between communicating 
partners, occurring over some determined period o f time.
But does this way of talking about communication -  in terms of senders, 
receivers, and signals -  reflect what actually transpires in a social situation? 
A glance back to the examples given in Chapter 2 suggests that the answer 
to this question would be negative.
Recall the object exchange sequence shown in Figure 2.3. At any moment 
in this interaction sequence, it seems impossible to determine who is the 
‘sender’ and who is the ‘receiver.’ In fact, the actions of both participants 
are changing continuously. And what is the ‘signal’ in this case? If  both the
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m other’s and infant’s hands are moving at the same time and the movement 
is continuous, how can we isolate segments of the movement and call them 
communication ‘signals?’2
On the other hand, information is certainly transmitted or exchanged 
between the partners since they manage to act cooperatively. T heir hands 
meet at a particular spatial location, the object is actually transferred between 
them, an act has been performed that requires the participation of both. 
Thus, information is exchanged even though we cannot clearly divide the roles 
of the partners into sender/receiver, nor can we identify any specific signals.
Senders, receivers and signals are term s that apply to discrete state 
communication systems. In such systems, the partners can be in only one of 
several clearly defined discretely different states, for example, positive and 
negative. In addition, while one partner is sending a message, the other 
must be in a state of readiness to receive the message. T he partners 
cannot both be transmitting messages at the same time. One listens while 
the other talks. Messages have information content that may change the 
behavior of the receiver, but the receiver’s change only becomes apparent 
when that individual takes the role of the sender. Exchanges of written 
communications such as letters, or formal oral communications such as 
debates, have this form.
As a participant in such forms of communication one often feels constrained. 
Why? Because there is no opportunity to give feedback to the speaker during 
the speech, no opportunity to interrupt or to nod in agreement, no opportunity 
to judge how the audience is reacting in order to be able to monitor and adjust 
your own speech.
M ost forms of social communication are continuous process communication 
systems, rather than discrete state systems. In a continuous process system 
both partners are continuously active and continuously engaged in the 
communication. T here  are opportunities to modify the actions of partners 
as they occur, without the need to wait until they are finished.
One of the founders of m odem  research on human communication was 
the anthropologist, Ray Birdwhistell. Birdwhistell was one of the first to use 
filmed records of social behavior as the basis for scientific study. Because of 
the complexity and continuously varying nature o f social interactions, films 
and videotapes have since become part o f the communication researcher’s 
basic tool kit. After thousands of hours o f tedious and difficult transcriptions 
of social behavior made from film, Birdwhistell concluded that an individual
does not originate communication; he participates in it. Communication as a 
system, then, is not to be understood on a simple model of action and 
reaction, however complexly stated. As a system, it is to be comprehended on 
the transactional level.3
In other words, when one examines communication in some detail, it is nearly 
impossible to say who initiates a communication, nor who responds to whom.
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Nevertheless, people frequently talk about social interactions as if it were 
possible to define social roles clearly and social actions as unambiguous 
signals. W hat is the meaning of a smile? From the perspective of a discrete 
state model o f smiling there are many different meanings o f a smile, each 
discretely different from the others. T here are smiles that communicate 
messages o f joy, o f achievement, o f friendliness, o f politeness, and of 
embarrassment. T he message is presumed to be in the smiler, who employs 
subtle differences in facial expression, gaze direction and body movement to 
enhance the probability of sending the message unambiguously.
We obscure our understanding of the workings of communication by 
treating smiles as discrete signals and ignoring the continuous process by 
which the smile is generated. Smiles, indeed all expressive movements, almost 
always occur in a social situation in which the partner is an active participant. 
T hat participation may contribute to the smile at the very moment when the 
smile is spreading across the person’s face. A sudden change in the partner’s 
actions could, conceivably, alter the form of this expression. For example, the 
smiler may be feeling enjoyment, begins to smile while looking toward the 
partner who at that moment appears distant or disapproving. T he enjoyment 
fades to shame.
In Sylvan Tom kins’4 theory o f emotion, he proposes such a process to 
explain the origins of certain kinds of emotional pathologies in childhood. If 
parents are consistently disapproving of the child’s spontaneous expressions 
o f enjoyment, children begin to experience shame about the very sources of 
their own pleasure. Freud uses the concept o f the superego, the internalized 
harsh parent, to explain the origins o f repressed feelings of pleasure in certain 
individuals. Both Tom kins and Freud had a discrete state model o f the 
emotions and their expression, and in their explanations o f pathology they 
envisioned a process by which discrete emotions went underground and lay 
closeted for years.
My point is that in normal situations, one’s emotions and expressions 
are not discrete entities encased in the individual, but they are socially 
constructed, dynamically created out o f the fabric o f the present.5 Pathology 
arises when individuals cannot participate in this creative dynamic process, 
which may sometimes arise in the company of a parent who refuses to be a 
co-participant. We need not assume that psychopathology is the festering of 
a repressed collection of discrete states. It is a way of acting in the present, 
a stance with respect to how open one is to the creative possibilities o f 
discourse.
It could be argued that smiles and other expressions are discrete by 
virtue o f their universality across cultures and because they are immediately 
recognizable as meaningful configurations of facial action. On closer analysis, 
however, the apparent discreteness o f the smile is actually a perceptual 
illusion. A smile reflects the action of at least four different facial muscles 
in the lower and middle part o f the face and the corresponding actions of the
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eyes, head and body. Although the contractions of these muscles are relatively 
rapid and mutually coordinated, muscles do not contract instantaneously. 
T he smile must be assembled from its parts as a continuous process of 
movement, even though we perceive it as a fully formed discrete package.
In order to understand how infants become communicators using culturally 
recognized actions that are interpreted by others as discrete signals, it will 
be important throughout this book to focus attention on the continuous 
aspects of social action. This is because infant communication is at first 
entirely within the realm of continuous processes. Later, infants acquire 
the skill to mold the form of these actions to resemble the categorical units 
of cultural communication. Adults are highly skilled at shaping the contours 
of their speech and non-verbal actions into forms that are culturally clear; 
nevertheless, words and gestures are composed out of continuous action 
processes.
M utual social coordination requires that there be a continuous unfolding 
of individual action that is susceptible to being continuously modified by the 
continuously changing actions of the partner. I call this continuous mutual 
adaptation process co-regulation.6 T he systematic description of co-regulation 
and its role in the formation of social relationships and developmental change 
is complicated, in fact it takes up most of this book. Actually entering into co­
regulated communication with a partner is so easy that newborn human infants 
are capable of doing it, and it is commonly observed in many animal species.
C o -r e g u la t io n
E xam ples of co -reg u la ted  com m u n ica tio n  p rocesses
One of my favorite examples of co-regulated communication comes from the 
work of Greg M oran and his colleagues7 on patterns of ritualized fighting 
between adult wolves. T he wolves enter into a repeatable pattern of co­
regulated action of the sort shown in Figure 3.1. In this pattern, called 
circling, one wolf walks past another seated wolf who gets up and begins 
to move in the opposite direction. Instead of walking past and away from 
each other, the wolves begin to move in a head-to-tail circle pattern.
If we look at the wolves from above, and if we rotate at the same speed 
the wolves are walking, we would see two animals who maintain a constant 
distance from each other, and mirror-image body shapes curved so that each 
wolf seems to be following the other’s tail.
T he circling is a wonderful example of the impossibility of determining 
who is the sender or receiver, or o f isolating a signal. Furtherm ore, the 
wolves are not immobile, they are constantly moving. Thus, the circular 
configuration is a dynamically created co-regulated system. T h e  wolves don’t 
have to plan this out, they don’t have to say to each other, ‘let’s make a
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Figure 3.1 The initiation and conclusion of a pattern of wolf-circling. In the first 
frame, one wolf passes close to a seated wolf. In the second frame, they turn 
their heads towards each other, after which the seated wolf begins to move in the 
opposite direction. By the fourth frame, the wolves are circling. They break out of 
the pattern only when the distance between them is safe enough to preclude any 
sudden attack. (Source: Moran, G. el al ‘A description of relational patterns of 
movement during “ritualized fighting” in wolves’, in Animal Behaviour, 1981, 29, 4, 
reprinted by permission of Academic Press Inc. (London) Ltd. and the authors.)
circle.’ N or does each wolf have to have encoded procedures in its brain 
for circling around with another wolf. N or would it be correct to say that the 
pattern is created because the wolves are copying each other. T he pattern is 
a consensual, negotiated system of action.
This co-regulated pattern emerges from the dynamics of the interaction 
and the constraints on the communication system. What are the constraints? 
Probably each wolf needs to be moving to maintain optimal readiness to 
attack and to respond to attack. Each must keep the other fully in view, and 
without turning its broadside or back toward the mouth o f the attacker. In 
addition to these constraints imposed by the potential threat o f aggression, 
the shape and flexibility o f each animal’s body (long from head to tail, 
four-legged, bendable, eyes on the side o f the head rather than in front, 
teeth used as main weapon of initial attack), it is not hard to see how a circling 
pattern could emerge spontaneously and without any planning or design.8
Adam Kendon observed a similar kind of pattern among humans. When 
any group o f standing individuals orient themselves toward each other for 
the purpose of engaging in a conversation, the group tends to form a circle 
pattern with individuals facing toward the center. Kendon calls this the F - 
formation, and suggests that it emerges spontaneously as participants create 
‘an orientational relationship in which the space between them is one to
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which they have equal, direct, and exclusive access.’9 T he F-formation is 
dynamic since individuals continuously move: they shift their heads and 
postures, they may change places, the entire configuration may rotate or 
reassemble in different locations.
Thus, co-regulated interactions are continuous processes, created out of 
the dynamics of action, the results o f which are emergent, that is, occurring 
without an explicit plan, without a scheme or program inside each animal’s 
nervous system that guides the action. T he circling pattern emerges from the 
dynamic interactions of the partners with respect to the constraints within 
the system. It is impossible to understand how such patterns emerge by only 
considering the goals of the participants. We have to allow for the shape of 
their bodies and the kinds of actions their bodies are capable of perform ing.10 
If we want to understand continuous communication processes and their 
development we m ust place the body at center stage in psychological inquiry.
We must also place creativity at center stage since the most salient aspect 
of co-regulated interchange is the emergence of something novel, something 
that was not there before. According to Ernest Schachtel,
The quality of the encounter that leads to creative experience consists primarily 
in the openness during the encounter and in the repeated and varied approach to 
the object, in the free and open play of attention, thought, feeling, perception, etc. 
. . .  In characterizing this activity as play I do not mean that it is playful rather than 
serious, but that it is not bound by rigorous rules or by conventional schemata of 
memory, thought or perception.11
Thus, creativity is characterized by a stance of openness to the partner, a 
willingness to allow events to unfold and to be shaped by the process.
W olf-circling is one example of a more general pattern of animal threat 
displays. In potentially aggressive situations, most animals show a threat 
display as opposed to immediately fleeing or actually engaging in a fight. 
Ethologist Robert H inde12 raised the question of why animals might threaten 
before attacking. If  an animal is concerned about the risk of injury or worse, 
why not turn and run? O n the other hand, if the animal intends to defend 
an offspring or some territory, the best strategy may be to attack immediately, 
depriving the opponent of the opportunity to defend the attack.
H inde concluded that threat displays, like the vigilance seen in the circling 
wolves, were ways of assessing the intentions of the rival. Once the threat 
posture begins the animals enter into a co-regulated interaction in which each 
individual sizes up the other, creating the conditions for a mutual withdrawal 
of hostilities or, for that matter, their escalation. It turns out, however, that 
after such interactions the probability o f withdrawal is much higher than the 
probability of a fight. Thus, although the animal’s initial posture suggests an 
internal state of fear or the intention to stand ground,
such signals are thus to be seen as involving negotiation with the rival as well 
as expression of an internal state. The term negotiation does not necessarily
imply manipulation but emphasizes the continuous interaction between the two 
individuals involved.13
Indeed, negotiation is closer to creativity, an openness to being co-regulated 
in the encounter, than to manipulation.
Human teasing is similar to ritualized fighting in wolves. For example, 
African-American male teenagers have been observed to exchange ritual 
insults, like ‘Your mother eats dog food.’ These insults typically do not 
lead to a fight, but rather to continued trading o f insults and laughter. 
This happens in part because the insult has both a playful aspect as well 
as a serious or personal aspect. Both parties know that the statement is 
in the form of an insult, but both also realize that it is not true.14 O ther 
forms o f teasing have more of a sting o f truth in them. In these cases, the 
playfulness o f the tease is largely determined by the reactions o f the recipient. 
W hether the participants go on to trade teases and smiles, or whether the 
conversation ends in annoyance and rejection depends on a co-regulated 
mutual negotiation process regarding the meaning o f the teasing.15
Interactions do not have to be aggressive to involve co-regulated negotiations. 
Research on human courtship interactions has revealed a rich array of verbal 
and non-verbal negotiation strategies. These include glances, nods, leans 
toward partner, invitations, stroking the hair, looking ‘sexy,’ coy smiling and 
the like.16 They are displayed in order to assess the partner’s interest and 
intentions; they convey one’s interest, but not necessarily commitment. In 
other words, these gestures are used for the purpose o f co-regulation.
Once a degree o f intimacy is established, negotiations continue to be 
salient in the regulation o f courtship interactions. This is illustrated by Adam 
K endon’s study of non-verbal interaction during a kissing episode between a 
male and female sitting on a park bench. In the following description, M = 
male, F  =  female, and Fa B =  a facial expression involving a smile with 
mouth closed.
it can be seen that each time M kisses F, M waits before finally approaching 
her until she shows Fa B, as if the appearance of Fa B is the signal that 
gives M clearance for his final approach. Whenever M kisses F, he always 
proceeds in two steps: he turns to face F and then approaches her. On each 
occasion . . .  M does not begin his approach until after F has shown Fa B 
. . .  M turns to F and remains still, F part-tums to M with parted lips. Her lips 
then close to produce Fa B and only when she has completed this does M begin 
his approach.17
In this example, the male makes a move toward the female and then waits 
until the female’s face changes from lips parted to closed smile before 
proceeding. O f course, the female in this example also waits until the male 
has completed the first part of the approach before changing her facial 
expressions. Thus, each partner’s actions are continuously regulated by the 
actions o f the other partner.
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O ther research on adult communication shows that partners mold their 
communication to each other in very flexible ways. Figure 3.2 shows a 
representation of a small segment of conversation between a doctor and a 
patient.18 T he solid lines represent gazing at the partner. T he patient begins 
a sentence, during which the doctor looks down at something he is reading. 
T he patient elongates the next word (errr), becomes silent, and shifts his 
posture. Finally the doctor looks at the patient who resumes the sentence 
with the same word, again drawn out (herrr). T he reshaping of the word 
‘her,’ the silence and the posture shift are all ways of capturing the listener’s 
attention, of assuring co-regulation.
It is as if words and sentences can be shaped like clay around the contours 
of the social situation, as if they are genuinely creative actions. If words were 
mere signals containing discrete units o f information, this would not be possible 
or even necessary. In Figure 3.2, the word ‘her’ has a certain culturally prescribed 
meaning. Because ‘her’ or any other word is composed of continuous movements 
of the mouth, throat and tongue, the person talking is free to alter the intensity- 
by-time contour of the sound, and does this as a means of co-regulating with 
the social partner. Thus, even in a rather ritualized doctor-patient discussion, 
there is room for a great deal o f creative variation. Once again we see that the 
dynamics and constraints o f the body are crucial ingredients in understanding 
the workings of communication in everyday situations.
In ordinary conversations we don’t notice or think about the fact that speech 
is constructed dynamically out o f movements o f the body. We hear words and












Figure 3.2 Stretching out a word, pausing and posture shifting are devices used 
here to attract the listener’s attention. These devices depend on the speaker’s 
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translate them into particular meanings. However, speakers routinely use their 
bodies to vary the dynamics of speaking to achieve communicative goals, such 
as waiting for the partner to look or listen, adding emphasis or emotion, or 
changing the communicative function o f the word or phrase. If ‘her’ is said 
with a rising intonation, the speaker seems to be asking a question. If it is 
said with a flat intonation, the speaker appears to be giving an answer or 
making a statement. In any case, co-regulated communication rests on the 
communicator’s freedom to manipulate creatively the dynamic aspects o f their 
actions with respect to the continuous changes in the partner’s action.
These dynamics, which typify communication between partners o f similar 
age and status, also occur during tutorial interactions in which a more skilled 
individual is working to educate another. According to Barbara Rogoff,19 
adult guides must tailor their actions to those o f children and they do so 
by picking up on subde cues about the child’s attention and skill. Such cues 
include pausing and hesitation, glances, postural adjustments, and missed 
opportunities for taking a turn. Children also use adult non-verbal actions
-  nods, head shakes or hesitations -  to gauge their own performance.
A similar process o f mutual coordination is observed in successful animal 
training. According to Vicki H earne20 the most trainable animals, such as 
dogs and horses, are particularly good at reading human non-verbal actions 
to detect signs of pleasure or displeasure, approval or rejection, seriousness 
or ambivalence. T he best trainers can detect subde shades of meaning in the 
animal’s movements. In order for training to work, a mutual understanding 
must arise between the animal and the trainer. Not only does the trainer 
have to recognize when animals are trying to mean something, but they 
have to take the animal seriously and enter into discourse on the animal’s 
terms. In both tutoring and training, the essential ingredient for success is a 
co-regulated communication in which each partner is open to be influenced 
by the other. T o  be influenced by another is to take the other seriously, to 
respect the mutual influence as a pact o f agreement, and to recognize and 
reward the other’s contribution to the creative evolution o f the relationship.21
D efin in g  co -regu la tion
Co-regulation is a social process by which individuals dynamically alter their actions 
with respect to the ongoing and anticipated actions o f  their partners. During co­
regulated discourse the individual’s actions are emergent from the constraints 
imposed by their own body (its shape, size and possibilities for movement), by 
their expectations, by the actions of the partner, and by the cultural setting.
As a consequence of co-regulated interaction, a consensual social pattern 
is created and elaborated over time. Co-regulated patterns are recognized by 
their repetition and their coherence over time. A social game like peek-a-boo 
is recognizable by its repeating theme of hiding and revelation. T he game has 
a coherence because of the preferred order in which the events occur: hiding
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is typically followed by revelation. Nevertheless, the game is also creative 
because it is being continuously elaborated by the participants. Partners 
change roles either by being the one who hides or the audience. A person 
can cover their own face with an object or they can cover the partner’s face. 
T he timing of the hiding and revealing changes subdy from turn to turn. 
Sometimes one lingers behind the hiding object, and at other times jumps 
out immediately. Changes are made in where one appears: from over the top 
o f the object, from the side, or from underneath. Each o f these variants on 
the game can be combined creatively so that the partner is never totally sure 
when, where and how the hider will emerge.
This creative variability within a patterned, ordered theme accounts for 
the heightened attention and enjoyment of the game.22 T he part o f the 
game that is consensually patterned also explains how partners can adapt 
their behavior to the anticipated actions o f the partner, even though those 
actions may be novel. I might vary the time or the place o f revelation in 
part because my partner is currently looking at me, and in part because I 
anticipate my partner’s laughter and continued participation in the game.
Co-regulated processes are emergent from the constraints on individual action. 
Co-regulated processes exhibit patterning and ordering. Such regularities 
suggest that there are underlying rules that individuals are following in the 
execution o f their actions. I take the controversial view that the rules of the 
game are not really there, not really guiding the behavior. Rules are inferred 
by observers, they are convenient metaphors that help us describe or label 
the regularities. Once a rule is inferred by a participant, it may serve as 
one component o f the system that guides action, but it is never the only 
explanation.
I can illustrate my view with a quote from a book chapter on social play 
that I wrote with colleagues Eva Nwokah and Jeanne Kams.
So long as we think of play in the abstract, as the ideal expression of its ‘rules,’ 
there can be little to contradict this notion. However, when one observes real 
individuals playing -  in any species in which play occurs -  the subtle variability 
and emergent creativity leap out almost in mockery of the supposed rules of the 
game. An entire game may contain several successive subroutines each with new 
elements added, or the content of a person’s turn suddenly changed. Do we 
have to have rules for strategies, and rules for breaking the rules, and rules 
for repairing the rules that were broken? Do we have to include rules to manage 
the emotional and linguistic forms of communication in which play is embedded, 
and all the rules by which these intrapsychic factors interact with the play of the 
game? Try writing down all the rules that would be necessary to play a game of 
checkers with a ten-year-old: for the game itself, for the banter, for the friendly 
advice about strategy, for the one-upmanship and protecting against it, and for 
processing the range of emotions during and after the game . . .
We are not denying that individuals can cognitively represent games and their 
apparent rules. Anticipation based on prior expectations is certainly part of 
the enjoyment and engagement. The existence of such cognitions, though a
component of the play, does not mean that those cognitions are constitutive of 
the game, any more than a coach’s game plan and score card and each player’s 
knowledge of the ‘rules’ regulates the specifics of the encounter between two 
opposing teams.23
T o  focus only on the apparent ‘rules’ as an explanation of consensual activity 
means limiting one’s view to the regularities of the sequence, ignoring the 
variability. It also suggests that the rules are reified and exist independent 
of action and are merely being followed by the participants. A complete 
understanding of communication and its development requires us to keep 
in mind both the regularities and variabilities. It is the continuously changing 
features o f action, the dynamics of action in the social situation, that hold 
the key to understanding how we can connect so gracefully with another 
individual, and how infants develop such abilities.
T he concept o f co-regulation has been used so far to describe the process 
o f mutual negotiation and the emergence o f consensual agreement. T he 
patterns o f consensual agreement are called consensual frames. Consensual 
frames must exist even before partners can actually engage in a focused 
communication about something. They have to arrange themselves in such 
a way as to take best advantage of the information derived from the 
communication process.
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C o n s e n s u a l  f r a m e s
W ebster’s unabridged dictionary gives several meanings of the verb to frame 
that are particularly relevant to the communication process:
(1) To shape, to fashion, to construct; to fit and unite together the several parts 
of (to frame a constitution, to frame a building); (2) To compose, to invent, to 
put into words (For thou art framed of the firm truth of valour. -  Shak.); (3) 
to utter (his lips framed the words); (4) to shape, to fit, to regulate (the law was 
framed to equalize the tax burden); (5) to surround or provide with a border, as 
a picture.24
In this case there is no need to frame a new word, since in ordinary English, 
as well as in communication research, frame has a precise meaning and 
refers to a well-known aspect of the communication process: the need 
for communicators to establish a working definition o f the communication 
situation. A frame is a co-regulated consensual agreement about the scope of 
the discourse: its location, its setting, the acts that are taken to be significant 
vs. those that are irrelevant, and the main focus or topic.25
T he concept of frame combines its ordinary language sense o f a border, 
with its ordinary sense of creation and regulation. Frames are mutual 
agreements about the limits of what is to be communicated between partners,
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about when and how interactions take place and for how long. Frames 
establish that some actions are to be taken as communicative, while others 
are less important. Frames also regulate the main topic of discourse; ‘Social 
frameworks provide background understanding for events.’26
T he notion of frame was first employed by the anthropologist Gregory 
Bateson27 to describe how individuals let each other know how their actions 
are to be taken. W hen two children or two young animals play at fighting, 
their actions look very much like those used in actual fights: raised fists, 
yells, screams, bites and the like. W hen examined more closely, these actions 
stop short of actual harm to the partner. In hum an children, the actions 
are accompanied by smiles and laughs. These gestures of enjoyment, and 
the abbreviated forms of the fighting gestures, reveal a mutual agreement 
with the partner that ‘this is pretend,’ ‘this is play, not real.’ Framing is a 
meta-communication; a communication about the way the communication is 
to occur.28 T he consensual frame, therefore, is subject to the same process 
of co-regulation as negotiations around the main topic.
W hen frames are being negotiated, they become the main topic of 
discourse. Suppose a preschool child is engaged in solitary play in a 
classroom area devoted to free play. Another child wishes to invite the 
first to play together. T he other child might say, ‘L et’s play house.’ For 
the first child to accept the invitation, the two have to agree that this is 
what they want to play. T hen  they have to decide together where this will 
be done, in what part o f the room. They must agree on what objects will 
‘count’ as part of the play, on what roles each one has in the play, and on 
whether to let other children join in.
Two adult friends decide to get together for conversation. W here will they 
meet? At what time? For lunch or a tennis match? Once they get together, 
further framing must occur. W hat is permissible to discuss? Can they talk 
to each other about problems at work or at home? Do they only talk of 
their achievements and successes? Can they talk about serious things or 
only humorous stories? Framing, like the ensuing discussion, is consensual 
and co-regulated. Even if  one takes the lead, sets the tone, is more directive 
than the other, the partner assents to these conditions in some m anner.29
Constituents of frames
Adam Kendon has specified a num ber of factors that typically constitute 
communicative frames in face-to-face interaction.30 These include attention 
direction, spatial location, postural orientation, and topic. Participants must 
achieve a consensus about some or all o f these factors before further 
communication can occur.
Attention Direction. We must first recognize that communication between 
individuals in live encounters (ignoring for the moment electronic commu­
nication, letters, voice-only communication and the like) can be extremely
complex. T here are a large num ber o f features that can be taken as 
communicative, not only actions but features of appearance such as clothing, 
grooming, respiration, intestinal noises, skin color, body secretions and 
odors.31
W hen two people m eet for the purpose of interacting, how do they know 
that the communication is about the content o f their speech and not about 
whether one’s tie is straight, w hether one has a nervous tic or some other 
distracting mannerism? W hen toddlers speak they mispronounce words, are 
poor articulators, and are unable to use adult grammatical constructions. 
Yet, in thousands o f hours o f observation done in many countries by many 
investigators, it is rare to hear a parent correcting a toddler’s speech or 
refusing to continue on the topic until the toddler gets it right. Instead of 
attending to errors, adults seem to respond to the apparent meaning of the 
child’s utterance. They interpret the child’s meaning using their knowledge 
of this child and the particular context in which the utterance occurs.32
In some way the parent and child have a consensual agreement that the 
focus of mutual attention is the referent, not the form, o f the utterance. 
Because communication is inherently multidimensional, participants must 
frame attention direction, agreeing to attend to some features and not to 
others.
Spatial Location. Agreement about the location of an interaction is essential, 
since the quality of a face-to-face interaction changes depending on the 
distance between partners and the physical setting. T o  begin an intimate 
encounter with someone, we would seek a quiet and private location. Level 
of intimacy' can also be adjusted according to the distance between people 
and the amount of physical contact that is permitted.33
Postural orientation. We can stand, sit, recline or lie. We can face each other, 
our bodies can be oriented in an ‘L ’ configuration, back-to-back or side-by-side. 
There are also different degrees of postural co-orientation. The orientation of 
the trunk is most salient, the upper body next, and then the head. If I sit facing 
you my upper body and/or head can also be facing you or be turned partially 
away. Each configuration has a different communicative significance.34
Sigfried Frey and his colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for Psychiatry 
in M unich, Germany asked people to rate their feelings toward the painting 
La Giaconda, otherwise known as ‘M ona Lisa,’ painted by Leonardo da Vinci 
in 1507. People were given a list of adjectives (sympathetic, dreamy, proud, 
cheerful, arrogant, honest, naive, etc.) and rated their feeling toward the 
original painting, as well as toward a picture of the painting in which the 
head was altered slightly to the left, away from her direction of gaze, and 
one oriented more to the right, toward her direction of gaze. W hen the 
famous lady had her head oriented toward the viewer and in the direction 
o f her gaze, she was rated as dreamy, friendly, sensitive, involved, honest and 
inviting. W hen she was oriented away from the viewer she was called proud, 
tense, unsympathetic, arrogant, cold and detached.35
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Research by Kendon and Ferber36 shows that during a greeting sequence, 
individuals move through a series o f head orientation changes: up, down, 
away and toward the other person. Each movement o f the head reflects a 
different phase in the process of framing what kind of interaction will take 
place during and after the greeting.
Posture of the body and head in adults can communicate a wide variety of 
information related to framing an interaction. For example, dominant males 
in US high schools hold their bodies in a more erect posture than less 
dominant males.37 During psychotherapy sessions, a higher rapport between 
client and therapist is associated with a higher incidence o f leaning the upper 
bodies towards each other and holding the limbs in mirror image postures, 
and similar results have been found in experimental situations between both 
friends and non-friends.38
Topic. This refers to establishing a mutual focus on a topic, independent 
o f the elaboration of the topic that we have discussed in earlier examples 
of co-regulation. An example of topic framing is given in Figure 3.2, in 
which the patient draws out his speech and adjusts his posture to assure 
the doctor’s continued attention to the topic of discourse. T he postural 
and pausing devices are attempts to co-regulate the frame of the discourse. 
Listeners can also contribute to topic frames by indicating their continued 
participation and attention to the speaker using back channel communications 
such as gazing, nodding, saying ‘yeah,’ or ‘uh-hum .’39
C o-reg u la ted  fram in g  p rocesses
When beginning any interaction the negotiation o f a frame is required. 
Yet how can two people co-regulate consensus about a frame even before 
interacting together to achieve it? H ere’s how Kendon states the problem:
P  is in something of a bind. He cannot formulate a line of action unless he knows 
how Q, will take it. Yet he cannot know how Q  will take any line of action he may 
produce, except by seeing how Q  is indeed taking his line of action.40
In other words, someone has to make the opening move and there are always 
some risks involved in doing so: risks in whether the discourse will occur, in 
when and how, and about what.
T he problems are similar to those in the co-regulation during the main 
discourse topic itself, except for the fact that a different dynamic may be 
needed to get things started than to keep things going. One resolution of the 
problem is easy: partners may rely on a cultural system and a history within 
their relationship to establish the bounds of discourse. One simply uses the 
cultural frame for how to, say, approach a teacher or ask someone for a date. 
O r, one relies on expectations built up with a particular partner. Even here, 
however, the cultural frame is only one component of the system. How does 
it apply to this person with whom I want to interact? Even within established
relationships not everything is worked out, and each new encounter calls for 
some risks, some guesswork.
In these situations, individuals often lead by making movements that 
partially announce their intention, but not entirely. For example, in trying 
to leave a party one might finish a drink, button a jacket, make small moves 
in the direction o f the door, talk about fatigue or the like. One hopes that 
the host will pick up on these cues and enter into a frame appropriate for 
departing. O n the other hand, none of these moves by themselves clearly 
announce the intention to leave, so the actor is open to establishing frames 
for continued conversation if  that is what the host seems to desire. In other 
words, by varying the explicitness of the action, one opens it to co-regulated 
negotiation about the new frame.41
S h ared  ac tiv ity  o r co n sen su a l fram ing?
In the sense that frames are consensual agreements about some feature of 
the communication process, they can be described as shared between the 
participants. K endon’s concept o f framing is related primarily to the actions 
o f the partners, to what is needed to establish a communicative discourse. 
In order to communicate, at a minimum individuals need to share at least 
the means o f communication in a shared space and with a shared focus of 
attention. Individuals could also share a good deal more than the means of 
communication.
T here are several problems from my point o f view with a description of 
communication as made up of episodes of shared activity. T he term ‘shared’ 
suggests that each individual has a fixed representation of something that can 
be communicated to and expected by another person.42 I argue in Chapter 8 
that fixed representations are terms in discrete state models o f cognition, and 
that they lead to assumptions o f a discrete state model of communication by 
which these discrete cognitions are transmitted as messages. I prefer the term 
‘consensual frames,’ because it implies a negotiated and dynamic process in 
which whatever is shared is earned through co-regulation. Jerom e Bruner 
uses the term ‘format’ in the same way as I use consensual frame, that is, 
a social patterning that results from a negotiated co-construction.
Chapter 8 also elaborates a perspective in which cognitions like intentions, 
memories and meanings are active and creative processes. Often they are 
created through co-regulated negotiations with others and are formed in the 
very process by which they are communicated. I further suggest, therefore, 
that intention, memory and meaning are inevitably inherent in all forms of 
interpersonal communication, even between a parent and a very young infant. 
Although the intentions, memories and meanings become developmentally 
more complex and expressed increasingly through cultural communication 
frames, these mature forms o f sharing evolve out o f more rudimentary 
cognitive precursors present from the very beginning.
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In this book, I intend to demonstrate that consensual frames partake of 
complex perceptual and cognitive processes from the beginning o f human life 
and in most forms o f communication in and between other animal species: 
every time there is co-regulation it must involve an intention, a memory and 
a meaning. I will not trace how the communication system develops over the 
course of human infancy because this could easily take up another volume. 
Rather, I offer a set o f theoretical constructs and a model of communication 
from which a more precise picture of human development could be drawn, one 
that may guide future research at the interface of the individual and society.43
In summary, communication is a complex system in which multiple processes 
of co-regulation are required. T o  become an effective communicator in a 
culture, the child must acquire the skills not only to use the conventional 
gestures and symbols in meaningful ways, but also to establish or to 
break frames for communication. Although this level of complexity of 
communication is not typically considered in infant studies because infants 
are believed to be naive to these processes, I contend that we must consider 
the whole communication system o f which the infant is a member in order 
to understand the acquisition o f self and culture.
T he essence of communication, in my view, is mutual creativity. It is from 
creativity in communication that we inherit creativity in personal action. 
Communication that is co-regulated occurs when both partners feel free 
to contribute to the process and when each respects the other’s right to do 
so. W hen we are focusing on the regularities o f communication, packaging 
actions into discrete units, formulating the supposed rules of discourse, or 
ignoring variability and playful creativity, we miss the core o f the process and 
the excitement that keeps us involved.
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C h a p te r  4
T h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s y s t e m :  
h i s t o r y  a n d  m e t a p h o r
T he place is Paris, on the evening o f the debut of Igor Stravinski’s ballet, 
Le Sacre du printemps (The Rites o f Spring) on 29 May 1913 at the 
newly constructed Theatre des Champs-Elysees. T he French audience was 
genuinely aroused by the anticipation of seeing this exotic ballet, composed, 
choreographed and staged by Russians.
Many in the audience were exceptionally elegant that evening as they arrived for 
the 8:45 curtain. All were excited. For weeks rumors had circulated about the 
artistic delights that the Russian ballet company had prepared for the new Paris 
season. Advance publicity talked of the ‘real art,’ the ‘true art,’ an an not confined 
by space and time. . .
Regardless of attire, the audience on that opening night played, as Cocteau 
noted, ‘the role that was written for it.’ And what was that role? To be scandalized, 
of course, but equally, to scandalize. The brouhaha surrounding Le Sacre was to 
be as much in the reactions of the members of the audience to their fellows as 
in the work itself. The dancers on stage must have wondered at times who was 
performing and who was the audience.1
The half-naked dancers, the frenzied movements, the dissonant and disturbing 
music, carried the audience into an emotional battle between excitement and 
fear, pleasure and disgust. Insults were exchanged, not just hurled at the 
performers, but between members o f the audience. T here were reports of 
duels arranged, and fist fights.
The boisterous evening rightly stands as a symbol of its era and as a landmark of 
this century . . .  that opening of Le Sacre represents a milestone in the development 
of ‘modernism,’ modernism as above all a culture of the sensational event, through 
which art and life both become a matter of energy and are fused as one.2
Within months of this performance World W ar I would blacken the fields and 
destroy the evidences of a great physical culture all across Europe. Homes, 
churches, offices and museums containing countless historical treasures were 
obliterated. With them went the view o f the world as a collection of essences
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o f pure forms, of art and beauty as self-contained, of monarchs having the 
right to rule, of people having fixed horizons and paths in life preordained 
by heredity.
S y s t e m s  a n d  in t e r d e p e n d e n c e
M o d e rn ism  a n d  th e  id e a  o f in te rd e p e n d e n ce  in  W este rn  th o u g h t
T he first two decades o f the twentieth century shook political practice and 
hum an consciousness to their foundations. N ear the end of the nineteenth 
century, the political world of kings and popes, dynasties and empires -  where 
power was passed on by heredity and divine succession -  was continuing 
to give way to the right of individuals to govern themselves. Centralized 
leadership, passed on by heredity, was yielding in national cataclysms3 to a 
more distributed and representative system of government in a process that 
began in the eighteenth century and continues today through the breakdown 
of the Soviet empire.
T he New World O rder of this century’s final decade is an elaboration and 
extension of this continuing revolution in world governance. Having lost faith 
in the institutions that seemed as immutable as the rocks and the air, people 
were forced to define themselves. W here before the primary relationships 
were between a person and a central authority (God, religious leader, political 
leader) people’s relationships to each other took on greater importance.4 
Part of this change is reflected in the scholarly studies in psychology and 
philosophy,5 in literature and arts, of this time.6
A change also occurred for the common people of W estern Europe and 
N orth America. In the battlefields, the scope of killing was unprecedented. 
For whom should one fight and die in the cold mud of the Belgian winter? 
Letters home from men suffering the horrors of trench warfare on the fronts 
of World W ar I revealed a retreat from the intolerable into the personal, a 
recognition that to obey blindly meant suffering or death. T here seemed 
to be a liberation of the self, an affirmation that personal meaning is all 
we have in a decaying world, and paradoxically a commitment to enter 
into the social stream and as an individual to take part in the shaping of 
history.7
T he legacy of the early twentieth century for the W estern world was the 
G reat War. It was the dictatorial embodiment o f German philosopher Karl 
M arx’s spirit of community in the Russian and later Chinese communist 
revolutions. At the same time in the West, this century saw the rise of the 
belief that freedom and wealth could be had by all. It heralded a century 
remarkable for its elevation of the self above all, the self to the point of 
violence, and at the same time remarkable for the rise of communist ideals 
intended to span the globe.
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W ithout recounting the successes and failures of this revolution, it seems 
important to place the progenitors o f our current view of human development 
into this historical context.8 T he idea o f human interdependence, o f social 
relativity, o f people and their products as individuals who construct the social 
order, o f freedom from hereditary predestination and from the constraints 
of centralized leadership, cannot be traced to a single individual but to a 
socio-historical process that shaped the character o f W estern science and 
thought.
P rin c ip les  o f system s th in k in g
Although American politicians have painted it otherwise, both capitalism and 
communism in the twentieth-century flow from the same socio-historical 
spring and share similar ideas. While communism was more oriented to 
community values and capitalism to the self, both of these political and 
economic philosophies are founded on the notion of the interdependence 
o f members o f a social and economic system. T he Soviet Union and the 
W est borrowed from each other, and were shaped in fundamental ways by 
a co-regulated discourse of international proportions. M odern capitalism was 
defined in part as a reaction to communism, and vice versa.
T he concept o f system is the main intellectual advance common to these 
political philosophies, and the central contribution of twentieth-century' 
thinking.9 This intellectual change arose from the Cartesian and later 
Enlightenment eras in which scientists and philosophers believed that they 
could reduce things to their elementary constituents and describe the world 
in terms of its objective reality. During this period in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries the notion of the responsible individual, o f the self 
created and independent from a divine being, was bom  as Descartes’ cogito 
(I think), Rousseau’s journey into self-discovery with Emile and John Locke’s 
rational citizen, self-constructed from a tabula rasa. T hese philosophical and 
literary ideas were accompanied by a science which had the goal o f making 
entirely objective measurements and discovering universal laws that governed 
all o f nature.10
Thinkers in the era o f scientific objectivity rejected the notion o f divine 
control over human affairs and seemed to set the individual free from a life 
o f dependency and obligation. T he revolution that brought about systems 
thinking placed the now godless individual back into a context, this time a 
secular context o f other humans and their cultural inventions. This revolution 
actually began in the m id-nineteenth century along a number o f different 
scholarly fronts.
T he dialectical process of Hegel and Marx suggests that change emerges 
from the transaction between opposing forces, the outcome of which cannot 
be set in advance. T he global explorers who emerged from the hubris of 
individual conquest and self-fulfilment dragged nineteenth-century scientists
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in their wakes across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, scientists who brought 
back an emerging view of a world of interdependent relationships.11 On 
his voyages to the Pacific, Darwin saw' that species evolved, not by some 
divine plan, but rather by their transactions with the local context o f their 
environmental niche. Ernst Haeckel, a German disciple o f Darwin, coined 
the term ecology, the ‘science o f the relations of living organisms to the 
external world.’ Alexander von Humboldt from Europe and John Wesley 
Powell from America were among the first to see the western United States 
as a vast ecology, dependent upon the subtle balance of earth, wind and water 
and not amenable to unhindered growth. They were a stark contrast to the 
developers and exploiters o f the arid lands east of the Mississippi River.12
Somewhat later, in the early decades of the twentieth century, Einstein’s 
theory of relativity is founded on the view that the observer does not have 
a privileged position, that the world looks and acts difTerendy depending on 
where one is standing, on the context of events. Pavlov construed behavior as 
having inexorable links to the situation in which it occurred. Freud explained 
psychopathology as emerging from the transactions between parent and 
child during development, and not necessarily due to the influence o f a 
‘poor family,’ a nineteenth-century euphemism for a belief in the genetic 
determinism of poverty' and wealth, sickness and health, unruliness and 
m anners.13 T he science of ecology arose in its m odem  form out of the 
drought of the American Dust Bowl of the 1930s.14
In the first half o f the twentieth century many insights such as these from 
the sciences of biology, physics and psychology were codified into what has 
come to be called General Systems Theory. Some of the basic principles of 
systems theory are: complexity, organization, self-stability, equifinality, and 
hierarchy.15
Systems are complex, that is, they contain many parts, each o f which may be 
different. T he difference between a collection of parts and a system is that 
in the latter each o f the parts bears some relationship to at least some of the 
other parts. Parts, in other words, are not independent o f each other. Parts 
could be people in a society who are each different and who have a unique 
set o f relationships to other members o f the society. Changes in any single 
part o f a system will create corresponding changes in other related parts of the 
system.
Systems are organized in the sense that the behavior of the system as a whole 
can be described in its own terms, terms that may not apply to the descriptions 
of the parts and their relationships. We can talk about phenomena that apply 
to the organization of a whole society, such as capitalism or communism. A 
society as a whole can tend toward capitalism regardless o f whether some 
individuals in that society' live in communes while others in that society 
acquire great wealth. Out of a large number of everyday transactions, a social 
order can emerge. In other words, systems can be described by their collective 
behavior, independent o f the relationships between their component parts.
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Systems are self-stabilizing and self-organizing. T he  collective properties of 
the organization are generally stable tendencies maintained over time by the 
transactions o f the individuals and their relationships. In a societal system 
it is unlikely that there would be frequent changes between capitalism and 
communism. Typically, systems have a tendency to remain in one or another 
mode most o f the time. T he ‘structure’ o f the system, whether it is capitalist 
or communist, is both created and stabilized by everyday transactions. When 
systems make changes between one major mode of organization and another, 
the transitions tend to be sudden and catastrophic. In a society, they feel 
like revolutions in which all individuals and their relationships undergo 
sudden and drastic changes. M ost viable systems quickly settle into new 
modes o f stable functioning following such transitions. T he stability o f a 
collective organization is maintained by dynamic fluctuations o f  activity between 
its component individuals, not by a static structural framework.
Systems exhibit equifinality. T here are many different dynamic processes that 
can lead to similar system organizations. For example, capitalism can arise 
and maintain itself in different ways as it evolves in different nations. Thus, 
similarities between systems can arise because the dynamics of the process 
naturally lead to a small number o f  collective forms -  in spite of the complexity' 
o f the dynamics -  and not because systems are adhering to a blueprint that 
from the start specifies the end result.
Systems form hierarchical patterns. Higher and lower orders within the same 
system are the natural result of system dynamics. Although hierarchies are 
relatively independent of each other, they can and do influence each other. 
Thus, in most political systems there are local, regional and national levels of 
organization. Each level has its own rules, actors and relationships, yet there 
are transactions both within and between the levels o f the organization. There 
is no particular level o f a system that is more fundamental than any other. 
Lower orders do not cause or generate the higher orders o f the system and 
vice versa, but rather all the orders are part o f  the same system and are the natural 
result o f  the system's dynamics.
Many of these properties of systems are nicely summarized by the biologist 
Paul Weiss:
life is process, not substance. A living system is no more adequately characterized 
by an inventory of its material constituents, such as molecules, than the life of a 
city is described by the list of names and numbers in a telephone book . . .  The 
systems concept is the embodiment of the experience that there are patterned 
processes which owe their typical configuration not to a prearranged, absolutely 
stereotyped, mosaic of single-tracked component performances, but on the 
contrary, to the fact that the component activities have many degrees of 
freedom, but submit to the ordering restraints exerted on them by the integral 
activity of the ‘whole’ in its patterned dynamics.16
In the political system, each individual has many degrees of freedom in their 
behavior. One can buy or sell, vote or not vote, speak up or remain silent,
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support or criticize leaders, and the like. Yet, in spite of these degrees 
of freedom for each individual, now multiplied by the large numbers of 
individuals in the society, there is an overall tendency for people to ‘submit 
to the ordering restraints’ of the whole, that is, to behave in ways consonant 
to the maintenance of the social order.17
Participation in a complex social system reduces the number of degrees of 
freedom for the individual on the one hand, and at the same time creates the 
conditions for the ordered and self-stabilizing behavior o f the system on the 
other. Selves and social systems define each other; each is a manifestation 
o f the dynamic processes that form the basis o f social organizations.
T here are not an infinite variety of social orders, as might be suggested 
from the complex interactive possibilities o f so many parts with so many 
degrees of freedom. As Hegel and Marx suggested, economic systems 
tend toward stable patterns of exchange between members by virtue of 
the operation o f the dialectic of conflict between opposites. Stated more 
generally, complex systems are more likely to be ordered than disordered, to 
settle into a small num ber o f relatively stable modes of functioning, in which 
only particular degrees o f freedom are perm itted to the component parts.
T h e  ordered nature o f systems is perplexing and paradoxical to many 
current thinkers. From the perspective o f discrete state models, complex 
wholes are built up from rule-governed, logical relationships between the 
elements. Self-organization in complex systems is impossible from the 
perspective o f logical combinatorial models of discrete elements.
Systems require a different kind of logic, a ^w-logic, or co-genetic logic in 
which relationships are the main elements o f thought.18 One must view the 
whole in terms o f the parts, the parts in terms of the whole. Unfortunately, it is 
just this sort o f mysterious-sounding language that turns many scholars away 
from systems thinking. T o  make it concrete with respect to the example o f a 
society, one has to imagine the relational constraints imposed by individuals 
upon each other, and at the same time imagine how those constraints are shaped 
in part by the emerging social order as a whole, which itself is shaped in part by 
the relationships between individuals. T o  comprehend a dynamic system, the 
mind must proceed with a flexible and dynamic logic that is not easily specifiable 
in terms of linear combinations of logical rules.
S ystem s th in k in g  a n d  id eas  ab o u t h u m a n  d e v e lo p m en t
I have organized the preceding part o f the chapter with respect to the 
organization and development of political systems for several reasons. The 
first I have already mentioned: ideas in science were part o f the political 
changes that altered our daily lives and senses o f self in fundamental ways. 
Second, by thus wooing you (I hope) into some tentative agreement about 
the worth of these systems concepts, I hope to get you on my side. My 
side o f what? T hese ideas, when applied to biology and psychology -  the
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fields to which we must turn to understand the origins and development of 
social communication -  turn out to be extremely controversial. While systems 
concepts have fared extremely well in biology, they are not generally accepted 
by psychologists whose journals and conferences are clogged with debates 
in one way or another related to the worth o f systems thinking compared 
to the well worked-out models and theories based on more mechanistic 
world views.
In some ways we are all caught up in these psychological controversies 
because they occur to most people in the process o f their own development 
of self-understanding. These ideas touch how we think about ourselves, 
the origins o f our own personalities and abilities, our attitudes toward our 
relationships with others, our own beliefs about how we and others become 
who we are. I can make this clearer by drawing the analogies between political 
beliefs and beliefs about biological and psychological processes, listed in 
Table 4 .1 .19
T he systems perspective suggests that transactions within and between 
cells, within and between components of the body and environment including 
the brain, must be involved in the regulation o f developmental change 
either in body structures or behavior. This view democratizes the process 
o f developmental change. T he body, its parts and their actions, are no longer 
subject to the tyranny o f the genes and the brain. Instead, these emperors 
have been dethroned. They may still occupy their seats at the center of 
the skull and the middle of the cell, but they are now merely one part 
of a dynamic system. They depend on the sustenance of their supporting 
environment simply to live and in order to function.
In systems thinking, the genes are no longer viewed as existing before 
anything else and as creating everything else. T he genes are part o f an 
ongoing living process. It is true that children inherit their parents’ genes 
but children also inherit the environment o f the genes: the original cell (the 
zygote) in which the genes live, the biological environment that supports 
the life of that cell and its progenitors in the father’s and m other’s gonads 
and reproductive passages, the sources of nourishment of that cell. The 
genes actively interact with these environments, which actively regulate the 
actions o f the genes. Thus, whole systems are passed between generations. 
Developmental processes are inherited and not simply genetic units.20
Similarly, systems thinking secularizes the brain, makes it one among 
many other essential components of the living body that contribute to the 
development o f behavior. T he body does not always need to look to the brain 
as a source o f inspiration (intention), or o f guidance (central commands), or 
of growth and change (brain maturation causes behavioral development). T he 
brain is shaped and supported by the rest o f the body. M ind and body are 
inseparable parts and levels o f a single living system.
Finally, and most importantly, infants and young children develop 
communicative skills in relation to their social contexts, but the social
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Table 4.1. Implications of systems thinking in three different fields
Political systems
Relationships between 
individuals have equal 
status as those between 
each individual and the 
fro up leader. Relationships 
between the individuals 
and the leader cannot by 
themselves determine the 
workings o f the society, and 
the leader's effectiveness 
depends on the group’s 
support.
The collcctive behavior of 
the system -  capitalist or 
communist -  is maintained 
by the dynamic (ransactions 
between individuals within, 
and between different 
levels of the hierarchy of, 
the system. The leaders are 
not completely in control over 
each individual, but rather 
act to regulate the form o f 
the relationships permitted 
between individuals.
These dynamics make 
political systems stable over 
long periods. Revolutionary 
changes require the active 
participation of members 
of the society in addition 
to the cooperation of the 
leaders. They occur when 
the dynamic transactions 
between individuals move 
beyond the normal range 
o f fluctuation and variation. 
Revolutions are the result o f  
the active participation at all 
levels in the social system.
Biological systems
Interactions between cells 
and between component 
parts within each cell 
are as important as the 
relationships of the genes 
to the cells and their 
constituents. The genes do 
not control all the processes in 
the body, and their operation 
depends on the functioning o f 
the cells in which they live.
The structure of the 
organism is not created 
entirely by the genes, but 
by the multiple transactions 
within and between all 
the levels of the system.
The chemicals, forces 
and electrical potentials 
exchanged between the cell 
and its neighbors arc just 
as important in determining 
its structure and the genes 
in its nucleus. The genes 
do not completely control the 
formation o f body cells and 
structures, and they encode 
only what is not already 
determined by the dynamics o f 
the system.
Cell structures remain 
highly stable until their 
local transactions change 
the environment in such 
a way that a different set 
o f genes becomes active 
in those cells, feeding 
back into the transactions 
between them, such as 
occurs during embryonic 
development or in cancer. 
Developmental changes in 
cell organizations are as 
much determined by the 




components of an action, 
such as the connections 
between the muscles in the 
face, arc equally important 
in determining the pattern 
of action as each muscle’s 
connection to the brain. By 
itself, the brain cannot control 
all the body's activities, nor 
can the brain exist without 
its containment within a 
living body.
The constraints and 
processes acting on the 
body, both from within 
(hormonal, neural, skeleto- 
muscular) and without 
(other people, gravity, 
surfaces and supports, 
tools, culture) are just as 
important in determining 
the final form of an action 
as information coming from 
the brain. The brain does 
not completely control action 
and its operation can be 
economized by affecting the 
dynamic relationships between 
parts o f the body, rather 
than trying to control each 
component unit on its own. 
Coordinated actions 
develop in part due to 
changes in the brain, and 
in part due to changes 
in the components o f the 
action, including changes 
in the environment that 
supports the actions. 
Changes in the body and 
in the environment can 
influence the development 
of the brain. Developmental 
change is as much the result 
o f changes in the body and its 
environment as it is o f brain 
or cognitive re-organizations.
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context is not the sole determ iner of how communication develops. In a 
systems perspective we would have to admit that adults are not fauldess 
moral and intellectual guides, not dispassionate arbiters o f right and wrong, 
not all-knowing experts in the workings o f the culture. Adults may have 
more knowledge and experience and a broader view of human life than 
the child, but adults’ actions must also be affected by the children’s. Adults 
are members o f social organizations and thus are a part of a complex flow 
o f social transactions in which the child is embedded.21
Systems thinking applied to the process o f communication is outlined in 
Table 4.2. These ideas apply to all forms of animal and human communication, 
including those between adults and children. This table summarizes notions 
about communication that have already been introduced in this book.
Perhaps because I was initially trained in physics22 and because I read 
current work in developmental biology, systems thinking is intuitively appealing 
to me. In fact, I can hardly imagine thinking any other way. It surprises 
me, therefore, that many of my colleagues in psychology persist in talking 
about genes and environments as if they were solid objects, unaffected 
by each other, unassailable in their empires of control over behavior and 
development. I get puzzled when developmental psychologists speak of 
cognitions or em otions as the central and primary ‘organizers’ o f behavior 
and developmental change. I am perplexed when people speak as if neural 
inform ation processing, neural circuits and neural networks are all we 
need to study when it comes to explaining cognition and language, as 
if  animals were com puters rather than flesh-and-blood species living in 
real environm ents. I am confused when parental behavior or misbehavior 
is talked about as the primary cause of children’s happiness or emotional
Table 4.2. Implications of systems thinking for the process of communication
Relationships of communicative actions between individuals are of equal importance to 
the relationships and organization of actions within the individual. Language, for example, 
cannot be understood only by examining the motor system for the production of words and 
gestures, nor only by examining the linguistic relationships that create syntax and semantics. 
Communicative actions arc embedded in dynamic transactions with other individuals in such 
a way that no single individual has complete control over either the process, structure or 
outcome of communication.
Communication is not guided entirely by a plan or script within the brain o f any individual. 
Nor is most everyday communication guided by a script for the actions and behavior of 
the partners. Individuals share in the regulation of communication, rather than its complete 
control. Regulation occurs when individual actions alter the information on which the 
partner’s actions are based, rather than by affecting the other’s actions directly.
Stability over time in a communication system occurs by virtue of a co-regulated process. 
The course of interaction between individuals is never identical across occasions, yet 
a theme or ritual is maintained as a recognizable pattern with variations. Changes in 
interaction rituals or themes require the active collaboration of all partners whose combined 
efforts re-establish a stable co-regulated pattern following the introduction of an innovation 
into the system.
5 2 The communication system: history and metaphor
pain, compliance or rebellion, as if  the children themselves or the envi­
ronment o f  the parent and family had nothing to do with developmental 
outcome.
Although I cannot promise to disprove these imperial metaphors, I do 
intend to offer in this book an alternative metaphor based on dynamic 
systems thinking. 1 try to translate this systems metaphor into some o f  
its implications for our understanding o f  human communication and how 
infants become communicating individuals and members o f  a culture. The  
hypotheses about development and the formation o f  individual differences 
suggested by this systems metaphor are very different from those derived from 
metaphors based on central controlling influences. T he practical implications 
for parents, educators and clinicians differ substantially from other views o f  
human development.
M e t a p h o r s  i n  s o c i a l  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t a l  p s y c h o l o g y
T he individual-environment relationship is discussed in psychology in terms 
o f metaphors. Metaphors (or similes) are frequently used in science as a 
useful way o f  describing phenomena. They enhance understanding by 
relating complex concepts to everyday examples: society is like the body, 
interdependent and whole; human rituals and games are like self-organizing 
systems, dynamic and emergent.
Metaphors are not only used for description, they are used as models to 
generate new' hypotheses and suggest applications. A model is a description 
o f the workings o f  a system,
an abstractive representation of some object or state of affairs . . .  it exhibits only 
certain properties -  the ones relevant to one’s needs and interests in using the 
model -  of the object modelled. Thus a model of the solar system hanging from 
the ceiling of the Planetarium, or diagrammed two-dimensionally on a piece of 
paper, or described in the utterances of some speaker, represents a state of affairs 
in some abstractive version: Some properties of the model resemble, or are like, 
or image, or mirror, or stand in for some properties of the solar system.23
A model is similar to the real thing, but does not share all o f  its features. A 
m odel airplane that duplicates the exact scale and shape o f  a real airplane 
cannot actually fly, since as one reduces the scale the proportions must 
change to provide the same amount o f  lift. Thus, in building a model, one 
has to think carefully about the aspects o f  the system one wishes to capture
-  for example, its external features or its actual functioning -  because the 
model should suit the purposes o f  the user o f  the model.
M odels are more specific and detailed than metaphors, and therefore 
preferable, but it is often not possible to develop a model, especially in the 
newer sciences like psychology. ‘Metaphor is used to represent the state o f
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affairs because no more literal description o f  its properties can be given.’24 
Thus a metaphor is often the only kind o f  model we can construct.
T he problem with a metaphor is that it is difficult to tell which o f  its various 
connotations is most like the phenomenon that is being explained. Yes, society 
is like the body in its general systemic processes, but societies are not governed 
by the same processes that unite the organs into a living creature. Societies are 
alive, but the patterns o f  their organization and the dynamics that create it are 
totally unlike the flow o f blood and the movement o f  muscle.
Metaphors suggest interesting ideas, but they can also cause trouble. If 
we use the metaphor o f  a discrete state communication system (senders, 
receivers and signals) it describes some features o f  real human interaction, 
but fails to capture the co-regulated nature o f  that interaction.
The most commonly used metaphors in developmental and social psychology 
have been reviewed in some detail by Arnold Sam eroff and also by Irwin 
Altman and Barbara Rogoff.25 They base their reviews on ideas from general 
systems theory, and on the work o f  philosophers John Dew ey and S. C. 
Pepper, both writing in the first half o f  the twentieth century.
Basically, there are two main metaphors that apply to the relationship 
between individual and environment: m echanism  and organism. T h e  
m echanistic metaphor suggests that individuals and environments can be 
described in their own terms, and relationships between them are similar to 
material interactions. Thus, the environment may push an individual in one 
direction or another, or an individual may change part o f  the environment. 
Each exerts a unidirectional mechanical force on the other. T his metaphor 
directs one to formulate laws o f  individual behavior based on constructs that 
are wholly within the individual.
The organic metaphor regards the individual’s relationship to the environment 
as an organized living system. As in systems thinking, individuals are parts 
o f larger systems; they can affect other parts o f  this system and at the same 
time, be affected by them. T h e environment becom es part o f  the system. This 
metaphor directs one to formulate principles o f  behavior for the organization 
as a whole. T h e focus o f  research is on the process o f  transaction between 
the elements o f  the system, rather than on the products o f  change within the 
individuals that compose the system.
For example, a mechanistic view o f the development o f human communication 
would focus on the acquisition o f  communicative behaviors within the 
individual. T he researcher would want to chart the developmental changes 
in infant vocalizations from crying to babbling to speech, and show how these 
products were formed either by genetically based maturation or by speech  
input from the social environment, or som e combination o f  both. Indeed, we 
have learned a great deal about normal development from work in this genre, 
and it is especially suitable to research on communication deficits, such as 
disorders o f  speech and hearing.
An organic view o f  the development o f  communication suggests that one
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should study communication as part o f the social system in which individuals 
are acting.26 Thus, a communicative behavior such as a smile is not merely 
an expression o f  an inner state, but also relates to the ongoing transaction in 
the social system. How a smile is used to affect another person, the sequence 
o f  events in which a smile is embedded and the relationship between smiles 
and other social behaviors would all be open to investigation.27
M echanistic models have a useful purpose because for some forms o f  
communication people do act as if  their behaviors are discrete, and as if  the 
behavior o f  one person direcdy affects the behavior o f  another. Moreover, 
some communication deficits and pathologies may be better modeled as 
discrete state, mechanistic systems.
R e la t io n s h ip  o f  c o - re g u la tio n  to  o th e r  o rg a n is m ic  c o n c e p ts  o f 
c o m m u n ic a tio n
T h e co-regulation metaphor captures the dynamics o f  the communication 
process, its continuously variable features and the fluidity o f  individual actions 
when in the company o f others. It is a metaphor that falls clearly within the 
organismic root metaphor. There are a large number o f  other metaphors that 
have been employed to express the organic nature o f  communication, but 
none o f  them completely encompasses the co-regulation process.
One o f  the most frequendy used terms in the literature o f  social and 
developmental psychology is interactional synchrony. T h is term has various 
definitions and usages. A strict construal o f  the term implies that there is 
an exact and precise temporal simultaneity o f  the beginnings and endings o f  
actions between partners.28
Work by William Condon and colleagues reported finding that newborn 
infants moved in exact synchrony with the speech o f  adults.29 They segmented 
the speech into phonem es, the basic elem ents o f  speech sounds, and 
suggested that infants made subde changes in the speed and direction o f  their 
body movements that seem ed to correspond with the phonemic changes.
Later careful analysis o f  this paper revealed a number o f  problems. 
One was that since the infant’s actions were continuous, the researcher’s 
segmentation o f  these actions into discrete bits o f  movement seem ed arbitrary. 
Furthermore, the onset o f  these infant action segments occurring at any time 
during an adult phonem e, not just at the onset o f  the phonem e, was counted 
as an instance o f  synchrony. In other words, the actions o f  the infant and the 
sounds o f  the adults are continuously changing but precise synchronization 
cannot be concluded. Additional technical and statistical problems flawed 
Condon’s research conclusions, and the work has never been replicated for 
any form o f animal or human communication.30
More recent definitions o f  interaction synchrony do not require precise 
temporal simultaneity. Glyn Collis defined interaction synchrony in terms 
o f  one partner anticipating the actions o f  the other. For example, in
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m other-infant interaction, mothers appear to use infant and environmental 
cues to determine what the infant is likely to do next. An infant might be 
expected to look in the direction o f  a particular preferred toy. O nce the 
infant looks in that direction, the mother synchronizes her behavior with 
his by naming the toy, talking about it or gesturing toward it.31
Also, when mothers are synchronized in this fashion, their behavior is not 
precisely simultaneous with the infants. Frame-by-frame analysis o f  video 
and film records o f  m other-infant interaction shows that there is an average 
lag between onsets o f  infant’s and mother’s behavior o f  about 0.05 seconds.32
This definition, while capturing the anticipatory aspect o f  co-regulation, 
does not mention the continuously variable nature o f  interaction, nor does 
it assume that mother and infant must regulate each other. T h e mutual and 
continuous nature o f  anticipatory action is better reflected in the concept 
o f mutual coordination used by Beatrice Beebe and Joseph Jaffee.33 It is 
enough, in both Condon’s view, and in Collis’s view, for regulation (or 
synchronization) to be unilateral. Unilateral regulation does indeed occur, 
especially when mothers monitor and respond to their infant’s actions without 
the infant being much aware o f  the mother’s continued presence.
A more recent usage o f  the term interactional synchrony comes from 
the mother-infant interaction research o f  Russell Isabella and Jay Belsky. 
According to these investigators, interactional synchrony refers to the recip­
rocal and mutually rewarding behavioral exchanges including those in which 
both members contribute, when there is an exchange o f  behaviors in which 
each partner is responsive to the other. They contrast this with the notion o f  
asynchrony, in which exchanges are one-sided, unresponsive or intrusive.34
T his usage o f the term captures the mutual influence aspect o f  co­
regulation. Co-regulation, however, does not require that the exchanges be 
‘mutually rewarding.’ In my view, arguments, fights and disagreements can 
be co-regulated as long as each partner adapts to the other and information 
is created between them. Isabella and Belsky also speak o f  ‘behavioral 
exchanges’ in a way that suggests a discrete state concept o f  communication, 
as if  it were possible to define senders, receivers and signals. Their definition 
is also insensitive to varieties o f  temporal matching between adult and infant.
During co-regulation, behaviors and actions are not exchanged since action 
is always occurring for both partners. In some circumstances, researchers may 
artificially break a continuous interaction into discrete units for the purpose 
o f analysis. Researchers often unitize interactions into divisions marked by 
salient behaviors, such as speech or gesture, or into equally spaced units o f  
elapsed time.35 In spite o f  the utility o f  such m ethods for specific research 
purposes, a precise description o f  communication is significantly blunted by 
this convenience.
In co-regulated communication information is created, behavior is not exchanged. 
Information, a concept that we will explore in some detail in the next chapter, 
is fundamental to an understanding o f  how communication exerts its mutual
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effects on partners. How can the behavior o f  one person affect another? 
Surely behaviors do not collide like billiard balls. Nor are behaviors actually 
exchanged between people, like gifts are exchanged, because the behavior o f  
a person does not transfer itself physically to another person. We can speak 
about exchanging smiles, trading insults or throwing punches, but these are only 
metaphors, however apt or eloquent.
In order for your smile to have an effect on me, in order for it to make me 
smile in return (another metaphor, since I didn’t actually take your smile and 
give it back to you), I have to perceive the light reflected from the changes in 
the surface o f  your face as informative to me. That information may translate 
into a feeling, and/or another action, like a smile in response.
Information is what my body needs to create its own smile out o f  its perception o f  
yours. M y smile is created from the m uscles and skin surfaces o f  my own body 
from information that I acquire while interacting with your body. In the case 
o f  a smiling exchange, your body is across a distance and perception is in the 
visual channel. T h e same logic applies even when we are in physical contact. I 
must still move my own body on the basis o f  information I create from yours 
through my own tactile perception. T h e information is not ‘in’ your body, nor 
is it ‘in’ my body. T he information is what happens to me when I perceive 
your smile. That information may be translated into action, but because it is 
embodied and relational, I experience it as feeling, imagery or compulsion. 
In this view information is not a cognitive content, a rational and detached 
quantity: it is the meaning o f  the situation as experienced in my entire body.
If I watch two other people having a fist fight I might say they are trading 
punches. I am less likely to think or to talk that way if  I am one o f  the 
participants. W hen my opponent lands a punch it is going to sting and that 
perceptual information will be translated -  via anger and indignation, distress 
and fear -  into the punch that I shall attempt to land. In this fight w e’re not 
trading anything. We are involved, we are participants, we are aroused, we 
are co-regulated.36
A definition o f  interactional synchrony that com es the closest to my 
definition o f  co-regulation was worked out by Frank Bem ieri and his 
colleagues. According to them, interaction synchrony is
the apparent unification of two behavioral elements into a meaningfully described 
whole, synchronous event. The elements of this event may be simultaneous, 
identical, and in phase or alternating, mirrored, and out of phase. The essential 
feature is that when the elements are put together, they create a ‘whole,’ or 
perceptual unit . . .  Synchrony, therefore, is operationalized here . . .  as the 
extent of gestaltlike harmoniousness or meshing of interpersonal behaviors.37
U sing this definition, observers were particularly good at deciding when 
interactions were synchronized. The definition captures the creative, continuous 
and emergent aspects o f  co-regulation. It focuses, however, on behavior o f  the 
individual as the unit o f  analysis: behaviors mesh and becom e synchronized.
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Figure 4.1 A Sumo wrestling match. (Copyright ©  Allsport/Chris Cole.)
In my view, individual behavior takes its characteristic form by virtue o f  its 
engagement with others; behavior is created in the process o f  co-regulation. 
T h e concept o f  synchrony suggests the opposite, that synchrony is created 
by combining each individual’s behavior.
Other constructs have also been used in the literature. For example, the 
mutual regulation model o f  Edward Tronick and his colleagues is defined as the 
goal to achieve a joint regulation o f  the interaction with interactive behaviors, 
or the goal o f  achieving a joint state o f  reciprocity. T his idea has problems
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similar to the foregoing, because it assumes that behaviors are exchanged 
rather than that information is derived from behavior. Another difficulty is 
the notion that partners need to have an explicit goal o f  achieving mutual 
regulation.
Goal is one o f  those useful metaphors that describes regularity in action 
from the observer’s point o f  view, but that may not be the way in which the 
participants are organizing their own actions. One observes an interaction that 
seem s to proceed toward a regularized pattern, such as a peek-a-boo game. 
T o  the extent that peek-a-boo and other games are spontaneous, creative, 
emergent achievements o f  a co-regulated process, why is it necessary to 
assume that the participants want to becom e co-regulated? Each may have 
had som e initial intention: to play, to have fun, to get attention, to get their 
way. M other may engage in peek-a-boo to assuage a baby’s anger or to 
move it from one activity into another, such as from playing with toys to 
going to bed.
It is not necessary to assume that participants share the same goal in 
order to achieve co-regulated discourse. Nor is it necessary to assume that 
participants, in spite o f  their private goals, share the goal o f  achieving joint 
coordination. I don’t think infants have the goal o f  achieving mutual regulation 
any more than circling wolves, or any more than I would like to get into a fist 
fight for the sake o f  establishing my ability to co-regulate on these terms with 
an opponent.38
Now, there certainly are instances o f  interpersonal communication where 
both partners share the same goal, such as when two or more people have to 
achieve a task that can only be done joindy. In some instances it might also 
be true that in addition to sharing the task goal, the individuals also really 
care about doing it with each other, they want to enter into co-regulated  
interactions with these particular partners. W hen this happens, and when 
we can enter into the desired form o f discourse with our chosen partners, 
it affects our emotional experience and commitment to the relationship.
There are also situations in which only one partner may have the goal 
o f  participation in the relationship. As a result o f  extended discourse, the 
other partner may com e to share that goal. In Chapter 6 , 1 discuss how such 
relationships o f  mutual commitment between parents and infants grow and 
maintain themselves. Even in these cases, however, goals are not enough: 
they are only one aspect o f  a complex and dynamic communication system.
T he remarkable and wonderful consequence o f  the way our brains and 
bodies are put together is that it is extremely easy for us to enter into 
communicative exchanges even in the absence o f  goals to do so, and to 
profit greatly by them. Focusing on goals and rules as the primary cause 
o f such coordinations m isses the essence o f  the process.
O ne other construct that deserves som e mention in this context is that o f  
matching. Matching occurs when one individual makes his or her actions more 
similar to those o f  another individual. O ne form o f  matching is imitation,
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where one copies what another person is doing. Imitation can immediately 
follow the model, or it can be delayed. Co-action is when partners each do 
something at the same time. What they do may be the same (as in singing in 
unison) or it may be different (as in interrupting while another person is talking, 
or clapping while another person sings). Unlike adult conversation in which 
co-active vocalizations are rare, adults with infants do it rather frequently.39
Attunement is a form o f matching in which the referent for the match is not the 
external action, but the presumed feeling state o f  the partner,40 Daniel Stern and 
his colleagues have defined and described attunement processes o f  which 
there is a wide variety. M atches can be in any behavioral modality’, such as 
vocal, respiratory (heavy breathing, sighing), facial, gestural or movement. 
One can also match intensity contours within the same modality or when 
using a different modality. For example, an infant may suddenly jerk out 
his arms to which the mother responds with a sharp ‘Oh!’ that has the 
same temporal and intensity contour as the infant’s arm movement. Tim ing  
matches can also occur according to beat, rhythm and/or duration. Clapping 
to the same beat o f  som eone singing is a good example. Finally, there can 
be matches according to the spatial shape o f  the action, for example moving 
the hand up and down can be matched by another person moving the head 
up and down.
Attunement reflects some underlying dimension o f  the action that is believed 
to correspond to the feeling that accompanied the action. Attunement can 
have the following social functions: to be with another or share feelings with 
another, to empathize, to mock, to respond contingently, to change the other’s 
arousal level or emotion, to change the other’s goal, to teach or to play. The 
specific forms and functions o f  attunement are culturally regulated.
One problem is that all the above concepts o f  matching are defined as 
unilateral actions and do not necessarily embody a notion o f  co-regulation. 
The task o f  matching som eone unilaterally is different from mutual matching. 
If mutual matching is co-regulated it would mean that the person you are 
trying to match is also trying to match you, and since this happens in a 
continuous way, you end up trying to match action that is partly the partner’s 
and pardy your own action reflected back to you.
While this seem s harder, it turns out to be easier because as you attempt 
to match another, that person is already changing their behavior to make it 
more similar to yours. T h e ‘stretch’ between your behavior and the m odel’s is 
reduced allowing the communication to converge toward a consensual frame. 
Indeed, this is the fundamental basis by which infants becom e communicative 
partners. Left to their own devices they are not very good at matching. But 
when partners alter their actions to fit better with the infant’s abilities, the 
infant can become a creative co-participant.
Although I don’t like the proliferation o f  scientific terminology for its own 
sake, existing metaphors describing communication processes all seem  to lack 
an essential ingredient. Either they focus on the actions o f  one partner, or
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in focusing on both they lack the precision necessary to understand what 
actually goes on during a communication episode; they partly illuminate and 
partly obscure the process. Finally, some terms have been used in a number 
o f  different ways and so promote confusion. T h e co-regulation metaphor was 
chosen partly for such reasons.
T h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r o b l e m  o f  b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n
T he systems metaphor o f  co-regulation leads to an apparent contradiction with 
respect to traditional Western psychological constructs o f the individual. If we 
are always in the thrall o f  relationships to one or another thing or person, why is 
it that we develop as individual persons within those relationships? In philosophy, 
psychology and sociology, there are many theoretical and empirical attempts to 
address the mystery o f the relationship o f  the personal to the social.
T h e traditional subject matter o f  Western psychology and philosophy is 
the individual.41 It is no wonder that we tend to reason from individual 
capacities to construct theories o f how people enter into social discourse. 
T h e Chomskian view o f language as an innate faculty o f  the mind is similar to 
a host o f  psychological reasoning about thought, social skill, and morality. In 
the individualistic perspective, these faculties may be shaped and elaborated 
by the social environment, but they are essentially self-contained boxes within 
the person that are presumed to be receptive to particular forms o f  input from 
the environment and possess certain types o f  routines for processing that 
information. If one’s focal attention is on individuals, relationships matter 
only as inputs and outputs o f  the individual psyche.
I take the opposite view. T h e essential fact about organisms is not their 
organic integrity but their connectedness to the environment. Evolution could 
not have made a creature that is first an isolate and later a participant since 
the primordial organism coalesced out o f a primordial environmental soup 
simmered in a rock cauldron in the sunshine and atmosphere o f  a primordial 
earth. T h e first life form was life-in-the-w orld, and its identity was its 
particular relationship to the world. T h e living cell today is not a copy 
o f  the original cell. All cells living today have evolved, have becom e more 
complex over an eon o f  test trials. Cells have got better at one essential task 
that has not changed over time: relating to their environment. Cell walls are 
permeable in that the interior structure o f  the cell is incomprehensible without 
a knowledge o f  the relationships between the interior and the exterior. N o less 
is true for the organism as a whole.
T h e primacy o f  the relationship over the individual is expressed by 
tw entieth-century philosopher John MacMurray,
human behavior is comprehensible only in terms of dynamic social references;
the isolated, purely individual self is a fiction . . .  [This idea] compels us to
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abandon the traditional individualism or egocentricity of our philosophy. We must 
introduce the second person as the necessary correlative of the first, and do our 
thinking not from the standpoint of the ‘I’ alone, but of the ‘you and I.’42
My own approach is similar in spirit. I use the metaphor o f  the co-regulated  
communication process as the starting point from which I try to explain 
the individual. T h e design, function and development o f  individuals is 
centered around the nature o f  the communication process, whether we are 
communicating with animate or with inanimate objects.
Many scholars who are trying to understand the individual often take 
refuge in simpler conceptual frames. Buoyed by the idealism o f  nineteenth- 
century scientific objectivity they pursue a quest for better measures o f  
individual functioning, for tracking individual change, for predicting risk 
and outcome. W e assess people in terms o f  their presumed faculties and we 
evaluate relationships as input to those faculties. It is common practice, for 
example, to speak about particular types o f  parental behavior as contributing 
either to healthy or pathological outcomes for children, even when it is 
acknowledged that children can affect their parents. It is as if  we were 
speaking about billiard balls whose collisions impact in predictable ways 
directly on the future behavior o f  each ball.
Co-regulation, at least as I define it, is not a conceptual commodity that one 
typically finds in the Western behavioral scientist’s pantry. And why should 
this be so? T he concept o f  co-regulation emphasizes the dynamically changing 
individual at the very moment o f  transaction with others: an individual whose 
behavior and goals are not entirely planned in advance but emerge creatively 
out o f  social discourse. If science is the study o f  objective entities, if  it requires 
those objects to remain identifiable and invariant through the measurement 
process, then co-regulated individuals are not amenable to this kind o f  
scientific study. It is my belief, however, that co-regulated systems are 
scientifically understandable. T h e science, however, will not be based on 
the logical manipulation o f  objective entities.
We forget the insights o f  the early twentieth-century because the tools o f  
our trade are not up to the task o f  a relational science. W ithout tools, there 
is an impoverished culture, and without a culture individuals can’t affirm 
themselves as members. T o  be a behavioral scientist o f  beings-in-relation is 
to stand outside the mainstream o f that culture. T hose who take seriously the 
power o f  relational concepts are still struggling at century’s end to elaborate 
the insights o f  its beginning.
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C h a p te r  5
A model of communication: 
meaning and information
In the early part o f  the tw entieth century, physicists discovered that ordinary 
light, and other electromagnetic radiation, could be mathematically modeled 
as a particle (the quantum mechanical model). T h e particle model o f  light 
had been around in some form since it was first proposed by Sir Isaac 
Newton in the late seventeenth century. T he particle model did not receive 
much attention for the next 250 years, in part because it was not as well 
articulated as the wave model o f  light, first proposed in 1690 by the Dutch 
physicist, Christiaan Huygens in his Traite de la lumiere. 1 Both the wave 
model and particle model are used today, depending upon one’s applied and 
theoretical perspective. M odels are not true or false. Each model captures 
a particular feature o f  the phenom enon and no model expresses all o f  its 
properties.
If som ething physical like light can be described legitimately from different 
and apparendy contradictory points o f  view, something complex and biological 
like communication must also be accorded a wide field o f  interpretation. 
Natural phenomena are understood using models as interpretive tools, and 
those tools should match our world views and purposes. Thus, in what 
follows, I shall favor a model o f  continuous process communication, while 
also suggesting that discrete state models continue to play a role in our 
understanding o f  communication.
D i s c r e t e  a n d  c o n t i n u o u s  m o d e l s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  
i n f o r m a t i o n
W hen people communicate, information links the actions o f  one individual 
with those o f  another. According to a number o f  theoretical analyses o f  
information,2 how one defines information is related to how one concep­
tualizes the communication process: the mechanistic discrete state model and
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the organismic continuous process model each have different concepts o f  
information. In the following discussion, communication is used in a generic 
sense that can apply to the communication between genes and proteins, 
between brain and body, or socially between individuals.
In fo rm a tio n  in  d is c re te  s ta te  sy s te m s
In discrete state models, there are senders and receivers. T h e purpose o f  
communication is for the sender to alter the behavior o f  the receiver by 
transmitting informative messages. In such a model, the role o f  information 
is to cause a change in the receiver. O ne can speak o f  the ‘m essage’ o f  the 
sender, or one can talk about genetic ‘m essages,’ or information com ing from 
the brain that ‘tells’ the body how to perform.3
This model o f  information moving from one location to another is based 
on John von Neum ann’s theory o f  information processing using the computer 
as metaphor.4 In the digital computer, information is transmitted from one 
processing unit to another. T his information can be defined and measured 
in units called bits that can take on one o f  two values: on or off.
Although messages in a computer are always transmitted faithfully, in real 
physical systems messages don’t always have their intended effect. Communi­
cation systems, because o f their complexity, are inherently noisy, obscuring the 
message and reducing the likelihood that it will be read by the receiver as 
intended by the sender. A message with a high signal-to-noise ratio is read more 
clearly, is transmitted with less ambiguity. In a model developed by Claude 
Shannon, information is measured as the probability that the message will cause 
the presumed change, or the correlation between the input and the output.5 In 
discrete state systems, information is synonymous with reliability', the extent to 
which the transmission process preserves the content o f  the sender’s message.
Because noise in the discrete state model is presumed to be an inevitable 
part o f  any communication process, communication systems need to include 
redundancy in order to increase the likelihood o f  a message getting correctly 
transmitted. Redundancy can be built into communication systems by using 
repetition, and by using multiple channels o f  information. Receivers are also 
designed to detect the signal within the noise and to amplify and enhance the 
signal. T his discrete state model o f  information works remarkably well for all 
types o f  electronic communication media, such as the transmission o f  radio 
and television information between the broadcasting station and the home 
receiver sets. Such models have also been applied to the functioning o f the 
brain and to social communication with varying degrees o f  success.
In fo rm a tio n  in  c o n t in u o u s  p ro c e ss  sy s te m s
T he concept o f  information in discrete state systems is appealing because 
it is concrete and intuitive. We users and perceivers o f  social information
are comfortable thinking about it as messages, and in terms o f  clarity and 
distortion o f  those messages. T he concept o f  information in continuous 
process systems is considerably less intuitive because o f  the difficulty in 
grappling with the fundamental interconnectedness o f  constituents in dynamic 
systems: that nothing -  quite literally, nothing at all -  exists or can be 
defined by itself without reference to its relationships with other constituents. 
Information as ‘m essage’ or ‘signal’ is concrete, bounded, a thing-in-itself. 
Information in continuous systems is relational, open, not observable except 
in its effects on action.
W e need a model o f  information that takes account o f  the complexities 
o f  a continuous communication process. T h e most fully developed models 
o f information as a continuous process com e from research in the area 
o f perception-action systems, which are essentially information-mediated 
correspondences between an individual’s action and the environment.
According to the theory o f  ecological perception formulated by James J. 
Gibson,6 there is information available in the environment but only with 
respect to biological organisms that have the sensory systems to perceive that 
information in relation to their action. Information, therefore, is created as the 
linkage between the environment and the involvement of one’s body with the 
environment.7 Perception, therefore, involves action. The body is not passive 
when perceiving, it is walking, chewmg, seeing. One sees not by passively letting 
light hit the retina, but by turning one’s head, moving the eyes, scanning the 
surface, walking around something, etc. I can perceive only when either myself 
or the object o f perception, or both, are in motion or have moved. The fact that 
perception and action are coordinated implies that they inform each other.
T h e case o f  visual perception is easiest to illustrate. As one looks out 
on the world, light enters the eyes. As hum ans, we can see primarily what 
is in front o f  us, with light entering the eyes in the shape o f  a spherical 
cone w hose point is at each retina, and whose base is along the surface 
from which the light is reflected. Surfaces reflect more com plex patterns 
o f  light i f  they have more texture: folds, bum ps, dim ples, waves and the 
like. What our eyes pick up is all the bits and p ieces o f  reflected light 
from the differently textured surfaces in our field o f  vision. T h is set o f  
light patterns is called the optic array. W hen the individual m oves, even  
a little bit, such as when the eyes move or the head turns, or when I 
m ove forward (locom ote) into the environm ent, this optic array appears 
to move. As soon as I move my head or eyes just a little bit, the pattern 
o f  light falling on my retina changes.
Instead o f  a stationary optic array, I now see a perceptual flow field. Suppose 
I move straight ahead and parallel to the ground, as in driving a car down a 
highway, I would see the optical flow field shown in Figure 5.1. T he lines 
in the field represent the movements within the flow field o f  the textured 
elem ents in the environment. If I move forward, parallel to the ground, and 
turning to the right I would see a flow field like that shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.1 Optical flow field for moving parallel to a surface without turning. 
The direction of flow is toward the viewer. (Source: Bloch, H. and Bertenthal, B. 
Sensory-Motor Organizations and Development in Infancy and Early Childhood, 1990, 
reprinted by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
Figure 5.2. Optical flow field for moving parallel to a surface while turning to the 
right. (Source: Bloch, H. and Bertenthal, B. Sensory-Motor Organizations and 
Development in Infancy and Early Childhood, 1990, reprinted by permission of 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.)
Experiments have shown that individuals perceive their direction o f movement 
from information obtained across the entire flow field. Even though the lines 
in the flow fields shown in the figures all seem  to emanate from a distant 
point in the field, the point o f  convergence is not enough information to tell 
som eone that they are going straight or turning. As the number o f  textured 
points in the surface is reduced, using computer simulations o f  flow fields 
that vary in density and heading, subjects becom e less accurate in judging the 
direction o f  movement.8
What is informative about the optic array that allows subjects to judge their 
direction o f  movement? According to Gibson, individuals have the ability
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to look at a complex optical flow and detect what is the same and what is 
different in the optic array as it changes over time. In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, 
the array changes since the individual points o f  texture appear to move and 
they also appear to get farther apart (the direction o f  travel o f  each point is 
toward the viewer). On the other hand, there is a constancy in the array since 
the lines o f  movement maintain a constant angle with respect to each other 
and also a constant curvature. T hese constancies across changes in the optic 
array (or in any perceptual flow field) are called invariants.
T hus, according to Gibson’s theory, information is created in a perceptual 
flow field in the form o f  the perceived relationship between the variants and 
the invariants.9 In another example, how do individuals know when they 
will make contact with a surface that they are approaching? In this case, 
optical texture appears to flow outward from the center o f  the surface, 
and the textural details o f  the surface get larger as one approaches, that 
is, there is a progressive magnification o f  details that appear to emerge from 
the center o f  the surface being approached. From the rate o f  change o f  the 
magnification (how big the image gets as a function o f  time), the observer 
can estimate the time until contact is m ade.10
T h e approach to a solid surface, or the approach to the edge o f  a surface 
(as in coming up to the edge o f  a cliff), is one example in which the 
relationship between perception and action has been studied in some detail. 
In the example o f  the ski-jumper shown in Figure 5.3, note that the jumper 
begins to emerge from the tuck posture and changes the position o f  his arms 
before actually arriving at the lip o f  the jump. Somehow, the jumper uses 
the invariants in the optical flow field in order to inform his actions to be 
appropriate for making the jump.
Figure 5.3 The relationship between perception and action as a skier approaches 
a jump. The changes in the skier’s posture depend on information detected 
from the edge of the drop-off regarding the time to contact. (Source: Lee, D. 
‘Getting around with light or sound’, in Warren, R. and Wertheim, A.H., eds. 
Perception and Control of Self-Motion, 1990, reprinted by permission of Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates and the author.)
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Research has shown that jumpers begin to change their posture at a 
time interval before the jump that is proportional to their speed, which is 
related to the time remaining until they reach the edge. Information about 
tim e-to-contact is available from the changes and invariants in the optical 
flow field, and this information is converted into the forces applied by the 
body to change one’s posture and the position o f  the skis. Birds about to land 
use the same tim e-to-contact visual information, and bats use tim e-to-contact 
information perceived from auditory echoes.11
In a perception-action system, therefore, information links kinematics (the 
motion o f  the flow field) to dynamics (the application o f  forces). At the 
same time, the dynamics are causing one to move and therefore contributing 
to the changes in the optical array that produce the information regulating 
the action. T his interdependence o f  perception and action, mediated by 
information, is shown in Figure 5.4.
From these examples, one can see that information is created out o f  the 
dynamics o f  action in an environment. Information is in formation, always 
being created out o f  itself and always changing with respect to action.12 
Information is specific to the particular individual-environment transaction. 
If one’s intention is not to ski o ff the edge, but to ski along the edge, 
tim e-to-contact would be adjusted to a visual point before the edge o f  
the cliff, and the action dynamics would be related to turning rather than 
jumping. As the turn was being executed, the optical array would change and 
the information needed to regulate actions related to turning would change 
correspondingly (as shown in Figure 5.3). And finally, information is specific 
to the type o f  body one has, its possibilities for perception and action.
EVENT
K inem atic flow ---------------  [PERCEPTION) -------  Am odal information
Kinem atic m ovem en t ------ [PRO PRIO CEPTIO N]-------  Dynam ic forces
ACTION
Figure 5.4 Basic model of a perception-action system. Actions and events are more 
than just movements and objects. Actions and events are movements and objects 
that are meaningful with respect to each other as part of a dynamic perception- 
action system. Events possess information relative to the individual’s actions. As 
movements change, it changes the perceptual flow, which changes the information, 
which changes the forces and the resulting movements. There is no starting or 
ending point in this loop. Action can only be understood as an entire process, as a 
self-organizing system.
7 0  A model of communication: meaning and information
P e rc e p t io n -a c t io n  sy s te m s  in  e a r ly  in fa n c y
As early as the first month o f  life there is evidence that human infants 
participate in perception-action systems. Auditory and tactile sensations are 
perceived in relation to action from birth. Awake and alert infants only 3 
minutes old can turn their eyes and head in the direction o f  a pleasing sound. 
If the sound is intense, infants turn their head in the opposite direction. 
T h ese are not mere reflexive actions since infants will visually scan around 
the area o f  the room in which the sound source is located.13 Even though 
newborn reaction times to the sound are rather slow compared to later in 
infancy, and even though the sound must be played for at least twenty 
seconds and in the middle range o f  audible frequencies,14 when newborns 
respond their actions are coordinated with their perceptions.
Infants only a few days old will turn their heads and make appropriate 
facial expressions according to the pleasantness or unpleasantness o f  the 
odor or taste. When given sweet solutions newborn infants will slow down 
their sucking rate in order to hold the liquid in their mouth for longer periods 
as if  savoring the taste, and they will consume more o f  sweet liquids. They  
becom e restless and stop sucking when the solution is bitter or very salty.15
T h e hand and mouth o f  a newborn are especially sensitive. Infants will 
suck as if  trying to get nutrition from a normally shaped nipple, but they will 
perform more exploratory movements o f  the tongue and lips when nipples 
have unusual shapes. They suck and touch differently depending on whether 
objects are hard or soft.16 Newborns will recoil from pain and curl snugly 
into the arms o f  a w arm adult.
Thus, for some sensor)’ and motor systems, newborn behavior is related 
to information created by a perception-action system. T his is not true for 
all aspects o f  the newborn’s behavior or for all aspects o f  the environment. 
Babies o f  this age are relatively insensitive to changes in the saltiness o f  
solutions and will often suck on water so salty it would choke an adult. 
They are not capable o f  perceiving a great deal o f  what happens around 
them. Nevertheless, when they do act it seem s to be in relation to what is 
informative for them in the environment and their actions are created with 
respect to the discovery o f  that information.
One way to conceptualize the development o f infant action is in terms o f  
an increasing sophistication o f  the kinds o f  information the infant can create 
in relation to the environment. This sensitivity depends on their ability to 
perform actions that are coordinated with their senses. In this way, neither 
action nor perception is the primary cause o f development. Rather, action refines 
perception at the same time that perceptual discoveries spur new actions.
By the time infants are 6 months, for example, they possess a remarkable 
range o f  manual actions that are specifically related to differences in 
environmental invariants. They can adjust their reaching to an object’s
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speed, shape, size and distance.17 W hen given objects o f  the same shape 
but varying in texture, 6-m onth-olds move their hands or fingers from 
side-to-side across the surface o f  the object. W hen given similarly shaped 
objects varying in hardness/softness, they will apply pressure by squeezing. 
They will bang hard objects on a table but not soft objects.18
These infants are using properties o f  the environment to inform them about 
the types o f  action that are most appropriate with respect to creating that 
information. T h e distinction between information as a created psychological 
construct and the physical properties o f  events and objects is crucial. T he  
same objects or events do not affect different individuals in the same way. The  
edge o f  the cliff means som ething entirely different to an expert compared to 
a novice skier. A textured rattle would have considerably more significance to 
a 6-m onth-old infant compared to a 6-day-old infant. T h e analysis o f  action 
must take account o f  what is informative for the individual, and not what is 
‘out there’ concretely defined. With babies it is especially clear that changes in 
their sensorimotor systems lead to changes in the availability o f  information: 
the body is central to an understanding o f  information and its development.
Although we know that animals have the capacity to use the variants and 
invariants o f  kinematic perceptual flow fields as informative for the dynamics 
o f their own action, it is a mystery how this is actually accomplished. Clearly 
neural circuits, muscles, bones and joints, and the connections between 
various body tissues play a role. So do the types o f  culturally available tools 
(such as whether one is wearing racing skis, touring skis or snow shoes).19 In 
this book, I accept as a given that perception-action systems exist, and I explore 
how they function in communication and its development.20 I will not attempt 
to probe the details o f  the neurophysiological and neuromuscular processes that 
are at the heart o f the perception-action linkages.21
I n f o r m a t i o n  i n  c o n t i n u o u s  p r o c e s s  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
s y s t e m s
C ro ss -m o d a l p e rc e p tio n
In order to move from the theory o f  ecological perception and perception-action 
systems to a theoretical model o f  social communication, we have to examine 
the kinds o f  perceptual information that are available to participants in 
social discourse. T h e discussion here focuses on human communication, 
but it could be generalized to all forms o f  animal communication, and to 
animal-human communication.
Participants in social interactions perceive each other across a number o f  
different sensory modalities -  including vision, audition, olfaction, taste and 
touch -  depending on the type o f  relationship between the partners. Although 
some perceptual information is specific to modalities, like color to vision, or
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timbre to audition, some perceptual information may be cross-modal: Cross- 
modal perception occurs when information perceived in one modality is translated into 
perception or action in another modality. An example is clapping to the beat of 
music. One translates the rhythm and intensity information invariants from 
the auditory perception into the tactile-m otor action o f  clapping.
Even though infants cannot clap to the beat o f  music, they are able 
to perceive when events in different perceptual modalities have the same 
temporal pattern. A number o f  studies have been done on the infant’s 
perception o f  a relationship between sight and sound. For example, infants 
are shown two animated cartoon films side-by-side. A sound track, matched 
to only one o f  the films, is played from a speaker mounted between the film 
screens opposite the m id-line o f  the infant’s body. Infants as young as 4 
months prefer to look at the film matching the sound track.22 If infants of 
the same age are exposed to an auditory rhythm and later shown two visual 
images — one with the same rhythm and one with a slightly altered rhythm -  
they prefer to look at the image with the matched rhythm.23
In another experimental design, the infant’s mother and father are seated 
across from the infant, one on the right and one on the left. A speaker in 
the center plays the mother’s voice and then the father’s voice eight different 
times in a random sequence. It is highly likely that 4-m onth-olds will look in 
the direction o f  the parent whose voice is heard from the speaker.24 W e know 
less about younger infant’s cross-modal abilities because fewer studies have 
been done. T h e fact that newborns will turn toward the source o f  a sound 
suggests a rudimentary cross-modal relationship between auditory perception 
and head movement. Certainly by 3 months infants can reach for objects that 
they can see, and recognize objects visually that they had been exposed to in 
the dark by touch alone.25
It seem s quite likely, therefore, that from the beginning o f  postnatal life, 
human infants do not behave like reflexive automatons. Their perceptions are 
continuously linked to their actions and these linkages can be cross-modal 
across both perceptual and action modalities. Thus, infants are especially 
suited to enter into continuous process communication systems that are based 
on perception-action linkages.
P e rc e p tu a l  in fo rm a tio n  a v a ila b le  in  so c ia l s y s te m s
What kinds o f information mediate the social interaction between individuals? 
Based principally on the work o f  James Gibson (who catalogued the general 
forms o f  invariants related to perceptual events that occur in the natural 
world), Daniel Stem  (who described the detection o f  perceptual invariants 
during social communication with infants) and Klaus Scherer (who elaborated 
the invariants o f  vocal communicative patterns),26 Table 5.1 presents a listing 
o f the common forms o f  perceptual invariants and elaborates their application 
to information during social communication systems.
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Table 5.1 Varieties of perceptual information based on the relationship between variants and 
invariants in a kinematic flow field (created by motion of the field and/or the subject). Also 




expansion and contraction, 
increasing and decreasing 
intensity
Lateral displacement and 
rotation, movement against 
a background
Elasticity and rigidity, 
shape and surface 
deformation
Dissolution and emergence 
of form
Color and texture
1. Expansion from a 
point and magnification or 
increasing of intensity
2. Contraction toward a 
point and minification, or 
diminishing of intensity
3. Maintaining constancy 
in size of elements or 
intensity
1. Deletion of background 
texture on one side of an 
object, and addition of 
texture on the other side
2. Shearing of texture 
against a constant 
background
1. Deformation of shape
2. Deformation of surface
3. Rigidity of form
1. Dissolution of perceptual 
texture
2. Emergence of perceptual 
texture
1. Changes in color
1. Approaching a partner, 
becoming louder, surging, 
crescendo, explosive
2. Avoiding, leaving or 
withdrawing, fading away, 
trailing off, becoming softer
3. Maintaining a constant 
distance, leveling off, 
framing
1. Parmer’s body moves 
across perceptual field, 
hiding and revealing, 
masking and deceit, 
stroking, clothing and 
make-up
2. Tuming toward or away, 
rubbing, role change and 
taking the perspective of 
the other
1. Changes in body 
posture, stance, gait, effects 
of clothing, sensitivity, 
pliability, suggestibility
2. Changes in facial 
expression, dimpling, 
wounds, swelling, muscle 
contractions and flexions, 
changes in flow (tears from 
eyes, mucus from nose, 
saliva, genital secretions, 
blood, perspiration), hair or 
beard style
3. Immobility, stiffness, 
insensitivity, impassivity
1. Disappearance, silence, 
pausing, leave taking, 
ending a topic
2. Appearance, action 
following pause, greeting, 
growth, eruption, 
aggregation, beginning a 
new topic
1. Blushing, tanning, 
becoming pale, reddening 
(anger, exertion, 
engorgement of sexual
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Table S. 1 (cont.)
Invariant Information Action
2. Changes in texture
organs), clothing and hair 
color changes; timbre of 
voice
2. Wrinkles, pimples, 
creasing of skin or clothes, 
goose bumps, moistening 
or drying
Frequency and regularity 1. Changes in spatial 
density or temporal 
frequency
2. Changes in regularity 
of time or space between 
events
1. Number of textural 
elements, beats (claps, head 
nods, vocal sounds), pitch 
of voice, synchrony in time
2. Rhythms, regularity vs. 
irregularity of time between 
beats or points, uniform vs. 
non-uniform distribution of 
spatial elements
T h e point o f  this table is to show that a small num ber o f  invariants 
create information that underlies a great variety o f  com m unicative actions. 
In addition to those actions listed in the T able, one can imagine an even 
larger catalogue o f  actions that represent com binations and variants o f  
these information types.
T ake, for exam ple, the invariants o f  intensity and o f  temporal frequency  
and regularity. T h e intensity invariant allows one to perceive a change o f  
intensity, say changes in stress within a word or sentence. T h e temporal 
pattern invariant allows one to perceive differences betw een stress change 
patterns that have different temporal properues. For exam ple, the word 
‘h ello ’ can be spoken with an abrupt stress increase on the first syllable 
(hel -  o), or with a m ore gradual stress increase on the second syllable 
(he -  lo), or with a gradual increase and m aintenance o f  high stress on 
the second syllable and the artificial addition o f  a low ered-stress third 
syllable (he -  lo -  o). T h e resultant d ifferences in information from 
these three readings o f  ‘h ello ’ com e from the listener’s and speaker’s 
perceptual detecdon o f  the invariant and variant properties o f  intensity 
changes over time, the intensity contour o f  the speech . Intensity contour is 
one o f  many possible com binations o f  informational m odes used in social 
com m unication.
Although the research is a bit sketchy, there is evidence that infants may 
perceive all o f  the invariants listed in Table 5 .1.27 Sensitivity to each invariant 
may emerge at a different age and may be more acute in some perceptual 
modalities compared to others. In any case, infants are capable o f  using 
perception to derive meaningful information in social interaction well before
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the onset o f  language and gesture: merely by being a participant in a mutually 
coordinated action system with another person.
This model o f  continuous information creation provides a link to the 
continuous creation o f  mutual action during co-regulation. In one example 
(Figure 3.2), a speaker stretched out a word (herrrr) and shifted his posture 
with the result that the listener, who had momentarily looked away, resumed 
looking at the speaker.
How can we describe this in informational terms? T he speaker perceived 
a shearing in the visual flow field around the listener’s head (rotation, 
turning away) that had meaning with respect to the speaker’s actions (this 
information means to the speaker that the listener may be inattentive). The  
listener perceived a change in the intensity contour o f  the speech (drawing 
out the word with falling stress and pitch), a dissolution o f  the speech sounds 
(silent pause), and perhaps caught in peripheral vision a deformation o f  the 
speaker’s form (posture shift). Each o f  these perceptual flow fields becom e 
informative to the listener (information meaning that the speaker is requesting 
the listener’s visual attention), whose head turn and gaze back at the speaker 
was perceived as a form o f rotation signifying that the talk could resume.
Similarly, very young infants will alter their behavior when adults turn 
away, leave, interrupt their activities with the infant, drastically change their 
intensity o f  touch or speech, or change their posture.28 I suggest that infants 
perceive these changes in action according to similar invariant dimensions 
as adults. Infants, however, may have less elaborate cross-modal linkages to 
actions than adults.
In a study I did in collaboration with Sueko T oda,29 we observed infants 
at 3 and again at 6 months interacting with their mothers. Following a 
3-minute spontaneous face-to-face interaction, the mothers were asked to 
cease talking and moving and just sit quietly and watch the infant. Previous 
work30 using a similar procedure at 3 months showed that when mother 
displayed the ‘still-face,’ the infants reduced their smiling and looked away 
from her more than during the spontaneous play. Toda and I found that in 
addition to merely looking away, 6-m onth-olds, compared to 3-m onth-olds, 
were more likely to look at som ething they were doing with their hands, such 
as touching their clothing or the chair, or their own hands. In other words, 
the creation o f  information related to maternal interruption was disruptive o f  
the infant’s social activity at both ages, but the older infants were able to link 
the perception o f  interruption to a wider array o f  action modalities.
T h e concept o f  information used here is similar to the concept o f  meaning 
used by others. According to the theory o f  activity (see Chapter 8 for a fuller 
discussion), the meaning o f  an event is related to the individual's purpose or 
goal. Jerome Bruner31 views meaning as initially functional and as related to 
the context o f  events in which the individual is acting. Proponents o f  this 
perspective typically view meaning as constructed through action, not as a 
representation o f  some objective reality ‘out there.’ I shall use the terms
meaning and information as synonymous, with the assumption that meaning 
is not taken as pre-existing, nor as categorical, nor as objectively inherent in 
actions and objects, but rather as continuous and created through action.
Information is created at the interface between perception and action. 
Events that one can perceive (including physical objects and the actions of 
others) are informative only to the extent that they are meaningfully related 
to one’s current actions: different actions with respect to the same events will 
yield different information. T h e information is therefore not ‘in’ the situation 
nor ‘in’ the perceiver, but is created when the perceiver engages in an active 
discourse with the event. Information is cross-modal in the sense that it can 
be perceived through different sensory systems and translated into different 
forms o f  action in any part o f  the body.
Information is also meaningful with respect to the experience o f  one's own 
body. It is not just that I can perform an action to achieve a purpose that is 
meaningful, but it is what I discover about how I perform the action: what my 
arms and legs can do, my cardiovascular tolerance, my trust in my ears and 
eyes to assist me. It is this last point, the saliency o f  the body -  the artistry 
o f  the performance and the simple pleasure o f  perceiving -  that is missing 
in many theories o f  meaning.32
In ordinary social communication, participants do not always detect the 
same information. Although information is, in theory, available in both social 
and non-social situations, those situations will be informative in different 
ways for different people, and at different times for the same person. In 
general, because co-regulation moves individuals toward consensual frames, 
this enhances the probability that partners will create particular forms o f  
information. When interacting in non-social situations, the individual must 
do all the work o f  accommodation. According to Gibson,
The information for perception is not transmitted, does not consist of signals, and 
does not entail a sender and a receiver. The environment does not communicate 
with the observers who inhabit it. Why should the world speak to us? The world 
is specified in the structure of the light that reaches us, but it is entirely up to us 
to perceive it.33
T he unique feature o f  the social world is that it increases the likelihood that 
we will perceive certain features o f  the environment, o f  ourselves or o f  the 
social partner.
G. H. M ead captures the dynamic nature o f  information creation in social 
communication. H e states that ‘the act or adjustive response o f  the second  
organism gives to the gesture o f  the first organism the meaning which it 
has.’34 Co-regulation enhances the creation o f  information because the events 
to be perceived are the actions o f  another person, actions that are fitting more 
closely over time with one’s own. Although it may seem more difficult to 
create meaningful information with respect to a complex, dynamic social 
partner compared to an inanimate object, the ‘adjustive’ response o f  the social
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partner that is becom ing coordinated into a consensual frame with one’s own 
makes one’s action more readily perceived as meaningful by the partner.
In fo rm a tio n  in  in f a n t - a d u l t  c o m m u n ic a tio n
Consider the following examples35 in which an infant’s mother holds out her 
hand in an offer to pick up an infant.
Successful offer to pick up. Laura (age 12 months, 15 days) is seated in the highchair. 
Her mother is kneeling in front of her and talking to her. Both are looking at each 
other. Mother points to ‘Woodstock’ (a toy bird suspended from the ceiling) and 
comments, ‘Look at Woodstock.’ Laura follows the directive and then vocalizes. 
She then looks back to her mother and grins. Her mother forms a pick-up offer 
and asks, ‘Are you coming?’ Laura immediately forms a reply. As her mother 
places her hands in position, Laura leans forward into her arms and her mother 
starts to lift.
Unsuccessful offer to pick up. Stuart (age 9 months, 18 days) is strapped in the 
highchair. His mother stands to the side by the mobile, approximately 3 meters 
away. She is touching the animals on the mobile and asking Stuart if he can 
see the tiger. Stuart’s attention is focused on the rattle in his hand, but he 
occasionally glances toward his mother and the mobile. Stuart looks toward 
his mother, who forms an offer to pick up, ‘Want to come?’ Before she has 
completed the offer, Stuart looks back to the rattle. ‘Do you want to come and 
see?’ He briefly looks at his mother and then continues to play with the rattle. 
His mother drops her offer.
In a discrete state model o f  information in communication we would view 
these examples in terms o f  individual states and signals related to those states. 
In the first instance, mother signals an offer to pick up and Laura signals her 
willingness to accept the offer. In the second instance, mother’s offer signal is 
met with a signal o f  rejection from Stuart. From a discrete state perspective, 
we might infer -  reading backward from action to intention -  that Laura is 
willing, cooperative and friendly while Stuart is uninterested, uncooperative 
or unfriendly at that moment.
From the perspective o f  a continuous process model o f  communication, 
however, this reasoning about inner states and communication signals often 
leads to erroneous assumptions about the participants and their motives. T he  
logic and language I am trying to develop here, however, may seem  to exclude 
the possibility that individuals have internal states. That is definitely not my 
view. Rather, because o f  co-regulation, cognitions and emotions are created 
as part o f  the communication and are not fixed in advance.
After studying many instances o f  pick-up offers, Valerie Service, Andrew  
Lock and Penelope Chandler36 were able to distinguish successful and 
unsuccessful offers on the basis o f  differences in the ongoing communicative 
process and not on the basis o f  each individual’s presumed internal state 
or intention. Successful offers occurred when mother and infant’s actions
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were both visually focused on the pick-up offer, and when the infant was 
not otherwise occupied. T hus offers were more likely to be informative for 
the infant’s actions when there was already a frame for consensual attention, 
and when mother’s position was such that it captured the infant’s attention 
(Stuart’s mother stood o ff to the side and above the infant; Laura’s mother 
was direcdy in front o f  and at eye level with the infant). Because the infant 
was not holding or sucking on anything there was an opportunity to create a 
consensual frame for picking up and accepting the offer. If the child is not 
ready and able to be picked up, the offer is not informative for the child’s next 
action. T h e child can clearly see the offer: it is not enshrouded in a haze of 
noise. It is simply uninteresting, not apparently relevant to the ongoing action. 
T hus, offering as a discrete and bounded action is not by itself informative 
even to an infant who might respond on another occasion.
Many investigators have found that infants appear to be more compliant, 
friendly and cooperative -  that is, they take adult actions seriously as 
meaningful -  when adults time their requests to the infant’s readiness to 
respond, and when the adults set up a sequence o f  continuous interaction 
that ultimately may lead to such readiness.37 In work currently in progress 
in my laboratory, Daniel M essinger and I38 have analyzed successes and 
failures in both the mother’s and the year-old infant’s offers o f  objects to 
each other. Offers to give or to take an object are most successful when 
framed by mutual attention. Although infants at 1 year are not as skilled 
as their mothers in setting up a prior sequence o f  actions that heighten the 
probability o f  informative offers, infant offers are often accompanied by an 
infant smile at the mother at the time o f  the offer. By smiling and looking 
at mother at the same time, and often by exaggerated extensions o f  the arm, 
infants o f  this age seem  to recognize the need for communicative strategies 
that make their offers more informative for their partners.39
If mother fails to respond to infant offers or to other types o f  communicative 
bids, infants as young as 6 months o f  age have been observed to try alternative 
strategies to capture the adult’s attention. Depending on their age, infants will 
vocalize repeatedly, use alternative forms o f  gesturing, grab an adult’s arm 
or clothing, reject adult’s alternatives, and otherwise persist until the adult 
responds in an acceptable manner. Adults do the same.40 T his phenomenon, 
called a communicative repair, suggests that from a very early age infants act as 
if  they view communication as a process over time and not as a set o f  discrete 
signals, and they act as if  the information for the partner related to their offer 
is based upon how it is framed and co-regulated.
A final example o f  information in continuous communication systems 
com es from my research on postural communication during face-to-face 
interaction with 3-m onth-old  infants.41 In the series o f  photos shown at the 
top o f  Figure 5.5, mother holds infant Linda in a semi-upright position and 
facing mother in frames 1 -3 . In frame 4, mother tips Linda to one side and 
leans her back to a sem i-supine position (frame 6) while supporting her head
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(frame 7). During the position shift Linda opens her mouth wide (frame 5) and 
initiates a bout o f  smiling while looking at the mother (frames 6-8). What we 
see in this series o f  photographs is a smooth shift in infant posture toward a 
more supine position in which both mother and infant are moving together.
T h e fact that the position change is achieved by a process o f  continuous 
communication is revealed by an unsuccessful attempt to move the infant’s 
body seen in the bottom half o f  Figure 5.5. Linda’s mother tries to attract 
the infant’s attention to her face by turning Linda’s head, which the mother 
supports with her left hand. Mother succeeds in capturing Linda’s gaze in 
frames 2—5. In frame 6, however, Linda looks down then puts her hand to 
her mouth and turns away again, which is accomplished as her mother gently 
relaxes her grip on Linda’s neck.
Thus, mother does not force Linda to look at her by applying more 
pressure to turn her head. Getting the infant’s attention seem s to work best
(a) Successful posture change
(b) Unsuccessful posture change
Figure 5.5 An example of a successful and an unsuccessful attempt to change an 
infant’s position. In each case, co-regulation creates information that is meaningful in 
guiding each partner’s actions with respect to each other. (Sourer. Fogel, A. 
‘Movement and communication in human infancy: the social dynamics of 
development’, in Human Movement Science II, 1992, reprinted by permission of 
Elsevier Science Publishers.)
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if  the mother’s attempt to turn the infant’s head or move her body is timed to 
when the infant is already turning toward her and relatively relaxed. Linda’s 
smile in the top half o f  Figure 5.5 may not have occurred if  the infant was 
not ready for the position change, and Linda’s face in the bottom half o f  the 
figure shows how infant facial expressions becom e informative for the adult 
during the co-regulation process.
Information in this system is continuously updated and mutually negotiated. 
It is not in the form o f a signal and a response but is part o f  the process o f  how 
the interaction unfolds over time. Because information in continuous systems 
is broadly defined as anything created by co-regulation, infants o f  any age can 
be participants in the creation o f  information that is meaningful to them.
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The formation of 
relationships: creating 
new meaning
Relationships form when communication between the same individuals occurs 
over repeated occasions. For most o f us, communication takes place within 
the context o f  ongoing relationships and it is within the sanctuary o f  
relationships that we develop as individuals: with parents, with children, 
with friends and lovers, with opponents and enem ies. W e com e to know 
ourselves first from moorage in the harbor o f  family relationships, hopefully, 
before we drift or sail under full steam to unknown protected waters.
In this chapter, I examine some o f the existing theories o f  individual 
development in relationships and the development o f  relationships. I compare 
discrete vs. continuous models o f  relationship formation. I propose that 
babies are participants in relationships from the beginning and that they 
share with their parents in the creation o f  meaning.
C h a p te r  6
M o d e l s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r m a t i o n
T h e  d is c re te  m o d e l o f  r e la t io n s h ip  fo rm a tio n
O ne model o f  development suggests that a relationship is organized into 
discretely different time periods in such a way that the characteristics o f  
the relationship at prior time periods are necessary precursors to the current 
and future characteristics. T his model o f  relationship formation is called a 
stage model. In a stage model, development is viewed as an invariant sequence 
o f discretely different stages, each o f  which contains the seeds for the next. 
O ne problem with such models is that stages often take on a life o f  their own, 
as if  they occur by design.
A continuous process model o f  relationship history assumes that new  
consensual frames in a relationship emerge via continuously changing and co­
regulating processes. T h e relationship system has a history because each new  
encounter creates new information that then becom es part o f  the consensual
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frame between the partners. Consensual frames emerge and stabilize as 
part o f  the active process o f  re-creation and not because o f  the organizing 
influence o f  som e generalized stage representation inside each individual.
I don’t want to resurrect the lengthy, ongoing and important debate within 
developmental psychology about the strengths and limitations o f  stage vs. 
continuous process models o f  developm ent.1 A brief critique o f  stage models 
is useful, however, within the general theme o f  this book. T he critique 
is based on theoretical approaches to development that rely on dynamic 
transactions and continuous process models o f  development.2
It often happens that stage concepts are developed as heuristic tools for 
talking about different periods o f  development, but later becom e reified as 
discrete units: stored in some dedicated area o f  the brain and presumed to 
be causes for the emergence o f  later discrete stages. There are models o f  
infant development that are based on representations o f  relationship stages 
and therefore on the individual’s use o f  such representations to guide their 
progress through the relationship.3 T h e only way to defend such models in 
early infancy, for babies participating in their first social relationship outside 
the womb, is by an appeal to an innate representation o f  relationships and 
their changing frames.
Table 6.1 shows the rather well-known sequence o f  stages in the development 
o f parent-infant attachment proposed by John Bowlby. At all stages the child 
has a ‘working m odel’ o f  the relationship, a representation in memory for the 
accessibility o f  the parent to intimate encounters.
T h e reductionism to a discrete state representation within the individual o f  
developmental stages o f  increasing intimacy reflects an objectivist, that is non­
relational, core hidden in many developmental theories that on the surface at 
least, appear to be interactional in focus. John Fentress,4 Susan Oyama,5 and 
Peter Wolff6 have written excellent essays on the meta-theoretical error o f  this 
sort o f  reductionism in developmental thinking.7 T he ultimate question -  for 
adults and for infants -  is, if  there are representations o f  stages, where are they 
stored and where did they com e from? Since infants don’t becom e attached to 
all their acquaintances, it can’t be the case that infants automatically invoke an 
attachment and intimacy development plan or a shared meaning progression 
with everyone they meet.
T h e danger o f  stage models is that individuals take the stage notion that 
is created purely as a descriptive metaphor and reify it into a determinism  
o f  inevitable succession.8 Once stages are reified, people are compelled to 
search for where and how they are stored in the individual (in the genes 
or in a genetic predisposition for the brain to develop in such invariant 
sequences) or in the environment (in the parent’s model o f  the infant and 
o f  infant development).
In my view, stage models can be useful in the following ways. They  
provide a set o f  cultural metaphors for talking about changes in what happens 
between parents and infants over time. They offer some guidance for parents,
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Table 6.1. John Bowlby’s model of the development of parent-infant relationship stages 
during the first years of life
Approximate 
age (months)
0 to 2 and over
1 to 6 and over
6 to 30 and














of proximity to 
a discriminated 
figure by means 
of locomotion as 
well as signals 
Formation of a 
goal-corrected 
partnership
The infant shows orientation to social stimuli -  
grasping, reaching, smiling and babbling. The baby will 
cease to cry when picked up or when seeing a face. 
These behaviors increase when the baby is in proximity 
to a companion, although the baby cannot distinguish 
one person from another.
Similar orientation behaviors as in Stage I appear, but 
they are markedly directed to the primary caregiver. 
Evidence of discrimination begins at 1 month for 
auditory and at 2V2 months for visual stimuli.
The repertoire of responses to people increases to 
include following a departed mother, greeting her 
on return and using her as a base for exploration. 
Strangers are treated with caution and may evoke 
alarm and withdrawal, others may be selected as 
additional anachment figures (for example, fathers). 
The child begins to acquire insight into the mother’s 
feelings and goals, which leads to cooperative 
interaction and partnership.
(Sourer. Bowlby J. Attachment, 1973, copyright ©  1969 Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations and ©  1973 Random House UK Ltd., reprinted by permission of HarperCollins 
Publishers and The Hogarth Press.)
caregivers and clinicians for patterns o f  interaction that are normative or 
expectable at particular ages and they can be useful tools in the hands o f  a 
skilled diagnostician. Finally, stage descriptions are concise narrative models 
for what a theory o f  relationship must explain as an outcome o f  a more 
fundamental process. Stages are, in a word, metaphors for development and 
not models o f  the developmental process.9
T h e  c o n t in u o u s  p ro c e s s  m o d e l o f  r e la t io n s h ip  fo rm a tio n
Assuming that relationships do progress toward an increasing consensus 
about intimacy or about shared meaning, how can we explain this process 
without resorting to discrete stages or innate pre-knowledge as the explanation 
o f this progression? Social psychologist Steve Duck10 describes relationships 
as moving through stages o f  increasing intimacy, but his view o f  relationship 
formation is a continuous process model. For Duck, the stages o f  intimacy are 
continuously created by the participants: intimacy emerges from the process 
of mutual interaction. After an initial mutual attraction is established, a discrete 
state model would suggest that each individual must assess for himself or herself 
the risks and benefits o f  moving to the next stage o f  intimacy as if both partners
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knew what was coming and could make the decision independendy o f each 
other.11 In D uck’s continuous process model, moves to new consensual frames 
for increased intimacy are the result o f  mutual negotiation.
The wish to become closer can be shown by indicating greater interest in the 
person, by showing that you enjoy his or her company, by confiding, by asking for 
personal advice and seeking opinions, or by generally creating more opportunities 
for further meetings in a wider variety of circumstances. When the invitation is 
thus indicated obliquely, indirectly and ambiguously, it may be acknowledged 
or ignored without offence . . .  Such changes in the patterns and diversity of 
their activities, the frequency of their meetings and their communication styles, 
are all ways of indicating, cementing and establishing increases in intimacy and 
commitment.12
It is notable that this observation on relationship formation is similar to 
the examples I cited in earlier chapters on the establishment o f  consensual 
frames during a single interaction. In other words, in the same way that 
the agreement about the type and topic o f  discourse must be mutually 
negotiated via co-regulation, the developmental changes in the frame must 
also be negotiated. As individuals spend more time together -  a mutually 
co-regulated change in their relationship -  they have more opportunities to 
know each other better and thus more intimate frames arise spontaneously.
According to Duck, couples do not start out talking about intimacy but 
as they becom e increasingly intimate they turn their discussions toward the 
topic o f  intimacy itself. They discuss their mutual commitments in such a way 
that the decision-making in the couple is not individualistic, based entirely on 
personal judgements o f  reward and cost, but rather socially co-regulated. It 
may actually be impossible to say whether a commitment to marriage, for 
example, is based on one’s independent evaluations o f  the other person, or 
on one’s sense o f  the other’s commitment, or on a mutual agreement to be 
committed to each other.
Couples also begin to recognize the concreteness o f  the relationship by 
increasing communication about their shared past and less about their 
individual experiences prior to their meeting. According to Duck, this ‘has 
the consequence o f  making them focus on the relationship itself and their 
feelings about it. It thus promotes an agreed definition o f  the relationship 
and its form, which is essential for its growth.’13 People mutually create 
stories about their relationship. Duck makes a remarkable statement about 
stories that captures what I believe is the essence o f  the relationship formation 
process: ‘I would go so far as to say that the creation o f  such stories is a part 
o f  the creation o f  the relationship itself.’14 
Cultural and individual factors clearly play a role in relationship formation. 
Relationships are constrained to develop by cultural norms, as illustrated by 
culturally imposed restrictions on dating, and also by moral and ethical 
restrictions on sexual intimacy between, for example, siblings, parents and 
children, clients and therapists. Relationships are also constrained by the
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individual’s tolerance for intimacy and willingness to enter into co-regulated  
discourse with a particular partner.
Nevertheless, a continuous process model o f relationship formation suggests 
that relationships create themselves in the context o f  these cultural and 
individual constraints, but without following the constraints slavishly as 
if  they were rules. Indeed, those cultural and individual constraints may 
become more or less important as the co-regulation creates new frames over 
repeated encounters. Relationships, therefore, are dynamic systems. They are 
created out o f  repeated interactions between the same two individuals, they 
develop stable and consensual frames over time, they change via creativity 
and variability.
W hen we examine the ways in which relationships change over time, it 
becom es apparent that the same kind o f  consensual frame may persist nearly 
unchanged for weeks until something unexpected happens and the dyad shifts 
dramatically to an entirely different frame o f  discourse. T his patterning o f  
stability and relatively sudden change has a stage-like quality. As we will 
discuss in the next section, this pattern o f  developmental change can be 
explained with respect to the creativity o f  co-regulation without appealing 
to pre-planning or to discrete state concepts.
C r e a t i v i t y  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s
M e a n in g  a n d  in fo rm a tio n  c re a tio n
Co-regulation is creative because information is not entirely fixed in advance, 
not entirely ‘in’ the se lf or ‘in’ the other. Information becom es available 
only through active engagement. I propose that the creation o f  meaning is 
the motivation for communication and for the persistence o f  relationships 
over time, not the mere meeting o f  needs through other people.1S Ernest 
Schachtel, a psychoanalyst who has written about normal development, 
captures this idea in the following way.
A painter may spend many days, weeks or months, or even years, in looking at 
the same mountain, as Cezanne did, or at blades of grass or bamboo leaves or 
branches of a tree, as many of the Chinese and Japanese masters did, without 
tiring of it and without ceasing to discover something new in it. The same is true 
of the poet’s or writer’s devoted love for his object . . .  of the true naturalist’s 
perception of the plant or animal with which he has to live for long periods of time 
in order to acquire that intimate knowledge from which eventually new meaning 
and understanding will be bom.16
T he same is true, he goes on to write, o f getting to know another person 
‘truly and deeply.’
T h e continuous process model o f  information provides an understanding
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o f  how repeated encounters with the same object or person can continue 
to create new meaning. W hen relationships evolve into patterns in which 
participants perceive them as sequences o f  discrete exchanges o f  reward and 
cost it is quite likely that the creativity has gone out o f  them. They are no 
longer dynamic systems in which individuals grow, they have becom e prisons 
o f  the soul. Repeated encounters, therefore, can sometim es dull the senses 
and produce hatred, anger and boredom. It is not mere repetition that leads 
to creative elaboration, it is one’s stance toward the other, one’s openness to 
change and desire to create new meaning through the relationship.
Relationships must have a mystique: there must be something not quite 
known, som ething that may never be understood or even articulated, som e­
thing that entices the mind and body and that renews the meaning in the 
relationship.
I am using the concept o f  continuously created information in co-regulated 
systems to explain their persistence over time; the desire and the thrill o f 
that information creation is the principal motive for staying involved. By this 
definition, I am not suggesting that relationships are primarily cognitive, for 
that would be taking the term information in its discrete mentalistic sense. 
As explained in Chapter 5, information in a continuous process model can 
be anything that is perceived and created through co-regulated interactions 
with objects and people: information can be in the form o f  body movement, 
emotion, thought, memory, or sensation.
Equally, I am not suggesting that there is a motivation to becom e intimate 
with another person as the primary cause o f  relationship development. Earlier, 
I rejected this type o f  prior representation o f  the progress o f  a relationship. 
I may begin a relationship with an individualistic need or wish to become 
intimate, but the process o f  information creation about that need with the 
other person should eventually replace it. If my body needs or wants to 
gain information about som ething in particular, this is what organizes my 
action and makes the information meaningful to me, but it is always in 
relation to the object o f  my encounters. T h e same relationship can mean 
different things to each participant. Having a shared goal is not required 
initially for relationships to form and develop, although at later stages o f  a 
relationship it may becom e an explicit goal for the continued growth o f  the 
relationship.
In n o v a t io n s  in  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  p a r e n t - in f a n t  r e la t io n s h ip s
I will illustrate how the creation o f  information across repeated encounters 
leads to the development o f  the parent-infant relationship by using examples 
from my own longitudinal research. T h e first example com es from research 
on infant transactions with objects in the company o f  their mothers near the 
end o f  the first year o f  life.
Around this time infants acquire the ability to release objects voluntarily
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into an adult’s outstretched hand, that is, to offer objects to the adult. A 
case study on the development o f  offering done by Mark Reinecke and m e17 
shows the progressive co-regulation o f  the consensual frame for offering.
Infant Hannah had becom e comfortable grasping and examining objects 
on her own. At 40 weeks o f  age (about 9.5 months), Hannah’s mother began 
to take the objects gently from Hannah’s hand, which Hannah immediately 
demanded back. M other waited until this request was made before returning 
the object. Several weeks passed in which mother took the object, waited for 
Hannah to reach for it and then gave it back to her.
A delicate period o f  negotiation ensued in which Hannah’s mother grasped 
the object Hannah was holding as if  to take the object, but stopped short 
o f  taking it out o f  Hannah’s hand. She waited with gentle pressure until 
Hannah released the object. T his barely noticeable tug-of-war became a 
barely noticeable little game in which, for the moment, everything depended  
upon who held and who released. It is identical to the balance o f  forces 
exchanged in the pull-to-sit example o f Figure 2 .1.18
Perhaps a moment occurred between Hannah and her mother that was 
like the moment I showed between Andrew and his mother in Figure 2.3: 
a moment in which the infant’s releasing the object and the mother’s taking 
o f  it were entirely co-regulated, a jointly created activity in which no one 
actually took or actually offered the object. Unfortunately, we didn’t capture 
this on tape for Hannah.
I believe that the genuinely decisive episodes in development are just 
such moments. T hese epiphanies o f  innovation are brief in elapsed time, 
mostly occurring in private, and therefore rarely observable by developmental 
scientists or clinicians.19 Innovations emerge out o f  the fabric o f  the ongoing  
relationship process, and then become integrated into that process often 
leading to new consensual frames for co-regulation.
Regardless o f  the specifics o f  the process, only after genuine negotiation 
about how to manage object possession did Hannah begin to release the 
object voluntarily into the mother’s hand. Hannah watched the object intently 
as it travelled away from her, carried by the mother’s hand. As mother held 
it, waiting for a request, Hannah pre-emptively crawled over to her mother 
and took the object back. New negotiations emerged, this time framed by 
Hannah as the grabber and mother doing the holding and releasing. We 
could say that this constitutes a new ‘stage’ in the relationship, but we also 
see how it evolves in a continuous way, via innovation and transformation, 
from the prior pattern o f  co-activity.
O ne o f  Hannah’s favorite toys was a bright red telephone that made a 
ringing noise. As with other objects, she would hand it to her mother to 
whom the telephone meant a game o f pretend conversation with grandma 
or daddy. Hannah typically became impatient with what she perceived as a 
meaningless delay and climbed into mother’s lap to get the phone back.
All o f  this changes at 44 weeks, when we recorded the following observation.
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Hannah picks up the phone and looks at it, then at her mother. She offers the 
phone to her mother in the same manner that she had done in previous weeks. 
Mother takes the phone, puts it to her ear as in previous instances and says, ‘Hi, 
grandma!’ At that point, Hannah looks and smiles at mother and reaches out 
to request the phone. Her mother offers the phone to Hannah, who puts it to 
her ear and says, ‘Ha-o.’ Hannah again looks at mother then offers the phone 
to mother.
Hannah’s explicit offer o f  the phone in this example shows an important 
difference because the offer now incorporates looks to the mother’s face, 
an actual request rather than a grab, a smile and a word indicating that 
the offer is framed as i  want to play the phone game.’ T hese changes in 
the meaning o f  the offer and request for the infant occur over repeated 
negotiated encounters with the mother. In the early instances, Hannah and 
her mother perceived different information about the telephone. In the last 
instance, the information about the phone was consensual.
This research illustrates how consensual frames are transformed and how 
information is elaborated over the course o f relationship change. One could 
say, as Kaye has done, that the change here can be described as a movement 
from shared rhythms (the turn-taking rhythm o f  give and take) to shared 
intentions (the agreement about jointly engaging in a game with a single 
purpose).20 There is also evidence here o f  a shared memory and a shared 
language. T his is as effective a way to describe this change as any that I 
know of.
From my perspective, however, all o f  the phases in the development o f  
offering described here were based on co-regulated communication within an 
established consensual frame. In the early instances, information was created 
about issues like possession, holding on and letting go. In the latter instance 
the information was about how to create a pretend conversation. Each 
communication episode involved consensus and each involved negotiation 
around aspects where consensus was absent. I prefer, therefore, to speak 
about cognitions that arise as part o f  the communication process rather than 
about communication as exchanging messages about one’s cognitions.
Another essential aspect o f  the development o f  the telephone game is that 
a small innovation in the communication system leads to a major change 
in the types o f  consensual frames for co-regulated discourse: from merely 
giving and taking routines to games with symbolic elem ents o f  pretend and 
imagination. T h ese innovations are not pre-planned, and they only make 
sense in terms o f  the spontaneous discovery o f  new meaning. One is left 
to conclude that developmental change in a relationship arises spontaneously 
from the creative elaboration o f  information within ongoing stable consensual 
frames. Thus, the same information creation process that is responsible 
for the maintenance o f  consensual frames linking perception and action is 
also responsible for the creation o f  entirely new information that leads the 
communication system to evolve into a new consensual frame.
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A final aspect o f  this developmental process is what Jerome Bruner calls 
conventionalization and what Maria Lyra refers to as the abbreviation o f  joint 
action.21 They are referring to what happens in the developmental transition 
from negotiation to consensus, from co-regulation to framing. Initially, there 
is no |  frame for giving and taking objects and it takes weeks o f  mutual 
negotiation to establish the frame. A single act o f  giving or taking may take 
a long period o f  time as the infant wants to hold on to the object or to chase 
it down after giving it away. Once this procedure is worked out, it becom es 
stabilized, repeatable and patterned into a mutually created frame in which 
giving and taking occur rapidly and automatically and begin to serve as the 
launching pad for more elaborate forms o f  discourse in which the give-take 
frame plays a small but necessary- part. T he abbreviation metaphor captures 
the fact that frames form out o f  earlier co-regulated dialogue by a process o f  
shrinking the action in time and smoothing out the performance.
Thus, relationships change by the dual process o f  innovation/negotiation 
and consensual framing/abbreviation. There is no single developmental 
trajectory. Different features o f  the communication are at different phases 
in this process. At any given point in time there is always som e consensual 
frame and always som ething being negotiated within the frame.
W h a t is  th e  ro le  o f  th e  a d u l t  g u id e ?
In the study o f  the relationships between infants and their parents, a 
comparison between their relative knowledge and abilities inevitably arises. 
Adults, clearly, are more skilled and considerably more knowledgeable 
about the culture, about infants, and about relationships than their infant 
partners. Adults also act in certain recognizable ways when in the company 
o f  infants.
As noted by a number o f  investigators o f  the parent-infant relationship, 
parents and other more capable partners provide supportive frames in which 
infants can act with higher levels o f  performance than when alone. T he  
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky was among the first to point this out 
with his concept o f  the zone o f  proximal development, defined as ‘the distance 
between the actual developmental level as determined by independent 
problem solving and the level o f  potential development as determined 
through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with 
more capable peers.’22 There is a considerable amount o f  recent research 
to support the idea o f  ‘distance’ between the child’s skills when alone or 
even with a similarly competent peer and the child’s more advanced skills 
when with an adult.23
T h e difference in the child’s performance during interactions with adults 
is believed to be due to the structuring, the guidance given by adults to the 
infant’s activities. Kenneth Kaye talks about what he calls ‘parental frames’ 
in this way:
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infants learn to play the role of system members because adults place them in 
situations where the skills they lack are performed for them . . .  By taking his role 
for him, they (the parents] also demonstrate that role. Gradually, they relinquish 
it to him as he shows signs of being able to take it on.24
Jerome Bruner describes the ‘language acquisition support system’ that 
occurs over the course o f  development within relationships, especially during 
elaborations o f  games like ‘peek-a-boo’ over several months o f  the infant’s 
life.
If the ‘teacher’ in such a system were to have a motto, it would surely be ‘where 
before there was a spectator, let there now be a participant.’ One sets the 
games, provides a scaffold to assure that the child’s ineptitudes can be rescued 
or rectified by appropriate intervention, and then removes the scaffold part by 
part as the reciprocal structure can stand on its own.25
The adult, it is believed, by virtue o f  increased experience, brings prefabricated 
structure to the interaction, perhaps using culturally available games, and 
assists the infant in discovering the characteristics o f  that structure. Barbara 
R ogoff also applies Vygotsky’s ideas to her concept o f  ‘guided participation.’
Shared problem solving — with an active learner participating in culturally 
organized activity with a more skilled partner -  is central to the process 
of learning in apprenticeship. So are other features of guided participation 
that I emphasize: the importance of routine activities, tacit as well as explicit 
communication, supportive structuring of novice’s efforts, and a transfer of 
responsibility for handling skills to novices.26
Each o f  these theorists is clear about the fact that transition to the next 
phase o f  a relationship, toward more infant responsibility for action, is partly 
dependent upon the child’s abilities and desires to becom e more responsible. 
Adults decide to transfer responsibility in response to the child’s widening 
skill. Rogoff, for example, emphasizes the child’s own initiative, creativity and 
activity. It is the child’s intrinsic motivation to be active that brings the child to 
the adult and makes children ‘active participants’ in their own development. 
Kaye also recognizes the importance o f the adult in responding to the child’s 
own initiatives.
It may seem contradictor)' to say that mothers organize the world for their infants 
and also to say . . .  that interaction is a matter of the mother’s adjustment to 
their babies. Yet this is not a contradiction . . .  When adults do allow their own 
behavior to be temporally organized by the infant’s, they are really assimilating 
his cycles of attention and arousal to the adult world’s cycles of speaking and 
listening, gesturing and observing. So the adult’s adjustment is in fact a form 
of socialization. They construct a consistently organized social world around the 
infant, teaching him to punctuate the flow of experience.27
Adults, therefore, participate in the creation o f  meaning for infants. They  
provide the outlines o f  frames and are open to adjust their actions to achieve 
co-participation.
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T hese writers accept the idea that meaning is created in pre-verbal 
interactions with infants. Infants do not need to be able to describe in 
words the meaning o f  a situation in order to participate in that situation 
via meaningful actions. T hese views also suggest that infants develop toward 
increased skills and more responsible cultural participation -  using cultural 
tools like language -  by having their actions structured and interpreted as 
meaningful by adults. Because adults can interpret the infant’s rudimentary 
actions and help the infant fill in the blanks o f  those actions in order 
to realize their goals -  through support, modeling, co-participation and 
gradual transfer o f  expertise -  infants becom e increasingly sophisticated 
social partners.28
In the guidance metaphor, the adult provides interaction formats -  cultural 
practices, games, tools -  to the relationship with the infant and becom es a 
participant in co-activity by actually playing the game with the baby. For 
some theorists the adult is also the source o f  innovations by pushing the 
child to new levels o f  activity with sensitively presented challenges. Like 
the water to which a thirsty traveller is drawn, infants are encouraged to 
drink in the parental culture. T h e infant apprentice later leaves to return 
to life’s travels, and the surface o f  the water -  the adult guide -  returns 
to its expectant clarity, untroubled, waiting to be shaken into happy ripples 
at the traveller’s next visit: the eternal mother o f  still waters, the mother as 
cultural saint.
Saints, however, do not develop; they always have the right answer and the 
necessary patience. Parents, though, develop by participating in co-regulated  
communication with an infant. T h e adult discovers how to negotiate and how 
to maintain consensual frames. Although most authors I have mentioned in 
this section are quite willing to apply the concept o f  directed action, discovery 
and creativity to the infant's action, they have only implicitly applied them to 
the adult.29
Som e authors suggest that guidance is the product o f  a mutual interaction 
between adult and child, with spontaneous and co-created discoveries o f  
relationship innovations.30 Relationships can grow even when neither indi­
vidual is consciously planning a guided curriculum because the very nature 
o f  co-regulated activity provides its own source o f  new consensual frames 
and information, new for both participants and available for further mutual 
elaboration and innovative change.
T hose who favor the guidance metaphor recognize that novices have input 
to the extent that the expert must take account o f  their level o f  performance 
and motivational readiness. In many instances, however, the infant and child 
may see the situation in a legitimately different and potentially more useful 
way than the adult. T h e adult’s action in this situation is not simply a matter 
o f being responsive to the needs o f  the child on the way to competent cultural 
skills, but rather to let the child take the expert role.
In her work on training animals, Vicki H eam e describes moments in which
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trainers must abandon their own intuitions and allow themselves to trust in 
the dog’s far superior sense o f  smell and be led on a tracking mission 
in what seem s, from the human’s perspective, to be an illogical direction. 
Trainers not only have to impart their knowledge to the dog during training, 
but at key moments they have to ‘let their knowledge com e to an end.’31 
Co-participation means that both individuals must be willing, at appropriate 
times, to accept expertise and guidance from the other, and to be vulnerable 
to being changed.32
T he first non-human examples o f  adult-child co-regulation o f  a cultural 
activity have been observed recently among chimpanzee groups in the wild. 
Som e, but not all, groups o f  chimps living in Africa have developed specific 
forms o f  tool use. Among those that use tools there are differences. They may 
use stones to crack nuts, sticks to catch termites in their nests, or leaves as 
drinking cups or sponges. Indeed the cultural diversity between chimp groups 
is considerably more than primatologists had ever expected.33
How' do young chimpanzees learn to crack nuts with a rock? Mothers 
have been observed to leave hammers and nuts near the cracking anvil 
when the children are around the area, a rather remarkable occurrence 
since the mother risks the loss o f  her hammer and nuts to another adult. 
M others will also provide hammers that are the easiest to use, and they will 
give some o f  the nuts they collect to the infant.
Salome (mother) was cracking nuts of the very hard Panda species. Sartre (infant) 
took 17 of the 18 nuts she opened. Then, his mother watching, he took her 
stone hammer and tried to crack the nuts by himself. These nuts are tricky to 
open as they consist of three kernels separately embedded in a hard wooden 
shell, and the partly opened nut has to be replaced precisely each time to gain 
access to the different kernels. After successfully opening a nut, Sartre replaced 
it haphazardly on the anvil in order to attempt access to the second kernel. 
Salome took it in her hand, cleaned the anvil, and replaced the piece carefully 
in the correct position.34
W e cannot attribute this maternal behavior to genetically given programs 
for guidance, since it does not occur in all the chimp groups, nor even in all 
the tool-using chimp groups. It is also unlikely that the chimp mothers have 
the goal o f  acculturating the infant, and they probably have no concept o f  a 
tutorial progression. T h e only reasonable explanation is that this guidance 
is spontaneously emergent from repeated communication with a less skilled 
partner within a culture that provides certain tools for specific purposes; that 
is, guidance is a consensual frame, the outcome o f  co-regulation rather than 
a plan enacted with forethought.
I don’t mean to imply by this example that human parents merely stumble 
upon guidance. Rather, I want to strip down the process o f  adult-infant 
interaction to its minimal constituents o f mutual construction. Humans are 
very different from chimps. N ot only is there a culture o f  tools and infant care 
practices, there is also a culture for guidance and its practices. Nevertheless,
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as I discuss in Chapter 10, mutual construction and creativity are at the core 
of putting those cultural practices into action with an infant.
Parenting can be done by almost anyone because in the company o f  
an infant, if  one is willing to enter into a co-regulated communication, 
parenting behavior will emerge over repeated encounters. T he pattern o f  
parental action is a creative product o f  a co-regulated interaction with an 
infant in just the same way that infant action emerges from the creative 
interaction with the parent figure. Parenting is the participation in a long­
term relationship o f  mutual commitment with an infant.35 It is a lasting 
relationship in which meaning is created, in which mutual understanding 
evolves and becom es the basis for continued involvement, and in which there 
is a willingness to work through the misunderstandings and mistakes. It is not 
to be encompassed merely as sensitivity or emotional attachment. Biological 
priming is not enough to make one a parent, no more than sexual attraction 
is a guarantee o f  a successful marriage.
A parental figure is som eone who can provide a nurturing environment that 
meets the basic needs o f  the infant, needs for companionship and sustenance, 
needs for comfort and repose. Virtually anyone can serve in the parental 
role,36 assuming they are motivated and capable o f  providing what infants 
need for their development: the biological mother and father, adoptive and 
foster parents, grandparents and other relatives, and professional infant care 
providers. In some cultures, older children provide infant care; in others 
infants are handed to any available adult in the community for tending when 
the immediate family is otherwise occupied. Parents are created through their 
participation.
C o n c l u s i o n s
The co-regulated creation o f  consensual frames is the process by which relationships 
develop. T he specific types o f  relationship patterns that emerge will depend on 
the types o f  skills available to the participants, their ability to regulate attention 
and body position, and the presumed purpose o f  their activities together. 
Just as the pattern o f  wolf-circling emerges from the constraints imposed 
by the animal’s body shape and movement potential, and by the motivation 
of each individual, I propose that relationship histories are similarly emergent 
processes to be understood from the way in which information is created for 
the participants.
Relationships sustain themselves when information is mutually created. T he  
co-creation o f  information is inherently rewarding and leads to a continuing 
mutual orientation to the partner with whom it occurs. Relationships will not 
persist in the absence o f  creativity. When people com e back together they 
don’t simply follow a script or plan, they re-create frames and continue 
to elaborate them. T h e rewards o f  mutual creativity are not necessarily
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associated with positive emotions, as presumed by a number o f  relationship 
theories.
There is considerable evidence that relationships exist and grow under 
conditions o f  adversity, such as between conflicting siblings, within animal 
and human dominance hierarchies, in pathological parent-child conflict, 
aggressive and abusive relationships, and in dysfunctional family interactions.37 
The only way to explain such persistence in relationships in spite o f  adversity 
is with respect to the sustenance o f  the co-created information: information 
about how to meet needs in spite o f  the potential for threat, information 
about how to be an equal participant in the battle, or information about how 
to diffuse conflicts even temporarily.
Successful therapies often involve re-framing the process o f  relationship in 
order for partners to be creative with each other in less destructive formats. 
It may also be that successful long-term relationships have developed ways 
to capitalize on the creative process in order to elaborate new patterns. A 
long-term relationship is never static. It is constantly self-renewing and 
therefore self-sustaining.
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C h a p te r  7
The formation of 
relationships: differences 
between dyads
In the novel, Love in the Time o f Cholera, N obel prize winner Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez tells the story o f  youthful love in his native city o f  Barranquilla, 
Colombia at the end o f  the nineteenth century. Like Romeo and Juliet, 
the adolescents in M arquez’s novel share a secret love, forbidden by family 
prejudice and the cultural standards o f  the time in which young women were 
only permitted to see young men who were approved o f  and chaperoned by 
the family. Like Shakespeare’s unlikely couple, the Colombian lovers met 
rarely. Instead, they developed a correspondence, passed between them by 
accomplices, lasting several years until the affair was discovered and forced 
to end by the girl’s father.
T h e young woman later married another man with whom she lived for 
sixty years and to whom she bore several children. T he young man never 
married, and through numerous affairs and personal trials he kept alive the 
dream o f eventual closeness with the object o f  his childhood infatuation. 
Following the death o f  the husband, the estranged couple finally court openly 
and establish sexual intimacy in their seventies. T hese literary allegories 
illustrate the power o f  relationships to persist, to shape individual lives and 
destinies, to capture the imagination.
M ost literature tells o f  relationships evolving and dissolving, remaining 
solid or breaking up through adversity. We hear stories o f  dogs and cats 
wandering for thousands o f  miles to find families who have re-located and 
o f children who mourn the loss o f  their cherished pets. Less apocryphal 
are Vicki H earne’s descriptions o f  the faithfulness and responsibility o f  
dogs and horses to their trainers, relationships lasting entire lifetimes and 
marked by mutual trust, respect and love.1 Newspapers report emotional 
family reunions: o f  adopted children with their biological parents, o f  twins 
separated early in life, o f  families torn apart by war. T hese examples are 
extreme cases o f  what we know intuitively to be true about relationships: 
they last, they have a history, they ennoble and they shame, they define us 
and hold us in their grip.
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Like individuals, no two relationships are alike. It thus becom es part o f  
the task o f  understanding relationships that we explain their variety and 
the process by which such differences form. There are a large number o f  
possible dimensions o f  difference between relationships. T hese include the 
degree o f  mutual commitment, the relative degree o f  affection vs. hostility, 
amount o f  mutual support and nurturance, and the nature o f  the roles and 
status relationships between partners.2
A theory o f  relationship formation should provide a m odel for how  
relationships preserve them selves and change over time and why human 
relationships develop along such dim ensions o f  difference. Taxonom ies 
o f  relationships’ dim ensions should not, however, be taken for a theory 
o f  relationship formation. In this book, I will not be able to address 
the variety' o f  relationships found in this taxonomy. I offer instead a 
way to think about relationships that may generate such explanations in 
the future.
P r o c e s s e s  o f  s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n  
w i t h i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s
C r e a tin g  in fo rm a tio n  b y  r e d u c in g  d e g re e s  o f  f re e d o m
Why is each relationship in which we participate different? How do relation­
ships com e to display stable consensual frames and yet maintain their creative 
variability? Although each encounter with the same person is somewhat 
different than the previous encounter, successive meetings with that partner 
have a degree o f  sameness. T he ethologist Robert Hinde has written that
to understand the stability of relationships we must understand both how they are 
preserv ed in spite of changes in the participants and the vicissitudes to which they 
are exposed, and we must also understand how they may change progressively 
and yet preserve their integrity
There are perhaps many thousands o f  potential patterns that might emerge 
when two people interact with each other at the beginning o f  a relationship. 
T hus, the theoretical problem is to discover why a particular pattern emerges. 
W e could assume that relationships progress in particular ways because o f  
some cultural rule or genetic predeterminism that biases the progress o f  
the relationship in favor o f  one or the other individual. In the last chapter 
I rejected such facile solutions because they merely take what is observed 
about the existing types o f  relationships and then hypothesize some discrete 
unit -  a gene or a rule -  that carries the code for the pattern. T he genetic 
and cultural models that arise are merely one-to-one mappings backward 
from the behavior to its presumed cause.
There is another approach, although it may seem  radical to many readers.
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That approach is to assume that there is no such rule or code but that 
differences between relationships emerge, are created in the process o f  
interaction. Complex systems, by their very nature, will converge after a 
period o f  time toward a relatively stable and identifiable pattern o f  functioning 
because o f  the ways in which the elem ents o f  the system constrain each 
other to act.
At the beginning o f  any relationship, the num ber o f  possible forms o f  
com m unication between individuals, the num ber o f  degrees o f  freedom  
in the com m unication system , is very high, set by the potentials o f  the 
participants’ bodies and their ability to form com m unicative actions. 
Individuals enter into relationships with particular predispositions, tem ­
peram ents, in the form o f  varying degrees o f  attentiveness, fussiness, 
activity level, and thresholds for stim ulation and em otional arousal.4 
B ecause these starting points are different, and because even through 
change som e tem peram ental features will continue to enter into what 
gets co-regulated, relationship patterns will be unique to each co-acting  
group o f  individuals.
In spite o f  the many possible ways two or m ore individuals could  
co-regulate, a relatively small set o f  patterns o f  interaction em erge that 
have order and regularity as well as variability. H ow, then, does a 
com m unication system  go from an initial condition o f  high uncertainty 
with many possible degrees o f  freedom  to a more organized pattern o f  
interaction?
Recall from Chapter 4 that the patterned behavior o f  collective organization 
in a system has a smaller number o f  degrees o f  freedom than the total 
number o f  degrees o f  freedom o f  its members, or in W eiss’s words, ‘the 
com ponent activities have many degrees o f  freedom, but submit to the 
ordering restraints exerted on them by the integral activity o f  the “w hole” 
in its patterned dynamics.’5
In these terms, by entering into a communication one’s many action 
possibilities (degrees o f  freedom) are in fact reduced. Out o f  the expectations 
that one may have had before the encounter, out o f  the multiple actions 
that might have shaped the encounter, out o f  all the ways one’s body can 
move that make communicative sense, a particular and specific set o f  actions 
selectively emerges in the actual encounter. Information is created when the 
degrees o f  freedom are reduced. How can this happen?
I can illustrate the initial phases o f  self-organization in a communication 
system by returning to the example o f  w olf communication, shown in Figure 
3.1. In the first frame o f  Figure 3.1, the first w olf walks past the second  
wolf, say from east to west, while the second w olf remains seated. In the 
next frame, the first w olf continues on this trajectory and both begin to 
turn their heads toward each other. In the third frame o f  Figure 3.1, the 
first w olf begins to execute a turn toward the north, while the second w olf 
begins to move toward the east: the circling pattern is taking shape.
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Now, we can begin to see how- the creation o f  information is related to 
the reduction o f  degrees o f  freedom in the action dynamics. A head turn 
constrains subsequent degrees o f  freedom precisely because its meaning 
to the other individual is to create a pattern o f  action (a matching head 
turn and a body turn) whose meaning to the first individual is continued 
vigilance. In other words, once the first w olf turns his head toward the 
second, the second’s actions reduce the first w o lfs  possibilities: he must 
continue to keep his head turned to maintain his gaze at the second wolf. 
H e can’t walk o ff cavalierly without risking attack. Something is meaningful 
because it informs me about how to regulate the dynamics o f  my next action, 
about how to choose my next action.
Thus, in a veiy short time, a consensual frame emerges with only a few 
degrees o f  freedom left to each animal: continue walking in a circle, continue 
looking at the partner. W e can formalize the description o f  the frame, therefore, 
as the set o f  degrees o f freedom that have been consensually constrained, via 
the initial co-regulated negotiation, while the remaining degrees o f  freedom in 
the system are currently part o f the negotiation process.
Information, therefore, is created when degrees o f  freedom are com ­
pressed, when one ‘submits’ to the restraints o f  the collective, o f  the 
discourse. Co-regulation as the continued compression o f  degrees o f  freedom  
is experienced by each individual as the continuous ceding o f  regulatory 
control from the se lf to the interaction. T his may feel good, or it may feel 
miserable, depending on the nature o f  the discourse.6
There are a number o f  important conclusions to be derived from this 
simple example. First, we can see how information arises when the dynamics 
o f  action are co-regulated and how information leads to consensus. Second, 
the inevitable consequence o f  reducing degrees o f  freedom in a consensual 
communication system -  or synonymously, the inevitable consequence o f  
creating meaning in a communication system -  is that frames coalesce 
spontaneously. T he wolves, as explained in Chapter 3, don’t have to plan 
this out and they don’t have to have a rule system in their heads for making 
a circling pattern. Yet, they may circle each other many times before they 
mutually withdraw, and they may do the same thing the next time they pass 
each other so closely. Repeating patterns in a relationship are symptoms o f  
information creation, not the proof o f  the existence o f  a rule or o f  the guidance 
o f  one partner by the other.
If I would otherwise have done one thing but because o f  my relationship 
with you I allow m yself to be constrained to do som ething else, I allow the 
relationship to define what is meaningful for me. If I do this consistently 
during each o f  our repeated encounters, I am also acting responsibly with 
respect to the relationship as I choose to enter anew' into a co-regulated  
contract that re-creates this responsibility. Responsibility to a partner is not 
necessarily represented in the mind, it is a characteristic o f  action-in-relation  
to another individual or thing.
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A  d y n a m i c  m o d e l  o f  c o n s e n s u a l  f r a m i n g  i n  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s
One model o f  how repeating patterns, such as consensual frames, form 
in a complex system is derived from a dynamic systems perspective. In 
certain systems, a stable resultant pattern can som etim es be modeled as 
a mathematical construct called an attractor. Attractors are not to be taken 
metaphorically to mean something like interpersonal attraction. Rather, given 
a family o f  curves generated by a system o f equations in a complex n- 
dimensional space o f  component variables, the word attractor refers to the 
mathematical property o f  these curves to converge to specific points or 
trajectories as a function o f  time. Point attractors converge to a single point, 
limit cycle attractors represent oscillatory systems and chaotic attractors 
represent a repeating movement over similar, but never precisely the same 
ground.7
I find dynamic systems models extremely heuristic for the purpose o f  
understanding relationship development because they suggest that complex 
systems can converge toward a stable pattern o f  behavior without a pre­
scription or plan, merely by the mutually constraining influences o f the 
components. T he concept o f attractors suggests that it is mathematically 
possible to model a system in which such convergence occurs spontaneously. 
Mathematicians have further demonstrated that it is possible to generate 
attractors from a system o f equations, none o f  which specifies the final form 
o f the attractor.
Such m odels are also useful because they assum e that dynamic 
system s are inherently variable. M ost o f  this variation, however, tends 
to return the system to the attractor configuration. In the example o f  
w olf-circling, we can imagine that on each new m eeting o f  this pair 
they may approach from different directions and at different speeds, 
and individual actions will be som ewhat different. Yet in spite o f  these 
differences, the system  is likely to converge into the same general 
pattern.
Sometim es, however, the range o f  variation exceeds that which is most 
conducive to creating a circling pattern. Circling occurs when one w olf is 
moving toward another who is sitting. If, however, the wolves are both 
moving in the same direction and initially in visual contact, a different 
stable pattern emerges called ‘following,’ shown in Figure 7.1. In following, 
the wolves maintain roughly the same distance between themselves at all 
times, a larger distance than for circling. They also maintain a similar body 
orientation toward each other, but that orientation is slightly different than 
for circling.8
B esides these two stable consensual frames in the tw o-w olf system,
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Figure 7.1 Another example of wolf co-regulation is the ‘following’ pattern. 
Following is similar to circling (Figure 3.1) except that the wolves have a 
different mutual orientation at the onset of the pattern. (Sourer. Moran, G. et al 
‘A description of relational patterns of movement during “ritualized fighting” in 
Wolves’, in Animal Behaviour, 1981, 29, 4, reprinted by permission of Academic 
Press Inc. (London) Ltd. and the authors.)
there are a number o f  others that Moran and colleagues have described. 
Consistent with the mathematical model o f  an attractor, each pattern 
has movement and variability, yet converges toward a repeatable and 
recognizable stability. Also, the relationship system moves from one type 
o f  stable pattern to another by different variations o f  the same features 
that maintain the initial stable pattern: in this case, distance between 
the partners and mutual orientation. Thus, the maintenance o f  a stable 
pattern and the changes between stable patterns are co-regulated by the 
same set o f  system components. Both stability and change, therefore, arise 
spontaneously and are part o f  the natural functioning o f  this particular 
system. Innovation leading to the emergence o f  new stable patterns is an 
inherent feature o f  any dynamic system assuming that variation occurs 
across the range o f  system activity. Som e variations will return the system  
to a stable configuration, while other variations will shift the system to 
another and perhaps entirely new stable pattern.9
In spite o f  the sophistication o f  such m odels and their potential applic­
ability to social relationship processes, I can only use them as metaphors 
rather than as specific m odels o f  relationship formation for the following  
reasons. First, the mathematical m odeling o f  a system ’s behavior can only 
be done for relatively sim ple system s in which all the m ovem ents and
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system variables can be defined and their relationships quantified. We 
are nowhere near this kind o f  specificity in the social sciences. Second, 
mathematical models have only been worked out for a small number 
o f dynamic systems in which the equations have exact solutions. Many 
systems o f  equations can only be solved by approximation and their 
theoretical behavior is unknown.
Finally, and perhaps the most critical problem for me, is that dynamic systems 
approaches are models o f  the macroscopic behavior o f  the system. A model of 
fitness, for example, tells you that heart rate and temperature co-vary in limited 
ways, it tells you where and when the systems converge toward stable patterning. 
The model does not tell you why or how this happens. T o  understand that one 
would have to examine the specific systems within the body responsible for the 
linkages between these variables. In other words, one would have to examine the 
way in which heart rate is constrained by temperature and vice versa, the type 
o f information that the temperature regulation system needs in order to respond 
meaningfully with respect to the cardiovascular system.
Dynamic systems models are heuristic because they are general, that is, 
not specific to the nature o f  the information-creation process that sustains 
the patterning o f  the system over tim e.10 They also focus attention on the 
possible em ergence o f  pattern without prescription. T h ese kinds o f  systems 
metaphors have been applied to the m other-infant interaction system by 
several authors, including myself. For example, one o f  the first to speak 
o f a non-prescriptive systems model o f  the parent-infant relationship was 
Louis Sander.
We believe it useful to consider the infant and caretaking environment together 
as a biological system and to focus on the aspects of the regulation of exchange 
in the system as a way of approaching the problem of mutual adaptation . . .  We 
take for granted the notion of the life process as an ongoing synthesis in an 
open-ended dynamic, one which is resolving basic polarities but leaving us 
with an ‘in-between’ in the open endedness of the present moment -  an 
open endedness that our living activity resolves in new organization.11
Dynam ic system s m odels o f  developm ent have led to the em ergence o f  a 
research strategy that focuses on the individual m other-infant dyad and 
its transformations over time, and on an unw illingness to ascribe causal 
primacy to m other or to infant in the organization o f  developm ental 
change.12
Nevertheless, without some connection to the way in which these patterns 
are related to the specific information created by individuals within such 
systems, these perspectives fall short o f  being a generative theory o f  early 
development. W e need to understand that social systems create stable patterns 
in the form o f consensual frames and that they change between such patterns, 
but we also need to know why and how this happens, and the ways in which 
the patterns are meaningful to the participants.
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Just as discrete state theorists have had a tendency to reify their models 
to search for similar units in the brain that correspond to their constructs, 
dynamic systems theorists may also succumb to such temptations. Attractor 
models, for example, may lead to the assumption that individuals are 
motivated to discover such attractors or to explore the limits o f  an attractor 
region in the state space defined by their body in the environment. Infor­
mation creation is the primary motivation for action and for development. 
Although individuals may somehow sense the inherent stability o f  certain 
patterns o f  action, they typically do not set out in search o f  those patterns.
In fo rm a tio n  w i th in  c o n s e n s u a l  f ra m e s
T he painter described in the last chapter who is gazing at the same landscape 
day after day is exhibiting a stable frame in his or her engagement with the 
environment: go each day to the same spot, set up the easel and paints, 
examine the subject, and paint. How can we grasp the stability o f  this 
frame from an informational perspective? Although the painter re-creates 
the same frame each day, there is continued variability within the frame 
regarding the discovery o f  information about the relationship o f  the paints 
to this particular landscape, about the gradations o f  shade and color 
where the m ountains m eet the sky and how that is translated into the 
dynamics o f  applying the paint to the canvas or to mixing and juxtaposing 
the co lors.13 T h e frame preserves the main topic while the variations 
induce elaborations and possibly innovations that may lead to changes 
in the frame.
Many observers o f  parent-infant relationships have found that couples 
create one consensual frame at a time. T he consensual frame is maintained 
for som e m inutes or even longer, followed by another frame that may be 
related in som e way to the first.14 Frames revolve around actions like 
rocking and walking, m ealtim es, physical or verbal gam es, and bedtim e 
routines.
For exam ple, parents often play gam es in which they loom their faces 
or hands in toward the baby’s face and then zoom  them away. W e found 
this type o f  game more frequent in Japanese com pared to American 
m other-infant dyads at 3 m onths.15 If we analyze this game from the 
perspective o f  visual perceptual information, we see that it is related to 
a single invariant o f  expansion and contraction (see T able 5.1). Other 
exam ples are gam es involving exchanges o f  facial expressions that create 
information related to shape and surface deform ation, and p eek-a-boo in 
which information is related to the dissolution and em ergence o f  visual 
and auditory forms.
T his kind o f  informational analysis o f  consensual frames suggests that 
games and other routines are stable in part because the degrees o f  freedom  
in the system have been reduced to focus on one or a small number o f
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information themes. A peek-a-boo game explores the many ways in which 
information can be created about the theme o f dissolution and emergence 
o f form.
Relationships develop unique consensual frames because each o f  the 
individuals has a preference or desire for the exploration o f  certain kinds 
o f information themes. T his preference may arise in the types o f  actions 
the body is capable o f  producing or perceiving, and also in the ways in 
which the culture makes certain types o f  consensual frames available to 
individuals. Information themes may be discovered spontaneously by the 
participants and then elaborated over time into stable consensual frames 
that have single information themes.
In the previous chapter I discussed the metaphor o f  adults as guides for 
their infants. According to Bruner and Rogoff, for example, adults introduce 
and maintain particular formats into which their infants com e to fit their 
own activity. From their point o f  view, these game formats, and similar 
consensual frames for all kinds o f  routines such as eating and bedtime, are 
jointly negotiated, co-regulated communication systems in which partners 
agree about information themes they wish to create together.
The role o f  the adult, therefore, is to participate in the co-creation o f  consensual 
frames making the environment informative fo r the infant. Som etim es this 
occurs because o f  intentional guidance on the part o f  the adult. Som etim es 
the adult relies on cultural tools and practices to highlight the information. 
Som etim es making the environm ent informative occurs during spon­
taneous play and without the goal o f  doing so. Adults can also help this 
process by continuing to participate in consensual frames with them es that 
interest the infant and by letting the infant take responsibility for action  
when appropriate.
T h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s
T o  summarize the conclusions o f  this chapter so far, I propose that 
relationships are systems engaged in the creation o f  consensual frames 
having themes o f  information. T h e result o f  the mutual exploration o f  one 
theme at a time, followed by a shift to another theme, corresponds to a process 
over time in which stable consensual frames o f  co-regulated action persist 
and then shift abruptly to different consensual frames. Relationships not only 
move between different themes, they also repeat the same themes many times 
until such themes are dropped from the repertoire. They may try out the same 
themes within different consensual frames. T h e theme o f  em ergence and 
dissolution, for example, appears in frames like peek-a-boo, hide-and-seek, 
and object-hiding games. By participating in such related consensual frames,
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individuals may com e to discover new invariants related to sub-them es and 
combinations o f  themes as they are set against the background o f  different 
frames.
T h e primary source o f  stability, change and diversity o f  consensual frames 
and themes is the motivational salience o f  information-creation for the 
participants. Information themes persist so long as they are informative 
and are lost when they cease to be informative. Although one or another 
participant may play a leading role in the introduction o f  a theme and its 
maintenance over time, both partners must participate in som e way to keep 
the theme alive.
T his brings us back to the main purpose o f  this chapter, the process by 
which differences between parent-infant relationships emerge. Relationships 
with a parenting figure are the first long-term relationships in which 
babies are participants. Thus, the information themes that emerge in such 
relationships, and the consensual frames that support them, are the primary 
means by which those infants experience their world.
E x am p le : M o to r  d e v e lo p m e n t  a s  a so c ia l p ro c e ss
In order to illustrate how different patterns o f  relationships form because o f  
differences in the em ergence o f  information themes I shall use the example 
o f  infant acquisition o f  the ability to reach voluntarily for objects. T he hand 
can be used to play a musical instrument, to write, or to sculpt and no one 
would deny that these cultural activities require interaction with a teacher 
who makes the medium o f the piano, pen or clay informative with respect 
to the potential and actual creativity o f the child’s hand. Som e people would 
argue, however, that many o f  the infant’s early motor skills such as reaching 
are culture-free and can be acquired without a social partner.16 It would 
be impossible, however, for infants to develop such skills without the active 
support o f  adults who at a minimum supply the baby with objects that are 
graspable and attractive.
What is the adult’s role in relation to reaching in a 3-month-old? T o  guide 
the infant through some curriculum o f  how to use objects at an early age? 
T o  be supportive o f  infants’ desires to use particular objects? T o  reinforce 
their efforts? M y guess is that the agenda for parents o f  infants this young 
is just to participate, just to do something together without an explicit goal 
for guidance. An alert 2-m onth-old infant lying on her back is probably a 
wonderful but incomprehensible sight to most young parents and it is not 
clear that the baby can be guided to do anything very useful. According to 
one literary description, when babies
are a few months old, they lie and look around and wave and smile and 
undergo a constant gentle agitation, as though they were sea anemones, gently 
waving in some other element, delicately responding to currents we cannot 
feel.17
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Many o f the actions o f  young infants are not recognized by their parents 
as being systematic. For example, I and others have discovered that infants 
as young as 1 month o f  age can display index finger extension movements 
and these movements occur when infants are attentive and not smiling or 
distressed.18 Parents, however, do not recognize index finger extensions as 
expressions o f  interest until the infant is almost 1 year o f  age because these 
early extensions are not as perceptually salient for the parents as the later 
ones that occur with the arm outstretched that we call poin ts.19 T h us, it 
is difficult to argue that parents intentionally guide the infant w hen the 
parents them selves are often uncertain about the m eaning o f  the infant’s 
actions.
Research that I conducted collaboration with Lisa W est20 shows that 
infants acquire different patterns o f  hand usage and attention to objects 
depending upon the type o f  information created about hand use during 
their co-regulated interactions with their m others. Som e infants are more 
likely to direct their attention to the object the m other is dem onstrating  
during the w eeks before they m anipulate objects on their own. O nce they 
are able to hold on to the object that the m other places in their hands, they 
look at the object as they hold it. At the sam e tim e, their m others continue 
to touch the object, and to support not only the ch ild’s manual actions, but 
also the ch ild ’s attention to the object. In the later sessions after reaching  
is acquired, the m other will simply place the object within reach and stay 
out o f  the infant’s way w hile the infant explores the object. For these 
infants, their exploration o f  the object is related to their gazing at the 
object; they seem  systematically to com bine information across several 
sensory m odalities (vision and touch, m outhing and touch, m outhing and 
action).
Mark Reimers and I21 worked out the following description o f  the 
consensual frames supporting object exploration in one such infant, Jerry, 
and his mother, in one observation session after the infant begins reaching 
for objects. T h e mother presents objects to the baby while the baby lies 
on his back, watches and tries to reach for the objects. T h is mother 
alternates between demonstrating the object’s properties and then moving 
the object in so the baby can easily contact the object with his hands. 
She helps the infant grasp the object and helps to pick it up when 
dropped. She seem s focused on highlighting the object’s physical features 
and on m aintaining the infant’s attention to the object. H er voice is 
distinctively different for each o f  these object-related actions, helping  
to mark the different p ieces o f  her action for the infant. T h e infant 
remains alert, attentive to the object, and sm iles and brightens in a 
m odulated way that is co-regulated with the m other’s actions and voice. 
S he seem s content to wait until the infant loses interest in an object 
before introducing another one, thus changing the them e within the 
same consensual frame. W hen she introduces objects to the baby she
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rarely persists for more than ten seconds unless the baby shows some 
interest.
In other infants we find very different consensual frames for action and 
attention vis-a-vis  the mother. For these infants, the mother’s demonstrations 
o f  object properties are not sequentially related to infant attention. Their 
early interactions with objects are short-lived, rapidly dissolving into bouts 
o f  face-to-face play, during which the mothers gradually try to integrate the 
infant’s attention to objects via their attention to the mother. T hese infants 
are slow to attend to the object. Even when they begin to grasp and hold 
the object, they look elsewhere. In later sessions, their actions on objects 
tend to focus on mouthing the objects without any systematic looking at or 
acting on the objects, leaving relatively few opportunities for their mothers to 
intervene in object-related discourse, and no option but for them to engage 
in face-to-face play.
Reimers and I described such a consensual frame in infant Andrew during 
one session with his mother at 4 months. In their consensual frame, the object 
is informative with respect to attention to the mother, rather than with respect 
to attention to and manipulation o f  the object. Like Jerry’s mother, this 
mother also demonstrates the physical affordances o f  objects but in a rather 
different manner. She moves the object continuously in the same position 
as the infant gets excited, but rarely follows up by putting the object in the 
infant’s hand. She touches the infant’s face and body with the object and when 
Andrew loses visual contact, he becom es visibly frustrated and over-agitated, 
calming only when mother puts the object down. T he mother’s voice is similar 
in its tonal characteristics regardless o f  the activity. Even when Andrew is 
holding an object, his mother touches or distracts him with a different object, 
a theme change that gives the child little opportunity for focused and socially 
supported visual and manual exploration. H is elaboration o f  information 
about objects, that is, the m other-object communication system, appears to 
be more fragmentary' than Jerry’s. Attention to objects and their visual and 
auditory properties is not systematically linked to exploratory action.
At 12 months our first pair, Jerry and his mother, go on to establish 
consensual frames for cooperative play. In a typical play frame, the infant 
initiates exploration with an object and often pauses to allow mother to 
becom e involved in the play. She responds by following up on Jerry’s 
initiative, elaborating the theme introduced by him. In other instances, 
Jerry will becom e involved in play with mother, but she won’t persist with 
her theme if  he shows no interest.
For this pair during the first year, the dyad has gone from consensual 
frames in which attention and action on objects are facilitated by maternal 
support and vocal encouragement, to the development o f  consensual frames 
for cooperation requiring more than one to play. During solitary exploration 
with objects, this infant looks rather focused and intent, showing object- 
appropriate examining actions. T h e mother is content to wait for pauses in
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Jerry’s activity, which occur frequently with looks to mother to get involved in 
the play, and he responds to mother’s bids, as in petting a toy cat the mother 
holds out.
At 1 year Andrew, the second infant, and his mother do not have 
consensual frames for cooperative play. She persists in introducing her 
own agendas while he is working on something else. She will place objects 
next to ones he is playing with, she vocalizes similarly whether the play objects 
are her own or the ones Andrew is using. W hen Andrew does not pause to 
allow her to intervene, she attempts to take away his objects to introduce 
herself into the action. Co-regulated consensual frames almost never occur 
around objects per se, but rather during highly stimulating encounters such 
as tickling or having a tug-of-war.
Thus, there is either solitary play in which Andrew attempts to ignore 
the mother and compromises his ability to examine objects unhindered, or 
play with mother in which she is the main actor on the objects or on him. 
W hen his activity is disrupted by mother, he often resorts to non-exploratory 
actions such as absently banging or mouthing an object without systematic 
examination. H e provides his mother with few or no opportunities for her 
to becom e involved in his play.
T hese infants differ in the relationship o f  the dynamics o f  action with 
respect to the object, that is, in the information about objects created by 
the encounter. For one infant, the meaning o f  the object is to act directly 
on it. For the other, the object means a social routine in which mother is 
a part. T h e adult’s role in both cases is to co-regulate consensual frames 
in which the objects are informative with respect to the infant’s prehensile 
potential, yet the consensual frames and the type o f  information created are 
different for each dyad.22
N ote also that information is being created for the mothers in these 
situations. It would not be correct to infer that the mother is imposing her 
style on the infant. It could be the case that some infants at 3 months are 
intently focused in their attention to the object, thus informing their mothers 
to hold the object closer to them, which in turn leads to more opportunities 
to reach and to the construction o f  an object-centered consensual frame. 
Other infants may appear less focused, providing less information regarding 
object-specific interest to their mothers. T hese infants leave their mothers 
with more degrees o f  freedom, and hence mothers may introduce themselves 
into co-regulated routines more often.
Whatever the explanation, very small differences in the early negotiation 
process may create lasting consensual frames that are preserved over long 
periods o f  time. It may be that in her early attempts either to demonstrate 
properties o f  objects or to get the infant involved with objects, the mother 
found the infant relatively more or less perceptive or skilled, relatively more 
or less focused or attentive. D ifferences between relationships in patterns o f  
exploratory play are likely to be emergent from the whole dynamic system o f
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two individuals o f  different skills and abilities, with different goals in relation 
to the physical and cultural context.
C o n c l u s i o n s :  T w o  p a t t e r n s  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
f o r m a t i o n
T h e preceding analysis suggests some new ways o f  thinking about the 
formation o f  early relationships, why they differ and why the participants 
differ as a result o f  their involvement. W henever communication is co ­
regulated, the process by which degrees o f  freedom are constrained is 
mutually negotiated. However, our examples suggest that not all consensual 
frames in a relationship lead to continued co-regulation and creativity. In 
some cases, as in Andrew’s interactions with his mother at age 1 year 
regarding objects, the actions o f  the partners are not mutually creative. In 
fact, the partners seem  to act in ways that curtail avenues for negotiation: 
both partners attempt to control the access and use o f  objects and leave 
few or no opportunities for the other to get involved. Although this pair 
is creative around other themes and in other frames, part o f  their unique 
character as a team is their lack o f  co-regulated discourse about particular 
kinds o f  object play.
Stable consensual frames for creativity and innovation. Som e consensual frames 
that persist over time in relationships are maintained by continued co­
regulation, characterized by inventiveness and creativity. There are themes, 
and each time those themes are mutually engaged som ething new emerges. 
T he participants want to interact about these themes, they are motivated by 
the potential for creativity in the relationship about these themes. As long 
as the relationship pattern is creative, negotiated and mutually maintained, 
stability is a dynamic and mutually engaging process that embodies the seed  
o f  change.
Stable consensual frames fo r rigidity and dissolution. O ther consensual 
frames that persist over time are not inventive or creative. T hey are 
marked by rigidity and sam eness, by a motivation to avoid creativity 
around particular them es, by a sense o f  obligation without pleasure. 
Rigid consensual frames, once established, may persist for long periods 
in a relationship. A parent or child may insist on introducing a topic that 
the other w ishes to avoid. T here may be activities that are maintained  
because o f  familial or cultural factors, regardless o f  their usefulness for 
the particular couple (see Chapter 10). T h ese rigid patterns co-exist with 
creative ones in most relationships.
I speak here o f  d ifferences in patterns o f  information creation around 
particular them es, rather than about the quality o f  a relationship as a 
w hole. In som e cases, rigid them es are mere annoyances to one partner
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(as in reading the same book with the baby again and again) and in others 
they are disruptive and destructive (as in consistendy denying a partner 
access to a resource or emotional support for an information theme that 
relates to adaptive functioning in that culture). In some cases, however, 
the maintenance o f  rigid consensual frames is useful for the individuals, 
as in ritualized greetings that may lead into more creative consensual 
frames.
All relationships need a process by which som e frames are limited in 
creative scope. Dyads cannot be creatively intense in all aspects o f  their 
co-action. Thus, som e frames may be curtailed into perfunctory rituals while 
others may dissolve entirely. By means o f  these two relationship processes -  
creativity and rigidity -  differences will emerge between relationships with 
respect to the frames that becom e elaborated, ritualized or dropped, and also 
with respect to the type o f  information-theme creation that occurs within the 
frame. Within the more creative frames, co-regulated innovations cannot be 
planned and their spontaneity introduces yet another source o f  variability 
between relationships.23
T h e continued creative elaboration o f  particular consensual frames and 
themes may be consonant with respect to the culture (as in the development 
o f  pleasurable and instructive games and routines) or dissonant (as in 
parent-infant-negotiated and mutually consenting participation in picking 
up and holding the infant who cries in a family or culture where this is not 
considered acceptable). In this case, it may be more culturally appropriate to 
rigidity the crying-picking up consensual frame in such a way as to eliminate 
it in the future.
There are many ways in which consensual frames and themes in a 
relationship may evolve. Social psychologist Starkey Duncan refers to such 
frames as composed o f  conventions that are mutually constructed and mutually 
dissolved by the participants through a process o f  ratification.
In order for a convention to be adopted within an interaction, it must be initiated 
by one participant and ratified by the other. Once adopted, for a convention 
to continue in use, it must be continually ratified by both participants . . .  For 
a convention to be changed, the change must be initiated by one participant 
and ratified by the other. Finally, the ending of some conventions requires 
the same process of initiative and ratification . . .  The process of initiative and 
ratification provides one important sense in which interaction must be regarded 
as an achievement involving the joint, coordinated action of both participants.24
T h e concepts o f  initiative and ratification are similar to my constructs o f  
innovation and co-regulation. Ratification is the process by which consensual 
frames achieve dynamic stability via co-regulation. D uncan’s view o f initiative 
within a relationship seem s to suggest, however, that one individual is 
primarily responsible for introducing a change which must then be ratified 
by the other. In my view, innovation is often the result o f  mutual creativity. 
Innovation is probably emergent and jointly constructed even when it appears
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to originate from a single individual, since the innovation is created in the 
context o f  som e ongoing consensual frame.
Duncan proposes a number o f  change processes for conventions that 
are consistent with the model o f  co-regulation. Conventions may change 
in intensity and timing, in the use o f  different actions, in streamlining or 
expanding, and in a change in the role o f  actors permitted to display the 
convention. H is model o f  convention variability and change offers some 
specific conceptual tools with which to study relationship development, as 
long as one is clear that these mechanisms o f  change must be jointly 
co-regulated, that they are not imposed unilaterally by one participant on 
the other. T hese processes fall under the heading o f  what I have called 
elaboration or creation o f  information within a co-regulated relationship 
system.
T h e reader, therefore, should resist the temptation to be evaluative about 
the different patterns o f  relationship formation discussed here: toward 
creativity and toward rigidity, toward innovation o f  new patterns and 
dissolution o f  old patterns. Both types o f  relationship process are part 
o f  a viable relationship system. T h e elaboration o f  informative themes 
and their maintenance within the relationship by consensual frames is a 
fundamental characteristic o f  co-regulating communication systems over 
repeated encounters. T he saliency o f  information-creation in a social system 
is the source o f  stability and change, stage and sequence, similarity and 
difference. In the next two chapters I turn to the problem o f how this 
process o f  information co-created in relationships becom es part o f  a sense 
o f  se lf and a unique individuality.
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C h a p te r  8
The self in relation: 
embodied cognition
Cognition, as I use the term, refers to the subjectivity o f  activity. Cognition is 
in the arms and legs, on the lips and tongue, and in the head. It is feeling and 
thinking, body and mind, perception and action. It is not entirely inside us, 
since part o f  cognition is our perception o f  the world around us. Cognition is 
completely mundane yet completely mysterious. It is necessary to understand 
the cognitive aspects o f  participating in a relationship because the central 
feature o f  relationships is the creation o f  information, through perceptual 
and cognitive process.
E m b o d i e d  c o g n i t i o n
In a discrete state model o f  cognition, action, thought, memory and intention 
are separate information-processing units. Information in the form o f messages 
is processed and interpreted by these different components o f  the discrete 
system. In traditional information-processing models, information flows 
between discrete units in a sequential fashion. T h e message is altered by 
each unit and passed on to the next.
In a recent version o f the discrete state model, called a parallel processing 
network or a connectionist model, all the components may be active at the 
same time and information may flow freely between them. Connectionist 
models avoid a central planning agent and allow cognitive activity to emerge 
from the multiple transactions o f  the system. In spite o f  their obvious 
improvem ents over linear inform ation-processing m odels, connectionist 
models have not escaped being essentially discrete state systems.1 Information 
is directly transmitted between components, and each component in the 
model has a designated function whose possibilities are set before anything 
ever happens.2
In earlier chapters I spoke about the importance o f the body in understanding 
communication and its development. I return to this theme now because
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the body also plays a crucial role in cognition. Progress in the modeling o f  
cognitive systems is occurring when modelers attempt to incorporate bodily 
processes -  perception and action -  into their models and when the nodes 
o f the models are free to co-regulate with each other in a system that creates 
its own rules as it acts in a real environment.3 For example, an insect-like 
robot named Genghis, designed by Rodney Brooks and his group at M IT, 
can walk over rough terrain and avoid obstacles in an unfamiliar situation -  
one o f  the first robots ever to function outside o f  a perfect and predictable 
laboratory environment. In these types o f  robots,
There was no central model of the world explicitly represented within the 
systems. . .  . There was no central locus of control. In general, the separation 
into perceptual system, central system, and actuation system was much less 
distinct than in previous approaches, and in these systems there was an intimate 
intertwining of aspects of all three of these capabilities. There was no notion of 
one process calling on another as a subroutine . . .  as the systems relied heavily on 
the dynamics of their interactions with the world to produce their results.4
Brooks’s robot works the way a Gibsonian continuous process model o f  action 
would have predicted. It has a motor system that relates directly to a sensory 
system. T h e more sensory experience the robot has, the more skilled the 
motor system becom es. T he robot does not learn by storing rules o f  action 
in an abstract represented memory, but by tuning its motor system direcdy 
to the demands o f  the environment. For Brooks and colleagues a robot must 
be ‘em bodied’ to function intelligendy.
In 1744, the Italian philosopher Gianbattista Vico published the following 
statement in his work Scienza Nuova,
the human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the 
body, and with only great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means 
of reflection . . .  words are carried over from bodies and from the properties of 
bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and spirit.5
This view is fundamentally different from the Platonic conception o f  words 
and thought as representations that direcdy encode the real world without 
reference to the nature o f  the perceiver. Vico’s idea is that we understand 
and know the world through our actions in it and our thought and language 
is a way o f  encoding the perception-action relationship between the se lf and 
the environment. Cognition is therefore embodied and relational, a reflection 
o f our participation in a dynamic perception-action system, not a record o f  
objective or represented contents o f  ‘reality.’
A more recent and more extensive treatment o f  the em bodied and 
relational nature o f  cognition com es from philosopher Mark Johnson.6 
Johnson suggests that we understand and rem em ber our experiences 
via m etaphors that are based on the body and its relationship to the 
environm ent. H e gives the example o f  how the m ental construction o f
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emotion is understood with respect to the metaphor o f  physical balance 
and physical pressure.
Emotions can simmer, well up, overflow, boil over, erupt, and explode when the 
pressure builds up . . . One can express, release, or let out the emotions (blow 
off steam) to lessen the strain. One can try to repress, suppress, hold in, or put 
a lid on one’s emotions, but they will not thereby disappear . . .  we tend to 
seek a temporary' homeostasis where we are emotionally balanced, stable, and on 
an even keel.7
According to Johnson, cognition is the history o f  the experiences in which 
our bodies have engaged with the world. Higher forms o f  abstract thinking 
are built up out o f  these embodied metaphors.
In contrast to the traditional information-processing perspective in which 
the memory o f  an experience is stored in some abstract manner in a specific 
location o f  the brain, cognitive psychologist Paul Kolers suggests that the 
processes o f  memory are closely associated with the processes o f  performing 
actions. A vast number o f  experimental studies on human memory, for 
example, have been done on the recognition and recall o f  words. T he  
assumption is that the meaning o f  the word is what the subject remembers, 
the word’s abstract content.
Experiments have shown, however, that subjects are more likely to recognize 
words if  they are presented in the same typeface during testing as during 
training. Color, size and the location o f  a word on a page influence the way 
it is remembered.8 According to Kolers,
knowledge is means dependent. . .  knowledge is expressed in activities, techniques, 
procedures -  skilled ways of relating to the stimulus . . . the means of 
acquisition, even motoric means, often form a part of whatever a person 
knows . . .  Consciousness does not report on what is in the world, but on 
how the person’s sensing organs respond to events.9
Knowledge, or what is remembered, is not simply an abstract representation 
o f a list o f  contents, but it is knowledge o f  how to do something or how to 
perceive something, knowledge o f  our body’s relationship to things. When 
making skilled movements, sighted individuals appear to rely primarily on 
visual cues, while the congenitally blind use movement cues under the same 
circum stances.10 W hen 1 remember a rose, I remember the way a rose looks 
and the way it smells, that is, I remember the rose through the perceptual 
modalities by which I initially gained information about roses.
There is another way in which I can remember a rose, a more direct way. 
When I go out to the garden and I see and smell a rose, it is familiar to me 
and I recognize it as a rose. My memory o f the rose is not lodged in the recesses 
o f my brain: it comes alive as my perception and action systems engage with the 
rose. In other words, skilled action and perception, performing knowledgeably 
in familiar situations, is also a form o f cognitive remembering.
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P a r t i c i p a t o r y  c o g n i t i o n
I call this participatory cognition because it is created in the individual’s ongoing 
transactions with that environment. James Gibson’s theory o f  perception 
and action, and the current work on embodied cognition, suggest that 
memory is an integral part o f  a perception-action system in the present.11 
Imaginative cognition, on the other hand, is a process that occurs when we 
are thinking about transactions with the environment that are not presently 
occurring.
I can illustrate the differences between participatory and imaginative 
remembering with novelist Marcel Proust’s description o f  a moment in his 
protagonist Swann’s love affair with Odette, from the novel Remembrance o f  
Things Past.
This new manner, indifferent, offhand, irritable, which Odette now adopted 
with Swann, undoubtedly made him suffer; but he did not realize how much 
he suffered . . .  this change was his deep, secret wound, which tormented 
him day and night, and whenever he felt that his thoughts were straying too 
near it, he would quickly turn them into another channel for fear of suffering 
too much. He might say to himself in an abstract way: ‘There was a time 
when Odette loved me more,’ but he never formed any definite picture of 
that time. 12
Swann’s current memory o f  Odette is a participatory memory that directly 
affects his frame o f  mind. He cannot conjure Odette as an imaginative 
memory even though he was able to do so freely in the past. Swann’s 
current perception o f  Odette is colored by his past relationship with her. 
Whatever Odette is actually doing or saying in the present is o f  little 
consequence. T h e information created when Swann perceives her amounts 
to indifference and irritability. Yet, Swann can’t bring him self actually 
to imagine his prior relationship with Odette. Swann’s remembering is 
experienced as miserableness. In Proust’s account, this is different from 
the period just after Swann first meets and courts Odette, when his memory 
was more imaginative as he compared her to images from Renaissance 
paintings.
There is a resemblance between participatory memory and the concept 
o f  recognition memory, and similarly between imaginative memory and 
recall memory. Recognition memory occurs when we experience something 
perceived as familiar or similar to something perceived in the past. Recall 
memory is more like an evocation o f  a past event for which a similar cue 
is not currently available. I reject these terms from individualistic psychology 
because they take the environment’s role in memory to be only with respect 
to the ‘cu e,’ the stimulus that is associated with the ‘real’ memory stored in the 
brain. In addition, participatory and imaginative memories are re-creations o f
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a perception-action system, embodied procedures o f  acquiring knowledge 
and not simply context-free contents.
Like physical actions such as driving a car, mental actions like thinking and 
remembering are perception-action systems constituted by their activity. T o  
be sure, the brain, body and environment all contribute to the creation o f  
the memory, but memory is a living thing, like the performance o f  an actor, 
the stroke o f  a tennis expert or the arpeggio o f  a concert pianist. M emories 
are not stored intact, they becom e intact and coherent only when we actively 
experience them in action or in thought. Experiencing a memory is not simply 
reading out a whole image stored in the brain. Rather, the individual takes 
whatever is stored in the brain in relation to what is going on in the world, and 
creates information from the resulting transactions.13 T h e neural patterns are 
not fixed and finalized, not burned in like images in the silver nitrate o f  a film 
negative. T h e neural patterns are open systems, co-regulated by the cognitive 
process and by the stream o f actions and sensations in which the individual 
is continuously bathed.14
T h e concept o f  participatory memory is similar to the term ‘involuntary’ 
memory developed by the Russian psychologists A. A. Smirnov and P.
I. Zinchenko.15 Involuntary memory is when remembered information is 
directly incorporated into the individual’s ongoing goal-oriented activity. 
Smirnov and Zinchenko’s experiments showed that people remembered 
things better when they actively had to perform some kind o f  task, such 
as actually using M orse code to send a m essage rather than simply having 
to recognize M orse code symbols. ‘Voluntary’ memory occurs when the 
individual’s specific goal is to remember something for its own sake. Thus, 
whether memory is involuntary or voluntary depends on what the person 
is trying to do. T he Russian psychologists were especially influential in 
establishing the idea that all forms o f  cognition could be understood with 
respect to the individual’s activity or goal, which led to currendy used 
contextual approaches to cognition.16
However, the activity theorists often leave out an essential component to 
activity: the fact that it is embodied. T h e way we think, experience, and 
remember action is intimately tied to the way in which our perception-action  
systems create information through their engagement with the environment. 
A more embodied approach is offered in the concepts o f  ‘autocentric’ and 
‘allocentric’ perception described by the psychoanalyst Ernest Schachtel.17 
According to Schachtel, autocentric perception is involved in the direct 
control o f  behavior and the immediate experience o f  acting, while allocentric 
perception involves reflection and understanding o f  objects and other people. 
H e calls autocentric memory ‘passive re-sensing,’ and allocentric memory 
‘voluntary recall’ and sees them both as creative activities.
Schachtel also makes the observation that certain sensory systems are more 
involved in autocentric perception, including the sensations o f  temperature, 
passive touch, taste and smell. Sight, hearing, and active touch (exploration)
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are more likely to becom e objects o f  reflection and active thought. For 
example, it is much more difficult voluntarily to evoke a memory for smell, 
temperature, or taste than for som ething seen or heard.
Schachtel speculates that adults are not voluntarily able to recall infantile 
memories because infant activity primarily involves the autocentric senses. 
Daniel S te m 18 also suggests that certain kinds o f  perceptions, such as for 
body movement, fail to becom e linguistically encoded and thus cannot 
be voluntarily recalled. T h ese memories, however, may remain with the 
individual as participatory memory, memory that is constituted as action. It 
may be that the adults’ typical postures, patterns o f  facial expression and 
sensitivity to sm ells and touches are organized with respect to their infantile 
participatory m em ories.19
The participatory future
Our relationship to the future is identical to our relationship to the past 
and present: through participation and imagination. Information about the 
future is generated in two ways: by actually moving toward the future in the 
immediate present through participatory activity, and by imagining on eself in 
some future state.
T h e participatory future is analogous to participatory memory. It is a way 
o f  acting in the present that moves the individual toward another activity, but 
without the need for a future state to be represented in consciousness. The  
participatory future is experienced as direction rather than as an imagined 
goal.
T h e psychologist Dankert Vedeler20 proposes that intention is directed 
action that is not necessarily future-oriented in the form o f a goal toward 
which one is guided. Intention, in his view, is part o f  action and need not 
involve any mental representation o f  a desired future state. H is reasoning is 
also influenced by Gibsonian thinking and by the phenomenologists. Vedeler 
reviews the work o f  m id-nineteenth century psychologist Franz Brentano who 
believed that intentionality concerned the ‘aboutness’ or ‘object directedness’ 
o f  action, which is not the same as having a goal. Husserl considered objects 
as ‘targets’ o f  intentions rather than mental representations. And Vedeler 
quotes M erleau-Ponty (1962, p. 160) as follows: ‘In the action o f  the hand 
which is raised towards an object is contained a reference to the object, not 
as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing toward which we 
project ourselves . . . ’
For animals, direction is observed in potentially threatening situations21 
as one animal takes steps to avoid another before a confrontation. It is 
not necessary to assume that the individual animal has a representation or 
imagination o f  the threat. Instead, there is information available in the present 
situation that calls forth in the animal some anticipatory directionality, either 
to approach or avoid.
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In greetings, individuals anticipate a communicative engagement with the 
person they are saluting, yet the greeter remains vigilant with respect to 
the possibility that the interaction will not develop, that the person being 
greeted, on closer approach, will turn out to be mistaken for another more 
familiar person. During informal conversations there is often a smoothly 
flowing topic progression, yet ‘one does not get the impression that speakers 
plan to proceed in any particular way, or know in advance what they are 
going to say or for what reason.’22 Even when individuals are involved in 
deliberately planning some joint activity, planning is a process that involves 
both improvisation and flexibility with respect to changing circumstances and 
ideas that emerge spontaneously during conversation.23
Because direction is not a separate faculty o f  the mind, but is integral to 
participatory activity, direction changes as action is being executed, much like 
the perceptual flow field changes as a function o f  one’s own movements. 
During greetings, one’s actions may smoothly flow into open conversation if  
the person greeted expresses a willingness to becom e involved. On the other 
hand, in the event that this does not happen, there is an abrupt shift in the 
greeter’s behavior and a corresponding change in direction. Stated simply, 
direction is not a static initial condition, not an executive giving orders that 
guide action, it is a fluid part o f  a dynamic perception-action system.
I m a g i n a t i v e  c o g n i t i o n
Participatory cognition is part o f  ongoing action, bringing prior experience 
to bear on current actions and goals. W hen I write this book, I do not 
have to remember all o f  the articles and books I have worked on in the 
past. Participatory memory allows me to incorporate that experience into 
the problems o f  writing in the present, without the intermediary o f  bringing 
all those experiences to mind. Independent o f  actually writing this book, 
however, I can remember a particular experience o f  writing som ething else 
in the past. I can remember the problems I was trying to solve, the time and 
place o f  writing, some o f  the other events going on at the same time. T his is 
imaginative memory, memory that has the purpose o f  remembering something 
done, seen, felt or heard before.
In principle, imaginative memory is no different from participatory memory.24 
W hen I imagine som ething from the past it is part o f  som e ongoing thought 
process, or it is evoked by some event in the current physical or social 
environment. Imaginative memory, like participatory memory, is a re-creation 
and a re-experiencing in the present o f something previously experienced. That 
re-creation may not necessarily be identical to the earlier experience. It is 
related to the goals o f  the present time and to the whole history o f  experiences 
I have since had. In addition, imaginative memory like participatory memory 
is embodied. I remember the way in which I experienced something, and not
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just the thing itself. For example, I don’t remember my childhood home in 
the abstract. I remember looking at it from different places in the yard, I 
remember walking through it, I remember hugs or scoldings that took place 
in particular locations.
Clearly, not every event in the present evokes imaginative memories.
It is ecologically adaptive that familiar objects do not automatically remind 
us of previous experiences. If they did, our minds would be deluged with 
experiences . . . On the other hand, events do sometimes seem to spontaneously 
remind one of previous experiences . . .  a theory (of memory] must not only 
explain how internally generated or explicitly presented cues do help one recreate 
past experiences, but it must explain why potential cues do not always prompt one 
to remember.25
Thus, even for imaginative memories, the remembered past is co-regulated 
with respect to the present situation and appears as a meaningful present 
experience in relation to that situation.
Without resorting to a memory faculty, how do we know the difference 
between when we are actually participating in the present in relation to a 
present task or situation, compared to when we are participating in the present 
with respect to a past situation? T h e French phenom enologist M erleau-Ponty 
suggests that the ability to imagine an event does not by itself tell you whether 
the event is in the past, present or future.
If my brain stores up traces of the bodily process which accompanied one of 
my perceptions, and if the appropriate nervous influx passes once more through 
these already fretted channels, my perception will reappear, but it will be a fresh 
perception, weakened and unreal perhaps, but in no case will this perception, 
which is present, be capable of pointing to a past event which enables me to 
recognize it as memory.26
M erleau-Ponty suggests that the information about whether an event is past, 
present and future is not ‘in’ the mind or brain alone. Rather, information 
about an imagined event’s temporal relationship to us must arise as part o f  
the process o f  active remembering.
According to M erleau-Ponty, the present is uniquely experienced in 
consciousness as an unfolding, as a creation out o f  what was, immediately 
before, the future. T h e present is created as information about the sub­
stantiation o f  mental or physical action. T he past, on the other hand, has 
already been substantiated. T he information unique to a past event is that 
we can imagine not only the event, but the related events that preceded  
and followed it. T h e event is precluded from change forever. Information 
indicating the future, on the other hand, is the lack o f  specificity, the lack 
o f  a concrete prior sequence and o f  an outcome.
One characteristic o f  fantasy and delusion is the belief in the imaginary as 
substantial, or in a remembered past that can be changed at will. In pretend 
play, children will alter the past and re-create it to suit their own purposes.
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That does not mean that their ability to remember or imagine is flawed, but 
rather that information created in those memories is strongly colored by the 
motives o f  the present context o f  remembering.
In one research study, 4 and 6 year-old children were questioned about 
their beliefs about monsters. W hen psychologists asked questions like -  ‘That 
monster that wags its tail and com es chasing after you in your head. Can I see 
i t . . .  is it a real one?’ -  the children overwhelmingly said the monster was not 
real. On the other hand, when asked -  ‘That monster in your head, were you 
really scared when it came chasing after you, or just pretend scared?’ -  most 
children admitted being afraid.27 Is this any different from an adult’s terror 
after a bad dream, or emotional reaction to an imaginary relationship with a 
film star or sports figure?28
For most adults, imaginative memories o f  the lived past are experienced 
as unalterable. After I had been driving no more than a year I skidded out o f  
control on the wet overpass o f  a highway, spun around and fortunately 
stopped, but just short o f  going over the edge o f the bridge. T h e experience 
tempers my driving on slick surfaces even today as part o f  participatory 
memory. In imaginative memory, however, I sometimes think about that 
particular incident. I think about what might have happened had I tumbled 
to the roadway below, or about how I might have prevented the incident from 
occurring at all. I re-live the incident in the present, but I perceive it as past 
because it is beyond reach, completed for better or worse. I can accept it, 
deny it, suffer from it, or rejoice in it in the present, but I cannot change 
it. I can only change what I am doing right now, on this wet pavement under 
my wheels, and I can imagine in the future how I might behave should such 
a situation again arise. T hese imaginings are all relational, my conduct in 
relation to the driving surface, but they are experienced as part o f  me and 
as part o f  my own past.
T h e important point is that memories are not merely traces in the brain that 
are accessed and re-played like a videotape. M em ories are active experiences 
in the present and they mean something different each time they are 
remembered. Whatever traces the brain does store they do not contain a fixed 
quantity o f  information. Rather, those brain traces becom e informative only 
during the act o f  remembering. I can learn more about m yself in the past by 
repeated imaginative remembering because each time I remember I perceive 
different information that restructures my understanding o f  the past event.29
T he view expressed here is that imaginative memories are perceived as 
part o f  my own past because they contain information about the sequence o f  
events before, during and after the remembered events, events that belong 
to me because my body experienced them. T his perspective on imaginative 
memory as a sequence o f  temporally related events is similar to the notion 
o f episodic or scripted memory, that is, memory for the flow o f  real experiences 
as they occurred in time.30 After the age o f  3 years, children’s memories are 
structured around episodes such as going to school, going to a birthday party,
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or talking with a friend, and children remember events best if  they can relate 
them to an episode.31
A problem occurs, however, when the concept o f  episodic memory is 
extended to explain how such memories relate to current actions. Those 
who take the view that memory' is a discrete faculty o f  the mind reason that 
in order for episodic memories to have an impact on current experience, 
such memories have to becom e generalized episodes, an average over all 
similar episodes. Thus, in going to school, one should get up, get dressed, 
eat breakfast, travel from home to school, and go into one’s classroom. This 
generalized event structure has elements that typically occur every' day, but it 
does not include any specifics o f  individual occurrences.32 Applied to a 
child’s experience in relationships with other people, such memories have 
been called representations o f  interactions that have been generalized (RIGs)33 or 
internal working models.3*
In this view, the individual stores generalized memories in some memory 
faculty or store, and when in a similar situation the individual calls up the 
generalized memory' and follows the script by adapting it to fit the present 
situation. Each time such a situation occurs, the generalized memory is 
changed somewhat and put back into storage. In other words, participation 
in the current situation is viewed as a separate faculty from the faculty o f  
remembering such situations. Somehow the individual must send information 
from the present perception to memory, find the correct script, and then 
generate the appropriate actions; a discrete state model o f  the mind. Even 
though the discrete elem ents here are episodes rather than single events, the 
problem remains.
Another problem is the need to invent a cognitive process o f  generalization 
and a cognitive faculty to store the generalizations. Actions are attuned 
to information by virtue o f  past experience, but this is not by means o f  
a generalization or averaging across past instances. It is a change in the 
relationship between the se lf and the environment, between the senses and 
the muscles, as easy as maintaining balance when riding a bicycle. T o  do 
this I don’t have to remember my experiences o f  imbalance, or even my early 
successes at balance. W hen I get on the bike the dynamic forces created by 
my body are perfecdy attuned to the forces that destabilize it. Balancing is 
direct, not mediated by memory in the traditional sense o f  a generalized store 
o f  information.35
I n f a n t  c o g n i t i o n  a n d  i t s  d e v e l o p m e n t
Participatory cognition in early infancy
T h e concept o f  participatory cognition that is linked to perception and action, 
and that is constructed with respect to the body, is well suited to explain
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cognition and the development o f  the se lf  in infancy. Infants as young as 
several months have a remarkable participatory memory for procedures in 
which they are active participants. For example, if  they learn to kick a 
particular leg in a particular way in order to make a mobile move over their 
heads, they will re-enact the same kicking pattern up to two weeks later when  
placed in a similar situation.36 Infants can also remember by reproducing a 
series o f  complicated head turns that they have been trained to perform, 
and they can bring a slide projector into focus by sucking either faster or 
slower on an automated nipple.37 Remarkably, newborns can recognize their 
mother’s smell and the sound o f  her voice, and they can also recognize songs 
their mothers were asked to sing to them in the two weeks prior to birth.38
Piaget observed instances o f  infant action becom ing increasingly skilled 
and proposed the concept o f  scheme in which cognition, including memory, 
was entirely in the realm o f action during early infancy. H e used infant activity 
and purpose as the central organizing feature o f  infant cognition, a view that 
was also taken up by the activity theorists. Other students o f  infant cognition  
have suggested that memory formation is direcdy related to the individual’s 
attempt to create meaning by pursuing goals and updating action.39 Indeed, 
it would be difficult to find a student o f  infant cognition today who thought 
otherwise.
If the infant’s memory is totally bound up with patterns o f  skilled action, 
then the infant’s entire cognitive experience is defined by the particular forms 
o f action and the particular modalities o f  perception that are used in these 
tasks. If the theory o f  embodied participatory cognition is correct, we have to 
assume that the cognition o f  young infants is not a world o f  visual images and 
verbal narrative -  these are aspects o f  adult cognition.40 It is certainly a world 
o f activity in which smells, sounds, tastes and touches are remarkably salient, 
filling practically the entire cognitive sphere.41 W hen we consider that these 
perceptual activities are in a living body that tingles and shudders, that feels 
pleasure and tension, that becom es aroused and relaxed, we can begin to get 
a sense o f  the quality o f  infant experience.
Freud, for example, remarked on the voraciousness with which babies 
attacked the nipple. For Freud, this was due to the overwhelming press o f  
the hunger drive. For me, it is due as much to hunger as to the sensory 
primacy o f  the lips and tongue and the information in the form o f  pleasure 
and mastery that is created when those organs co-regulate with a soft nipple 
and sweet warm milk. Research has shown that the mouth o f  a small baby 
is adept at adjusting to different shape nipples, the tongue will explore and 
detect differences in shape, and oral stimulation and sucking serve a variety 
o f  exploratory and soothing functions, not just nutritive intake functions.42 
For the baby, at that moment, there is nothing but smell, warmth, taste and 
touch: no distracting visual or verbal images. T h is primacy o f  perception and 
direct action, o f  participatory cognition, is more likely to be the source o f  the 
oral eroticism with which Freud endowed infants, not the drive to eat.
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Infant participator)' cognition, therefore, is clearly embodied. It is also 
rooted in the situation in which the infant experiences the activity, as shown 
by research related to the infant’s memory for procedures necessary to make 
a mobile move by kicking. In a variant o f  the studies reported earlier, if  
infants cry when the initial training takes place they fail to remember how to 
make the mobile move on later occasions in which they were not crying. Or, 
i f  the experimenter changes the decorations in the crib between training and 
testing the infants fail to remember. That is, the infants re-enact the action 
sequence with respect to the entire context in which they first acquired their 
action with respect to moving the mobile.43
In the previous chapter I reviewed research on the development o f  the 
infant’s relationship to objects that evolves out o f a history o f  interactions 
between mother and infant around the topic o f  object play. I concluded that 
the meaning o f  objects for the infant was related to the way information 
about objects was created with the mother over the course o f  the first year. In 
the language o f  this chapter, the infant’s participatory cognition o f  objects 
includes all the procedures that were used during those social interactions. 
T h u s, for infants, the cognition o f  objects is inherently social because 
infants acquire object-related procedures in a social situation. Indeed, 
it is the d ifferences between the social relationships in the two dyads 
that I described that captures the differences in infant cognition about 
objects.
Daniel S tem  expresses a very similar view with his concept o f  the evoked 
companion.
For instance, if a six-month-old, when alone, encounters a rattle and manages 
to grasp it and shake it enough so that it makes a sound, the initial pleasure 
may quickly become extreme delight and exuberance [that is] not only the 
result o f successful mastery, which may account for the initial pleasure, but 
also the historical result of similar past moments in the presence of a delight- and 
exuberance-enhancing (regulating) other. It is partly a social response, but in this 
instance it occurs in a nonsocial situation . . .  It is in this way that an evoked 
companion serves to add another dimension to the experience . . .  so that even 
if actually alone, the infant is ‘being with’ a self-regulating other in the form of 
an activated memory of prototypic lived events.44
S tem ’s concept o f  the evoked companion is similar to the concept o f  
participatory’ memory in the sense that the memory o f  the other person 
occurs as part o f  ongoing action. Stem  thinks o f  early infant memory not as 
imaginative or purely ideational, but as the relationship o f  the whole body -  
involving perception, action, and emotion -  to the context. S tem ’s view also 
suggests that participatory memory is not limited to the particular event, like 
shaking a rattle, but to the entire sequence o f  actions and events that have 
occurred with mother when shaking the rattle in the past.
S tem  points out that the concept o f  the evoked companion is similar to 
the original Freudian notion o f  infant ‘hallucination,’ as when the infant
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feels hunger and re-creates, at that moment, the experience o f  nursing with 
the mother because in the past hunger and mother tended to occur together.45 
The evoked companion is also similar to the psychoanalyst D . W. Winnicott’s 
concept o f ‘illusion’ in which the infant creates the mother in relation to 
her typical presence at times o f  need.46 Unlike Stem  and Freud, however, 
Winnicott elevates creativity to a central role in the formation o f  illusions, and 
suggests that the infant’s creation o f  the mother arises in co-regulated activity.
The infant cannot be said to know at first what is to be created. At this point in 
time the mother presents herself. In the ordinary way she gives her breast and her 
potential feeding urge. The mother’s adaptation to the infant’s needs, when good 
enough, gives the infant the illusion that she is an external reality that corresponds 
to the infant’s own capacity to create. In other words, there is an overlap between 
what the mother supplies and what the child might conceive of. To the observer, 
the child perceives what the mother actually presents, but this is not the whole 
truth. The infant perceives the breast only in so far as a breast could be created 
just there and then.47
Winnicott is talking about the creation o f  information: the infant’s participatory 
cognition o f  the present situation. Winnicott believes that imagination arises 
only later, when there has been a controlled ‘disillusionment’ process by 
which the mother withholds immediate comfort allowing the infant to self­
comfort via imaginative re-creation.
Stern’s evoked companion is not created by the infant ‘there and then.’ 
S tem ’s views evoked companions as stored, individualized memories and as 
generalized event structures. H e explains the association between the evoked 
companion and the infant’s action when alone with an object as ‘cued recall.’ 
Stern has a discrete state model o f  the infant in which memory is separate 
from action, and in which there are dedicated and separate parts o f  memory 
for se lf and for mother.48 T he only differences between his view and the 
discrete state concept o f  internal working m odels is that he focuses more on 
specific incidents and endows them with feeling.
T h e concept o f  participatory memory suggests that there is no stored 
or generalized memory that exists separate from the procedures by which 
experience is acquired. T h e infant is fully relational at all times, and the 
experience o f  the other person is completely in relation to the procedures 
o f action by which one co-regulates with that person. This is true even later 
in infancy and childhood, when individuals begin to engage in imaginative 
cognition and can talk about their own cognition.
The origins of imaginative cognition
W hen do infants begin to engage in imaginative cognition? In order to 
understand what form o f  imagination is available to infants, it is useful 
to examine relational theories suggesting that adult imaginative cognition is 
entirely encompassed by imaginative dialogues.49
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T h ese dialogues are with one part o f  the se lf and another part o f  the self: 
the se lf imagined at different times, in different places, or taking different 
narrative perspectives. In thinking, in other words, one is always telling or 
showing something to oneself. W e do this because the inherently social 
nature o f  our experience leads us to create multiple mental perspectives that 
are the parties to a mental discussion. Adults also imagine dialogues with 
other people, dialogues with imaginary figures in imaginary situations, and 
dialogues with the non-social environment. Data to support this perspective 
com es from the pervasiveness o f  narrative dialogues found in literary formats, 
psychological research data, clinical case material, and the near universality o f  
relational metaphors in private and in social speech.50 In most cases, adult 
cognitive narratives take on a linguistic form.
Personal narrative dialogues using language apparendy do not begin until 
the middle o f  the second year o f  life.51 We know this because until about 
the age o f  5 or 6 years, children think out loud. T his form o f  cognition, 
called private speech, is a m onologue that typically occurs when children are 
alone or think that they are alone.52 It is unlikely that imaginative narratives 
using speech occur earlier than the second year since the developmental 
onset o f  private speech is coincident with the developmental onset o f  speech  
during social interaction. Katherine Nelson taped the private narratives o f  
2-year-olds while in their cribs. Here is one example from a child named 
Emily.53
Go to library. I sat in Mormor’s lap. I went to the library. Probably that’s what 
we did in the bus! I sat on top of the bus and I wait for my bus. Cause the . . .  I 
did sit in the regular bus I not in school bus. I wait for the school bus. I waited 
and waited and waited and waited and waited. The last buses are for . . .  that’s 
too much outside. But mostly . . .  But mostly one more time.
Among other things, Emily is telling herself about having to wait for a bus. 
She seem s to be remembering a particular feeling, using her narrative as 
cognition. T h e disjointed sequence o f events suggests that Emily’s purpose 
was not to remember for its own sake, but because the narrative occurs in 
the present, just before bedtime, its purpose may be to setde Emily’s feelings 
about the situation before falling asleep.
N elson ’s interpretation, however, is somewhat surprising.
Stricdy speaking, we cannot call these memories at this point because they seem to 
be neither remembered or anticipated. Rather they form a general undifferentiated 
knowledge base that serves as a background for present experience . . .  Under this 
account, we can speak of experientially based representation in infancy, but not of 
memory per se.5*
N elson’s view o f  an ‘experientially based representation’ that guides present 
experience is close to the idea o f  participatory memory. However, Nelson 
assumes that this experiential memory is stored somewhere as a representation 
o f  the contents o f  reality, and that because Emily’s narrative is not stricdy
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sequential in its re-creation o f  events, her representations o f  reality must be 
stored in a confused or ‘undifferentiated’ way. N elson, like Stem , insists on 
a discrete memory faculty that represents, more or less faithfully, the ‘real’ 
world.55
T o understand the developmental origins o f  imaginative cognition we have 
to examine it as an active cognitive process, not as the recall o f the contents 
of a generalized memory store. Imaginative cognition is, in fact, one form o f  
participatory cognition because it is mental action in the present, it is related 
to our purpose for imagining (to comfort ourselves, to remember an event, to 
plan, to solve a problem, or to help us fall asleep), and because in imagination 
we use the same perceptual and motor modalities that are the procedures for 
participatory cognition.
T his participatory aspect o f  Emily’s narrative is revealed by her meaningful 
use o f  words and grammar, by how she forms her lips and throat and tongue 
into conventional sounds, by her use o f emphasis to express emotion (not 
shown in the transcript), and by her ability to tell herself about things that 
are important to her in the form o f private speech created in the present.
A surprisingly large number o f children’s first words are emotion-related  
such as tired (fatigue), ouch (pain), sad (distress), yuk  (disgust), love mommy 
(affection) and good/bad (value), and a considerable amount o f early pretend 
play with language focuses on feelings.56 By the age o f  2 l/ i  years, children 
can talk about their feelings and label emotional states correcdy,57 they can 
discuss past and future emotions and the sequentially related causes and 
consequences o f  emotions (It’s dark, I ’m scared', Mommy, you went away. I  
was sa d ),5S and they can recognize emotional sequences in themselves and 
in other people.59
Language also has the ability to describe events that are not currendy 
present -  what Roger Brown refers to as the displacement property of  
language.60 Thus, once children begin to use language as a mode o f  action 
they becom e capable o f referring to that which is not present. A number 
o f developmental psychologists have suggested that the ability for cognitive 
displacement, or imagining, begins around the age o f 2 years as evidenced  
not only by the onset o f language, but also by delayed imitation, in which the 
child copies another’s action at some later time when the m odel is no longer 
present.61 Because this is the age at which children begin to recognize their 
own image in a mirror, it is assumed that they have an ‘objective’ sense o f  se lf  
and that they can form mental representations o f  self and other, and hence 
perhaps multiple narrative perspectives within the self.62
Almost everyone agrees, therefore, that the infant can imagine once 
language is acquired. But can the infant imagine before language is acquired? 
Recall from my example in Chapter 7 that when infants play with objects on 
their own, their cognition o f  the object is related to how they related to the 
object with their mother. T h e participatory memory is the re-enactment o f  
procedures used with objects in the past, procedures acquired in the mother’s
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company. T h e mother at this point is not, contrary to what is suggested by the 
evoked companion metaphor, created as an imaginary play partner.
However, if  the infant begins to have enough experience with objects when 
alone it is inevitable that the infant will discover, by creating information 
through action, procedures for interacting with objects when alone that are 
different from those procedures acquired in the company o f  the mother. 
T hus, when the infant returns to the mother’s company and enacts the 
participatory cognition based on the solo experiences with objects, information 
will be created that differentiates these newr procedures from the old 
context.
T o  put this in the language o f  communication, the infant is a participant 
in two frames that share similar themes o f  information. O ne o f  the frames 
is consensual, the result o f  co-regulated negotiation with the mother. T he  
other frame is created through a non-social communication with the physical 
environment. Because the infant is a participant in both frames, information 
can be created through perception and action. N ot only can the infant 
detect invariants within each frame, but the opportunity exists to detect 
invariants between frames, particularly since the information themes are 
closely related.
What results is a participatory cognitive dialogue in which perception and 
action are compared between several different frames in which similar 
information is created.63 T he dialogue is participatory in the sense that 
when participating in one frame, the other frame is present as a procedural 
memory. T his comparative activity has all the elements o f  a narrative mental 
dialogue, except that it does not occur imaginatively: the infant has to be 
involved in one or the other frame. T he object-related action created in one 
frame is one cognitive perspective while the action created in the other frame 
forms another cognitive perspective. The infant does not have a Platonic view 
o f the context, the object, the mother or the se lf as real objective entities. 
Neither, for that matter, does an adult.
In other words, every action embodies a relational dialogue between one’s past 
and the present.M Thus, through participatory dialogical cognition the infant 
begins to create information about what is not present in relation to what 
is actually present. T h e not-present becom es part o f  participatory cognition 
and thus, from its inception, stands in a dialogic relationship to the present. 
Imaginative cognition probably develops as images coalesce around the co- 
participating frames o f  a cognitive dialogical relationship. T o  the extent 
that cognitive dialogues are co-regulated forms o f  communication between 
different cognitive frames or positions, these images created are cognitive 
processes, not cognitive contents. Thus, imagination begins as a participatory 
dialogue between cognitive frames and does not have to await the acquisition 
o f  language.
In conclusion, infants are capable o f  a relational cognitive activity from 
a very' early age. Because cognition is always the experience o f  being
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related to som ething or to som eone, and because infants are capable o f  
detecting invariant information in complex situations, cognition contains all 
the necessary attributes for discovering a sense o f  se lf in relationships.
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C h a p te r  9
The self in relation: 
self and other
What is the self?  More than a body, or a history, or a set o f  feelings: the 
self can’t be completely encompassed because it is always re-making itself. 
Individuals that have stopped making themselves becom e shadows cast by a 
former self, they speak to themselves and others in a single voice o f  pain or 
compulsion or sentimentality.
Human identities are considered to be evolving constructions; they emerge out of 
continual social interactions in the course of life . . . Narrative constructions are 
the socially derived and expressed product of repeated adventures and are laid 
over a biological life progression that often extends beyond its storied span . . .  the 
athlete retiring after a long and successful career is often ill-prepared to meet 
the challenges of continuing to structure a life story . . . The typical dramatic 
progression is that of tragedy.1
The self is the set o f  one’s personal stories, or narratives, told in inner speech  
or told to others. Selves, like relationships, are collections o f  story themes, 
some o f  which are creatively changing in the re-telling, while others becom e 
rigidified vestiges from the past.
V. S. Naipaul describes his experiences o f  travel, followed by his attempts 
to write stories about those experiences.
To arrive at a place without knowing anyone there, and sometimes without an 
introduction; to learn how to move among strangers for the short time one could 
afford to be among them; to hold oneself in constant readiness for adventure or 
revelation; to allow oneself to be carried along, up to a point, by accidents; and 
consciously to follow up other impulses -  that could be as creative and imaginative 
a procedure as the writing that came after . . . However creatively one travels, 
however deep an experience in childhood or middle age, it takes thought (a sifting 
of impulses, ideas, and references that become more multifarious as one grows 
older) to understand what one has lived through or where one has been.2
Every human life is a journey into the unknown, often with guides but rarely 
without taking risks and grasping opportunities. T h e se lf is seldom setded
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or known completely. W e travel through time as creative participants. Later, 
we re-create it imaginatively as participants in dialogue. T h e self, in both 
the living and the enlivened telling, is relational. T h e se lf is both parts o f  
the dialogue, it is a continuously re-created co-regulated process. And there 
are many dialogues and many parts to the self. W hen the dialogue on a topic 
turns into a monologue, when it becom es a thing about which everything 
seem s known or knowable, when the story is unchanging, that part o f  the 
se lf becom es a rigid frame that is no longer a participant in an otherwise 
unfolding personal tale.
T h e  d i a l o g i c a l  s e l f  i n  a d u l t s
In the previous chapter, I embraced the notion o f  cognition as embodied 
narrative dialogue. Hubert Hermans, Harry Kempen and Rens van Loon, 
two psychologists and one philosopher from the Netherlands3 argue that the 
se lf em erges from that dialogue. Psychologists beginning with William James 
at the end o f  the nineteenth century and continuing to the present time have 
made a distinction between the /  as the part o f  cognition that is the thinking 
agent, and the me as the object o f  that thought.4 T he I  imagines things or 
makes metaphors (thinking about taking a walk), while the me is what the /  
imagines (picturing on eself actually walking).
If cognition is a narrative between two or more imagined positions, the 
cognitive process seem s spontaneously to assign multiple narrative voices that 
can engage in a discussion and that can be perceived as parts o f  ourselves.s 
Position, as a dynamically changing process, is a more appropriate metaphor 
than that o f  role to suggest the different perspectives which constitute 
dialogue.6
we conceptualize the self in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of relatively 
autonomous I  positions in an imaginal landscape. . . .  The I has the possibility 
to move, as in a space, from one position to the other in accordance with 
changes in situation and time . . .  the /  has the capacity to imaginatively endow 
each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be 
established . . .  As different voices, these characters exchange information about 
their respective mes and their worlds, resulting in a complex, narratively structured 
self . . . The /  in one position can agree, disagree, understand, misunderstand, 
oppose, contradict, question and even ridicule the I  in another position.7
O ne need not retain the conceptual distinction between /  and me. It is 
sufficient to conceptualize the se lf as a dialogical process between multiple 
cognitive positions.
According to Hermans and his colleagues, the dialogical se lf has a number 
o f  characteristics that make it different from the traditional Western (or 
Cartesian) notion o f  the self, some o f  which are summarized in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1. Characteristics of the adult dialogical self, based on the work of Hermans, 
Kempen and van Loon
D ia log ica l s e lf
The self has multiple I positions, each of 
which has a different perspective
The self is embodied such that the /  
positions must occupy an imaginary time 
and space. Thus, cognition must participate 
in a dialogue and cannot transcend those 
positions, except from some other embodied 
position
The self is social, and can act ‘as if’ it 
were another person as one of the positions 
the /  can occupy. The other position may 
or may not be the actual perspective of 
another person; it could be an imaginary 
person or an imagined point of view of 
another person.
The self as dialogical is decentralized; it is 
not one particular position but all of them 
combined and the dialogue between them.
The self is defined with respect to its 
historical and cultural context
R atio n a l/ob jec tive  s e lf
The self is unitary, with a single cogito 
responsible for reasoning 
The self is disembodied and thought can 
transcend its material boundaries by taking 
an abstract stance
The self is individual even though one can 
think about interacting with another, or take 
the role of another
The self is the centralized or ideal center 
of control with defined boundaries
The self is context free, without reference 
to society and culture, and can stand 
outside its own history
(Adapted from Hermans, H.J.M. el al ‘The dialogical self, in American Psychologist, 47, No 1, 
January 1992, copyright ©  1992 by the American Psychological Association, adapted by 
permission.)
T h e dialogical se lf  is not an objectively specifiable entity. T h e se lf  is not 
entirely ‘in ’ the individual, since it em bodies the positions o f  others and 
can imagine itse lf  in times and places that are not here and now. T h e se lf  
is not a single locus o f  control, since it is com posed o f  m ultiple positions, 
none o f  which is more correct or real than any other. T h e se lf  is never 
entirely defined, but is always in the process o f  creation through dialogue. 
T h is dialogue can occur with another person, or it can occur between the 
different cognitive positions, or between one or more im agined narrative 
voices. In any case, the form o f  the dialogue is identical to the form o f  
social discourse.
In answer to the question ‘who am I?’ I can describe m yself in terms o f  
linguistic-cultural categories. I am o f  medium height, I have grey hair, I am 
a father and husband, I am a psychologist, I have particular religious and 
political beliefs, and the like. But none o f  these categories is myself, they 
are descriptors o f  external features or o f  completed actions.8 If I were to 
describe m yself in continuous process terms, I would have to talk about all 
o f  my cognitive debates and discussions. I would have to admit that I am not 
a single and permanent entity, but rather a set o f  choices, possibilities and
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uncertainties. I would have to describe all o f  the identities 1 take on in both 
actual and imagined social relationships.
Frankly, I could never finish this description because o f  the multiplicity o f  
the se lf and because it continues to change as I am thinking about it. I could 
never entirely know m yself objectively, I could never trace all the historical 
connections, alternative cognitive positions, or even all o f  the facets o f  the 
se lf  here and now. I can’t do it partly because o f  the complexity, but also 
partly because every time I think or remember, I create a different point o f  
view as my participatory cognition engages with one embodied position from 
the perspective o f  another.9
It is easier in the end to think o f  m yself categorically, because in Western 
culture we are encouraged to simplify our experience, to achieve a single 
identity and an independent point o f  view. T h e concept o f  the ideal, stable, 
unified se lf is a distincdy W estern cultural concept and Western readers 
may balk at the notion o f  the se lf as an inherendy open-ended dialogical 
process.10
Jerome Bruner refers to the dialogical se lf as the ‘distributed’ se lf and 
makes the claim that such a se lf is known only through a lifelong interpretive 
procedure.11 Bruner finds the roots o f  this view o f  se lf in current trends in 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology and psychoanalysis. T h e se lf is always 
created in the present, it only exists with respect to the interpretive activity 
o f  creating a story in the here and now. Bruner’s studies o f  autobiographies 
found that almost one-half o f  the narrative units are in the present tense. 
T h e authors seem  not merely to be recounting the past but ‘deciding what 
to make o f  the past narratively at the moment o f  telling.’12
T h e  d i a l o g i c a l  s e l f  i n  i n f a n c y
I propose that the infant se lf is dialogical and that it is experienced primarily 
in the realm o f  participatory cognition rather than imaginative cognition. 
Instead o f  a dialogue between actual or imagined points o f  view or between  
different voices, the infant se lf emerges as a result o f  the cognition o f  
alternative action possibilities and the resulting dialogue in action between  
them. T h ese action possibilities are perceived direcdy by the infant as 
self-produced actions, and therefore the se lf is experienced by the infant 
as the relationship between the different self-produced activities.
Multiple action possibilities as dialogical positions
From an individualistic perspective, one would argue that the se lf is located 
in the body. A relational perspective suggests that the se lf is distributed as 
the relationship between the body and the environment. According to James
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G ibson’s theory o f  ecological perception, individuals perceive themselves at 
the same time that they perceive the environment.13 In the process o f  visual 
perception, for example, one looks out and observes the visual flow field 
and at the same time perceives one’s own location with respect to the flow. 
Humans, for example, can see their nose at all times in the visual field. 
Depending upon one’s posture and the direction o f  gaze it is possible to see 
other body parts in the field. Thus, in order to perceive what is out ‘there,’ 
one at the same time automatically perceives what is ‘here.’
According to Gibson, the hands as visual images expand and contract as 
they move closer or farther away from the body. Babies can determine the 
spatial limits o f  the body because the hands can get only so small as a 
visual array, while other objects can recede until they disappear. Because 
the production o f  force in the arms is precisely coupled with changes in the 
visual array for the hands, the infant perceives the hands as part o f  the self, 
but only with respect to the co-perception in the background o f  the visual 
field o f  things that are clearly not under one’s control. T hose things that are 
part o f  my body have a different visual array, different patterns o f  motion, 
and different connections to proprioception than things that are not part o f  
my body.14
Thus, one always observes from a location, and the point o f  observation is 
located by virtue o f  its relationship with everything else in the visual field. 
T h e se lf is not merely the point o f  observation, nor is it merely the sense 
o f convergence between the motor control and the visual image o f  the body. 
It is the dialogic relationship between the point o f  observation, the rest o f  the 
body, and the perceptual flow field in which the body is immersed. The self, 
from the beginning and by the very nature o f  perception, is relational.
There is a wide range o f  converging evidence that young infants perceive 
the se lf as the dialogical relationship between the perception o f  self-produced  
action and aspects o f  the environment that are not self-produced. Self­
produced motion — like crawling or walking -  enhances infant skill in acting 
on objects, and their knowledge o f  out-of-sight object locations: knowledge 
o f the environment, in other words, is directly tied to self-m otion.15 Similarly , 
kittens who have acquired visually guided locomotion are better at reaching 
at objects with their paws than those who cannot locom ote.16 Human infants 
o f  7 months who are skilled at reaching are more likely to reach for a 
sound-making object in the dark if  it is within reach compared to out o f  
reach. Thus, forms o f  skilled action and knowledge o f  object locations are 
intimately associated with the movement o f  the individual within the spatial 
environment.
According to George Butterworth,17 infants also have a range o f  dialogue­
like self-directed action, similar to the idea o f  the I  that acts and the me that 
is the focus o f  that action. Newborns will exert strong pushing movements 
if  they are in danger o f  suffocation. In the first few hours o f  life, newborns 
touch their own head in an ordered sequence beginning with the mouth, then
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moving to the face, the head, the ear, the nose and the eyes. T his occurs only 
when the infant is awake.18 Prior to hand-to-m outh contact, newborns open  
their mouths. Such patterns o f  hand-to-m outh and hand-to-head contacts 
occur in fetal development in both humans and other species.19 As infants 
becom e more skilled at reaching, touching and grasping, they begin to 
self-explore by touching different parts o f  the body beginning with the 
fingers and ending months later with the toes.20
These self-directed actions seem analogous to the adult I  telling something 
to the me. In some ways, it seem s curious that adults have mental dialogues at 
all. If the se lf were som e central and coherent all-knowing entity, why would 
it have to talk to itself? It should know itself directly and immediately, making 
imagined I-m e dialogues unnecessary or even ridiculous.21 T he Cartesian 
mind is transparent to itself, is completely rational and can never deceive 
itself. It is only from the Cartesian point o f  view that one is confirmed as 
a se lf by means o f  rational certainty. There is no certainty in dialogue in 
which knowledge is always relative to other cognitive points o f  view. Selves 
are open systems and never entirely complete.
T h e fact that we do talk to ourselves is an indication that there is not a 
higher-order point o f  view: we are the dialogue and not one voice or another. 
Indeed, to the extent that one voice takes over and ceases to participate 
in the dialogue, that part o f  the se lf becom es rigidified. Som e forms o f  
psychopathology may be found either in the absence o f  dialogue when a 
single inner voice com pels, or when the dialogue becomes ritualized and 
constraining. T he Cartesian mind o f  absolute certainty is a Western myth 
and a psychotic’s reality.
Similarly, why should babies have to touch themselves to know their 
own bodies? T his can only be explained by the different perspectives 
gained as an action dialogue between the position taken by the act o f  
touching and the position taken by the act o f  perceiving the area that is 
touched.
T h e idea o f  a pre-linguistic or pre-conceptual sense o f  se lf is relatively 
recent in the history o f  psychology, and represents an important turn in our 
thinking about infancy. However, the scholars who propose that infants have 
a se lf have not conceptualized that se lf as dialogical or relational. T he infant 
self they construct has an objective existence as a stored representation and 
a unity o f  purpose, control and organization. T hese scholars take the same 
data that I have reviewed and interpret it differendy.
For example, they note that the infant can both see the hands and feel 
the proprioception com ing from that location o f  the body. T his coherence o f  
perception, feeling and the control over activity is what they call the self. They  
propose that the se lf is built up as a generalized representation o f  coherence 
between perception and control: the se lf is the experienced locus o f  control 
and o f  feeling.22
For example, Robert Emde agrees that the infant se lf develops via
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Figure 9.1 A 2 or 3-month-old infant touching and looking at the hands and 
feet. (Copyright ©  Ace Photo Agency/Vibert-Stokes.)
procedural knowledge, what I have called participatory cognition. Yet he 
states that ‘a sense o f  coherence and o f  agency are the cardinal features o f  
the se lf system along with a fundamental sense o f  control (i.e. ownership) 
o f body and action.’23 Ulrich Neisser develops the Gibsonian idea o f  an 
‘ecological s e lf  that is embodied, but then speaks o f  a remembered self, a 
private self, and a conceptual self. T hese different selves are not the same 
as the different narrative locations in the dialogical self. Rather, they seem to 
be different types o f  stored representations each o f  which has an independent 
developmental course.24
Daniel Stem  also relies on Gibsonian notions o f  the detection o f  invariants 
and their relationship to one’s sense o f  self-produced action. T he infant’s 
sense o f  se lf is experienced direcdy in feeling, action and perception and is 
not linguistic or conceptual. But S tem , like Emde, suggests that the se lf is the 
infant’s sense o f  coherence or organization across the various perceptual and 
motor realms. Infants are seen as creating order and organization. T he ‘sense 
of a core se lf results [because] the infant has . . .  the ability to integrate all 
of these self-invariants into a single subjective perspective.’25
O f course, infants experience a coherent link between perception and 
action, but one should not stop there. As I have tried to show, it is impossible 
to perceive coherent self-action  without reference to a corresponding  
perception o f  the se lf in a location, in a body, in an environment. Thus,
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coherence o f  perception and action is always relational, always with respect 
to a context, and never part o f  a context-free objective core.
What is the problem with defining the infant se lf simply as the sense o f  
coherence between perception and action? One problem is that the dialogical 
self o f  the older child and adult seem s to emerge as if  by some developmental 
magic. Every one o f these se lf theorists recognizes, as I do, that dialogical 
narrative is central to the se lf o f  the older child. How can the se lf transform 
from coherence to dialogue, from unity to multiplicity? How can a core se lf  
that exists encased in a generalized form change into the narrative, open and 
questioning se lf  o f  the older child and adult? T h ese theorists all assume 
that the ability' to take narrative perspectives is brought in by the deus ex 
machina o f  neural maturation, cognitive sophistication, and linguistic skill. If, 
as I propose, the dialogical se lf exists from the beginning in the inherently 
relational form o f  perception and action, the developmental change is no 
longer mysterious.
A second problem occurs when these theorists try to connect the se lf to 
other people. How can a core, objectively defined se lf be related to anything? 
T he answer varies, but it seem s to be by mere associationism between 
objective representations o f  se lf and other. Stern’s concept o f  the evoked 
companion is an example in which the absent other exists as a separate 
coherent mental representation associated with the mental representation 
o f  coherent self-action. T h e concept o f  the internal working model o f  the 
mother is a similarly objective mental entity; coherent and self-contained. 
T h ese metaphors are mechanistic rather than relational.
A final problem is that the coherent, objective self, if  found in an adult, 
would be pathological. One could argue, perhaps, that what is pathological 
for an adult may be normal for an infant. There are many aspects o f  infant 
behavior that if  displayed by adults would not be considered mature: extremes 
o f  emotion, excessive dependence on a single person, or poor motor control 
when eating. Yet in spite o f  these infantile forms o f  acting, I believe that 
infants have a se lf that is dialogical and relational, and that those relationships 
are an inherent part o f  the original self.
The social origins of the self
T h e solution to these theoretical problems is, as I have suggested, to define 
the infant se lf as the relationship between multiple points o f  view, between 
the body and the not-body, between the individual and others. T he fact that 
the adult dialogical se lf is in the form o f a social conversation is derived from 
the pervasiveness o f  social relationships in infancy.26 Simply put, the self is the 
individual’s participator)’ and imaginative cognition o f  co-regulated relationships.
In Chapter 2, I gave three examples in which infants may have the 
opportunity to detect a se lf in relation to the context o f  communication 
with their mother. T he first example involved mother vocalizing in order
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to calm a crying infant, the second was being helped by mother to sit up, and 
the third was the transfer o f  an object between infant and mother. What is 
common across these examples is the essential ingredient for self-cognition: 
the dialogue that results from participation in consensual action frames in a 
long-term relationship with another individual.
Consider the pull-to-sit consensual frame shown in Figure 2.1. As the 
infant changes from a supine to a sitting position, both mother and infant are 
together exerting dynamic forces to create action that is related with respect 
to the changing perceptual information about the infant’s body location. T his  
consensual frame o f a two-person action system creates a smooth movement 
o f the infant out o f  the ebb and flow o f forces that are continuously changing 
within each individual. It is this co-regulated alternation o f  exertion within 
a consensual frame that is the origin o f  the dynamic dialogue that we call 
the self.
If the infant and mother were perfectly matched in their efforts, there 
would not be an alternation, and without alternation there would be no 
dialogue. T h e self would not be perceived at this moment because there is 
no background against which the individual’s efforts take on a relational form. 
Imagine being immersed in a water bath that is exacdy at the temperature 
o f your body. If you close your eyes you will shortly lose a sense o f  the 
boundaries o f  your body. For some people this corresponds to a state o f  
blissful relaxation. For others, this perceived loss o f  se lf is startling, perhaps 
frightening, and they make efforts to move, surface, open the eyes or touch 
something solid. On the other hand, if  water is colder or warmer than body 
temperature, or if  you or the water move, the boundaries o f  the body and the 
motion o f  the body are spontaneously detected in relation to the difference 
between the body and the surround.
If the mother pulls the infant with such force that the infant is unable to 
resist or to provide compensatory effort, there would be no sense o f  self 
as it is absorbed into the background without an opportunity to detect the 
relationship between self-action and a non-responsive overwhelming force. 
Imagine being completely overtaken by something, as in falling o ff a raft in 
the middle o f  a river rapid. Nothing you do can change the situation, no 
force you exert can counter the power o f  the river. T he self is also lost in 
this situation. O ne has the choice to submit to the river’s urges or to continue 
to fight against them. In fighting the river, the se lf re-em erges as a palpable 
experience: as muscle fatigue, disorientation, fear, and if  all goes well as 
gasping for breath in calmer water, feeling grateful for the life jacket.27
Hamlet’s famous soliloquy, ostensibly his thoughts about suicide, is also 
about creating the se lf or submitting to its loss, ‘to be or not to b e,’
-  that is the question: -
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
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And by opposing end them? -  To die, -  to sleep, -  
No more; and by a sleep to say we end 
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks 
That flesh is heir to, -  ’tis a consummation 
Devoutly to be wish’d.28
In this narrative it seem s to me that Shakespeare equates the sense o f  self, 
one’s being, with the embodied metaphor o f  a thousand natural shocks 
experienced in relation to the background o f a sea o f  troubles. Hamlet, o f  
course, is suffering and the self-story he creates from his imagined action of  
resistance is symbolized as corporeal pain.
T h e baby in my example who is pulled to sit by the mother is not suffering. 
T h e baby’s se lf at that moment is related to the consensual frame o f  coming 
upright to view the world, experienced in the exertion o f  the arm and trunk 
muscles in relation to the mother’s, in the feelings o f  com petence due to 
effort, in the flow o f  the visual array detected by the retina, and in the changes 
in acceleration with respect to gravitational force detected by the semicircular 
canals and the otolith organs.29 Yet, both Hamlet and the baby create the self 
by opposition and exertion in relation to their social surround.
T h e se lf is a metaphor for the cognition o f  alternative action possibilities 
in a particular private or social consensual frame: alternative actions o f  
the individual, or alternative actions taken by the individual and partner. 
T h e alternatives for the baby in the pull-to-sit episode, to paraphrase 
Shakespeare, are to pull or not to pull, or better: to pull more or to pull 
less. T h e mother has the same choices and can also perceive herself in this 
transaction in relation to the baby.
Why does co-regulation have a special status with respect to the self? 
Earlier in this chapter I suggested that the se lf is perceived as the relation 
o f  the infant to the environment, whether animate or inanimate, because 
perception is always self-referent, always with respect to the individual’s 
position. Even so, the infant may not always detect that relationship because 
information is creative and emergent, not automatically pressed upon the 
senses nor imprinted in the brain. Social co-regulation has a special role 
in human development because it enhances the individual’s likelihood o f  
detecting self-referent information, o f  detecting the individual’s relationship 
to the environment.
T his happens because in co-regulated communication individuals create 
information about their own actions in relation to another person whose 
actions are adjusting to the individual at the same time that the individual 
is adjusting to those actions.30 Thus, the events to which one is adjusting 
are increasingly fitted to one’s adjustive actions, making the adjustment 
immediately meaningful. Because co-regulation moves individuals toward 
each other with respect to converging upon co-created themes o f  information, 
and especially when partners have lasting relationships in which themes 
becom e created and elaborated within a stable consensual frame, the
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perception o f  the individual’s own action in relation to the environment is 
also salient.
In the pull-to-sit example, the infant’s se lf is perceived as the relationship 
between forces tied directly to proprioception and the forces to which the 
infant submits. T h e se lf is not one’s own movement, it is how that movement 
in combination with this set o f  circumstances achieves the result o f  sitting 
upright. T o  put the infant’s se lf in this example in linguistic terms it might 
be: I am one who, in combination with compensatory support and force, can 
pull m yself upright.
Across time in a relationship the infant and mother may do this exercise 
many times. D oes the infant se lf in this situation becom e the generalized 
representation o f  all o f  those experiences? There is another explanation. The 
consensual frame makes salient how to re-create his or her own participation 
with respect to the mother’s in order to achieve an upright position. Each time 
they do this the precise timing and balancing o f  forces will differ, but this 
infant does not have to store and generalize all these instances. Part o f  the 
infant’s memory is in the situation (lying supine, raising the arms, the mother 
taking hold), in the body location o f the action (tighten trunk and arm muscles 
when in this situation), and in the sequence o f  co-regulated alternations that 
are created in this consensual frame by both participants.
Each time this discourse o f  forces occurs in this situation the infant se lf  
will be slighdy different. T h e self will evolve with respect to the continued  
re-negotiation o f  the patterning o f  forces within the consensual frame. As 
the infant’s trunk and muscles become stronger, perhaps through this socially 
mediated exercise regimen, the infant will spontaneously exert more control 
and the mother will spontaneously cede it, not in an all-or-nothing fashion, 
but by adjusting the balance o f  force alternation in the living process o f  
coming upright. Eventually, the infant’s sense o f  se lf with respect to this 
action will not include the mother but it will always be relational, including 
the nature o f  the surface from which one must arise (one gets up differently 
from a hard floor compared to a soft mattress).
T h e dialogical se lf is always present in every such transaction, although it is 
not readily observable, any more than one’s inner thoughts are observable to 
another person. T he dialogue is in the subde interplay between one’s exertion 
and the momentary and fleeting adjustive response o f  the environment to that 
exertion. That adjustive response is different when I am being assisted up, 
compared to pushing m yself up from a bare floor, compared to holding on to 
a rigid support like a table. T he self is each o f  those dialogues. It is re-created 
in each o f  those situations. It is not generalized across them except in so far 
as the actions that make one come upright may be similar in each situation.
Research suggests that the se lf is created with respect to social co- 
regulatory processes, when the partner is not merely responsive to infant 
signals but is an active participant in the dialogue and takes a role in 
the cooperative co-creation o f  consensual frames. For example, infant
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compliance and self-m onitoring activities in the second year are enhanced 
in relationships that are co-constructed.31 Similarly, understanding o f  the 
se lfs  relationship to family members arises in m other-child and sibling-child  
discourse during the second year, as teasing, support and prohibition are 
co-regulated in the family.32
Studies o f  infant peer interactions in the second year are especially 
interesting. It is only at this time that peers can establish what appear to 
be co-regulated forms o f  communication without the intervention o f  an adult. 
T hey spontaneously adjust their actions with respect to each other and are 
able to create elaborated dialogues through mutually creative activities, first 
involving mimicking and later with more complementary actions in response 
to the partner. W hen investigators actually study the process and outcomes o f  
peer play, they find that there is indeed cooperative activity in which frames 
are co-constructed, and that participation in consensual frames enhances 
the child’s self-m onitoring and self-regulatory actions as well as the child’s 
understanding o f  se lf and other agency.33
By the age o f  5 years, children define themselves linguistically with respect 
to their relationships to other people. T he se lf is described, for example, 
as being similar to or different from other people, or in relation to actions 
performed with others (‘W e went way down by the pool’), to others (‘I taught 
my little brother how to color’), or by others (‘Jimmy hit m e’). Even when 
describing things that happen when alone, children refer to their relationships 
with others (‘N o one was holding my hand’).34
T h e behavior o f  adults when alone is particularly revealing in this regard. 
According to a review o f  research on emotions by Alan Fridlund,35 when 
alone we treat ourselves as interactants, we act as if  others are present by 
having both imagined and pretend conversations with them, we rehearse 
potential interactions and make social emotional expressions even when 
others are not present, and we often treat non-humans and inamimate 
objects as social interactants, such as in talking to pets and making faces 
at houseplants.
O ne interesting finding concerns the child’s use o f  the word mine. When 
children first use this word around the age o f  2 years it is in the context o f  
social play and they appear to be using it in the sense o f  defining ownership 
rather than in the sense o f  being possessive. They are likely to say mine if  
another child approaches or picks up one o f  their toys, but they may not 
complain if  the child uses the toy. Also, they often switch freely from mine 
to me. Thus, they seem to be defining for the other child their relationship 
to the toy, rather than acting as if  the toy was exclusively for their own use. 
M ine, therefore, expresses the nature o f  a relationship rather than an absolute 
property o f  the self.36
U nfortunately, before infants can use language and before they can 
act independently in a relationship between peers, it is harder to find 
conclusive evidence for the social dialogical self. T h is may be why many
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observers in the past have suggested that the infant se lf begins around 18 
months when infants appear to recognize themselvess in a mirror.37 This 
developmental achievement, however, seem s to be related primarily to 
the ability to name and describe one’s own body, appearance, emotions 
or se lf agency linguistically with respect to either a mirror, a peer or an 
adult.38
There is som e evidence that infants as young as several months act 
differendy in the company o f  different social partners,39 and in the presence 
o f interactive disturbances such as simulated maternal depression,40 interruption 
o f maternal action,41 changes in the animacy o f  the partner,42 changes in 
behavior following maternal separation.43 T h ese differences in responding 
typically do not involve crying, aversion or following as they might in an older 
infant under such circumstances. Rather, they include subde changes in the 
movements o f  the infant’s hands, arms and legs, in the facial expression, 
and in the gaze direction. One has to examine the infant’s whole body in 
relation to the specific social situation in order to detect these changes. T o  
the extent that self-perception is automatically a part o f  other-perception, I 
suspect that these different social experiences yield different dialogical selves 
for the infant.
Another hypothetical mechanism for the em ergence o f  a social dialogical 
se lf is imitation. Throughout infancy and early childhood, imitation serves as 
one o f  the primary agents in social discourse. Newborns appear to be able to 
imitate some simple gestures like mouth opening and tongue protrusion,44 
mothers and infants imitate each other during social play during the first 
year o f  life,45 and when peers first begin to interact in the second year they 
establish play routines via mutual imitation.46 In each o f  these instances, 
imitation serves as a simple and reliable means for the initiation and 
maintenance o f  dialogue and sharing between social partners.47 Imitation, in 
other words, is often the admission ticket to a social play routine. Because o f  
its centrality as part o f  social dialogue, and because o f  its mirror-like aspect, 
imitation is one way in which self-action can be made salient with respect to 
another person’s action.
T his view o f  the social function o f  imitation fits the concept o f  the 
dialogical se lf only if  imitation, like any other social action, is creative and 
co-regulated. Is this the case? According to some individualistic theories o f  
imitation, it is a capacity o f  the individual, based on the ability to form 
representations o f others’ actions and to match those representations with 
objective representations o f  their own actions. These representations are 
believed not to be tied to a specific modality o f  action, but rather to be 
amodal.48
On the other hand, research has shown that imitation o f  all sorts 
depends on a variety o f  features o f  the context. New borns, for example, are 
more likely to imitate actions they can perform on their own (the m odeler 
must choose just those actions that the infant is likely to imitate) and the
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imitation is more likely if  the time between presentations is long enough 
for the infant to visually process and attempt to perform the action. Thus, 
when adults structure the situation so as to make salient information the 
infant can perceive and perform, in other words when adults and infants 
co-regulate, imitation is more likely.49 Imitation, even newborn imitation, 
depends on the existence o f  a social context which allows infants to 
create information from visual or auditor}' displays and translate that 
into imitative action. Imitation, therefore, is co-regulated social action 
within a consensual frame for mimetic activity, not an individualistic 
performance by the infant. According to Kenneth Kaye, ‘imitation is active 
and creative. An imitative act is never a perfect copy, always a novel 
act . . .  imitation is often achieved by the joint action o f  children and 
their models . . .  imitation does not entail representation.’50
Imitation does not require representation because it is created directly from 
perception into action. T h ese co-regulated features o f  imitation occur in 
older infants and children. O ne-year-olds are more likely to imitate familiar 
actions than unfamiliar actions,51 and by age IV 2, children are more likely 
to imitate acts for which the modeler provided a verbal explanation in the 
context o f  an ongoing interaction.52
Thus, even the simplest o f  social actions, imitation, is co-regulated and 
therefore requires self-action to be performed in relation to the other’s 
action. In the early months o f  life, imitation is dialogical because the self 
is perceived in relation to the other as part o f  participatory cognition. By the 
age o f  2 years, and som etim es earlier, imitated actions become part o f  the 
se lf  via imaginative cognition.
Emily, the child whose crib monologues were recorded, was also recorded 
during the period when the parents were still in the room and putting 
her to bed. An analysis o f  these data were conducted by Rita W atson.53 
Her father often said, ‘night-night, H on,’ with a falling pitch intonation 
characteristic o f  coaxing and soothing. Just after the father leaves, Emily 
produces her own ‘nighty-night’ three times in succession with the same 
falling intonation pattern. Just after, she imagines the next encounter with 
her father, ‘when Daddy com e, then Daddy get Emmy then Daddy wake 
Emmy up . . .  ’ T his is followed by a description o f  herself sleeping during 
the night. Watson writes,
[Emily] does not seem to be simply repeating or imitating what she has heard, 
or simply listing experiences in a random way. In this monologue, she casts her 
experience in relation to a social reality. Her effective self-regulation [calming 
down, getting ready to go to sleep] co-occurs with her expression of shared 
patterns of action . . .  54
Once again, imitation is not mere copying based on some individualistic 
capacity to do so. Imitation is an action created to establish a se lf in relation 
to personal history and context: I am one who, when falling asleep, am
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connected to my father, and to the immediate history and future sequence 
o f events in which this period o f  sleep is embedded.
T h e  d i a l o g i c a l  s e l f  i s  c o - r e g u l a t e d
The self as the history of relationships between multiple positions
In the example o f  Emily’s monologue we can see how experiences with other 
people immediately becom e part o f  the dialogical self. Emily’s se lf dialogue 
is partly o f  the I-m e variety, telling herself that she will see her father when  
she wakes up, and partly o f  the other-m e variety, as she repeats her father’s 
‘night-night’ it is as if  the imagined position o f  the father is telling something  
to the me.
T o  the extent that the dialogical se lf is co-regulated communication, the 
consensual frames that make up the se lf are continuously being formed and 
dissolved in just the same way as consensual frames in social relationship 
formation between two separate individuals over time. T h e se lf is not a 
dialogue between discrete signals nor between fixed mental representations. 
Rather, the meaning and character o f  each dialogical position must be created in 
the dialogue itself T h e motivation for people continuing to interact with each 
other is the possibility for creating new meaning through the dialogue. By 
analogy, the developmental sustenance o f  the dialogical self is self creation. T h e se lf 
is the developmental history o f  these participatory and imaginative cognitive 
relationships.
As we participate in this self dialogue we often better understand something, 
or better understand our relationship to something or som eone. Even at our 
most relaxed, on a hill looking at the sky perhaps, we think about the clouds 
having shapes we recognize or we think about our place in nature. We don’t 
just run stock phrases across the mind like ‘save the earth,’ we typically try 
to examine who we are or what the clouds are or what it would be like to 
fly among them. Our thoughts are open-ended discussions with possibilities. 
M ost o f  the time, we get up from the hill with most o f  these thoughts 
and dreams unresolved but yet somehow self-renewed by virtue o f  having 
a creative experience.
Just as co-regulated social dialogues are negotiated, with each partner 
changing to suit the other until som e kind o f  consensual frame or stable 
pattern o f  co-action is achieved, se lf dialogues often have the quality o f  
a negotiation. As children get older their part in social dialogues, and 
their creation o f  different positions in se lf dialogues, becom e more self­
corrective. During conversations, adults, for example, prefer self-repair and 
self-correction compared to being corrected by the partner. People generally 
pause and restart, repeat, or re-pronounce words and phrases in the same 
sentence before the partner has an opportunity to do it.55
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As we have seen, negotiation and repair are present in early infancy in 
non-verbal discourse. T h e examples in Chapter 2 o f  Laura and o f  the 
crying infant show how through negotiation o f  initially uncertain meanings, 
there are self-corrective adjustments with respect to the other. By the 
middle o f  the first year, children can initiate self-repairs in speech,56 
although they have been doing this non-verbally since early infancy.57 
Indeed, in some theoretical formulations, repairs and corrections are part 
o f  the communicative process o f  individuals who use language and gesture 
to create something together.58
Socially co-regulated self-corrective and other-corrective dialogues have 
been described especially clearly in studies o f  remembering in the process 
o f  social discourse. Derek Edwards and David M iddleton59 recorded the 
conversations o f  eight people asked to recall together the feature film E.T. 
T h e people began by establishing a frame for remembering, using the word 
‘w e’ as a marker for joint activity, such as ‘w e’ll start by singing the theme 
tune.’ They then constructed a narrative about the film, with each person 
elaborating on or contributing to the reconstruction.
K: well he goes to the fridge to get something to eat first doesn’t he with the 
dog following him 
D: yeah that's it 
K: mm
D: and he finds him feeding the dog 
J: and then and then he finds the beer
D: and then he finds the beer and what is it there’s a link between Elliot and 
E.T (&)
K: Elliot’s at school 
J: telepathic link
D: (&) that whatever happens to E.T. Elliot feels the same effects and E.T. got 
paralytic (laughs) and so E.T. is sort of going 
L: all a bit drunk 
T: that’s right I remember
In this excerpt,60 the people use words like ‘and then’ to establish that they 
are filling in the sequence o f  events. People also correct or prime each other’s 
memory and express a gap in their own memories with incomplete sentences 
or saying ‘m m.’ Other narrative techniques for completing the memory are 
saying things like ‘we haven’t mentioned. . . ‘ or ‘do you remember?’
T h e constructed memories are not exact copies o f  the original. People add 
evaluative com ments that reveal the memories to be partly constructed by 
their own impressions and partly by the film, such as, ‘I thought the whole 
thing was stupid that aliens could be able to fly in bikes.’ Som etim es people 
remember primarily those things that stood out for them, such as scenes 
that are ‘horrible,’ ‘brilliant,’ or ‘confusing.’ People try to persuade others 
that their own version o f  the story is more valid, regardless o f  whether it 
happened that way in the film, thus creating a corrected version o f  what
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actually occurred. Or alternatively, people agree too quickly on a version o f  
the film that does not fit the original, and thus rigidity the creation o f  new  
memories. Thus, incomplete individual impressions are linked with others to 
create a remembered whole story.
It is common in families to re-construct a past event through group 
discussion. In research on the evolution o f  family stories, David Reiss found 
that story-making is always a creative and collaborative activity. Even when 
families are re-telling a story, ‘in almost no instances did the story emerge 
fully formed: its retelling was always an event o f  re-creation, formulation, 
elaboration, active suppression, fresh dissent, reconciliation, or all o f  these.’61 
Family stories are emergent from the self-corrective and other-corrective 
patterns in the dialogue.
There are similar examples o f  research on memory constructed through 
corrective negotiation in which children are participants, but adults are more 
active than children in using such devices.







C: Da . . . Michelle give it.
M: Michelle didn’t give it to you. No.
Mommy and daddy gave it to you for your birthday.
In this conversation with a 2-year-old child, the mother is asking questions 
and affirming the child’s answers. The mother in this research study62 used 
temporal questions and temporal language (when, then, before, today, this 
week). She also used corrective speech to alter the child’s creation o f  his 
own relationship to his past. By the age o f  3 years, children respond with 
more details and are better able to provide self-corrective monitoring for 
their own recollections.63
Thus, the self- and other-correction during social negotiation occurs both 
during live social dialogues and during se lf dialogues. Indeed, the se lf  
dialogues have the same co-regulated form as the social dialogues. Thus, 
all the principles o f  the development o f  relationships discussed in Chapters 
6 and 7 also apply to the development o f  the self.
Finally, and again by analogy to the development o f  relationships, not all 
se lf dialogues are o f  this open and creative type. Som e are rigidified into 
mental slogans that repeat and don’t go away, like ritualized patterns in 
relationships that we som ehow can’t change. Even these rigid patterns are 
relational. If I tell m yself ritually that I’m not good at making friends, that 
probably means to me that I am not open to developing such skills. I have 
closed this o ff  from creative elaboration as part o f  myself.
T h e se lf is all o f  these multiple relationships to all o f  the multiple situations
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to which we are regularly exposed. W e can never be open to all o f  those 
situations, so we have parts that are relatively more rigid and parts that are 
relatively more creatively predisposed. As in relationships, some individuals 
may experience more situations creatively or rigidly than others so that an 
individual’s character is not a generalized representation o f  a superordinate 
se lf that is good or bad, it is always the se lf in som e situation.
Self fram es
I have argued for a theory o f  se lf that is parallel to a theory o f social 
relationships; a se lf that is always relational and that is com posed o f  multiple 
dialogical processes from multiple positions o f  participatory or imagined 
activity. I rejected the notion o f  the self as a coherent and generalized 
representation that is adopted by many scholars with respect to the self  
o f the young infant. I suggested that the infant se lf is first participatory 
and later imaginative, first non-verbal and later verbal, but always dialogical 
and relational. Indeed, individuals are free to create any number o f possible 
selves through relationships to imagined others and to imagined pasts and 
futures.64
Yet, there are times when the se lf seem s cohesive and unified, when there 
seem s to be a ‘central’ se lf that has the characteristics o f  the W estern 
individualistic concept o f  the core self. Although I reject the idea o f a single 
self representation, I suggest that the feelings o f  cohesion that individuals 
som etim es have can be explained by the same process that creates stable 
consensual frames and information themes within a relationship.
Informational themes are mutually created within consensual frames by 
both individuals in a relationship. Because the self is comprised o f  potentially 
many different private consensual frames, it may be the case that common 
informational themes arise across these frames. However, we do not require 
a ‘super’ se lf to integrate the information across each o f  these separate 
dialogical relationships within the self. Rather, all we need is participatory 
cognition.
T h e different consensual frames within the dialogical se lf are not split 
o ff from each other as in a multiple personality disorder. Instead, they 
are often connected by participation in similar information themes. One 
example is the development o f  the infant’s relationship with objects in 
the company o f  mother in comparison to relationships with objects when 
alone. T o  the extent that the grasping with mother and grasping when 
alone yield common information about the object, the self’s relationship 
with objects will be coherent across these frames. If, however, the 
information created differs, the infant will experience them as separate 
parts o f  the self. With infant Andrew in Chapter 8, for example, because 
social object play had a different meaning from solo object play, he 
had difficulty allowing mother to enter into his solo play with objects
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at the end o f  the first year and rarely engaged in cooperative activity 
with her.
In summary, the multiple dialogical se lf does not preclude a sense o f  
self-cohesion or a sense o f  harmony between different aspects o f one’s 
social or private life. T h e concept does, however, provide a very different 
explanation for such cohesion from the traditional objective representational 
views. T he experience o f  cohesion probably occurs when each o f  the 
relationships in which one engages are informationally consonant with each 
other, mutually supportive and similarly creative. A se lf in which one voice 
and one relationship dominates all others is not cohesive: it is rigidified and 
exclusionary, it is one that experiences disjunction between each o f  its real 
and imagined relationships. Developmental change, therefore, is the process 
o f  elaboration, dissolving, comparing and consolidating dialogical se lf frames.
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C h a p te r  10
Culture as communication: 
stability and change
C u l t u r e  a s  a  p r o c e s s
Co-regulation and culture
Communication, se lf and culture are constituted by the same process. Each 
is a dialogue between multiple positions, an evolving story played out on 
different stages. Each is governed by co-regulatory processes, by creativity 
and rigidity, by stability and change.
T h e stage o f  the dialogical se lf is the cognitive experience o f  a single 
individual. T he actors are real or imagined, embodied as persons or as parts 
o f  the same person, as ideas or as emotions, as sensations or as metaphors. 
T h e stage for communicative dialogue is the space between individuals, 
experienced by selves and enacted in som e tangible form. That form may 
be a conversation, a fight, an embrace, or an exchange o f  letters. It may occur 
face-to-face or separated by distance and time. T h e cultural stage is vast by 
comparison: it extends from pre-history to the future o f  the human species, 
it occupies an infinity o f  real and imagined universes. Cultural dialogues 
occur in the se lf and in communication between selves. They also occur 
every time we read a document, watch television, go shopping or to work, 
attend a concert, sporting event or religious ceremony. Culture is alive in its 
process and in its products and it lives through its use by individuals.
There is nothing I can say in this chapter about culture that I have not 
already said about communication in relationships and about the self: the 
relational process, the nature o f  the dialogue, is identical. Culture, as I 
understand it, is not a thing. It is neither a set o f  encoded rules nor a 
fixed patterning o f  behavior. Culture does not stand above individuals, does 
not guide individuals like a super se lf that knows all and sees all. Culture is 
created through communication.
Culture is the set o f  stable consensual frames in a social system. Cultural 
frames may appear fixed and rule-like because they coalesce into products
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like pottery, languages and writing systems, because their change is slow and 
distributed across time, space and social networks wider than the one in 
which we typically live our lives. Pots, languages and writing systems are 
living things, however. They change to accommodate individuals and their 
collective actions.
There are many cultures in a society, even in a society that is relatively 
homogeneous in its racial, religious and ethnic characteristics. Cultures, like 
selves, are comprised o f  multiple dialogical processes. There is a cultural frame
-  in the form o f a distinct vocabulary and a unique set o f tools and behavioral 
practices -  for every different sport, for each religion, for different occupations 
and industries, and for each community. Every local communicating group has 
its own variation on the larger cultural frame. For example, within the culture 
o f  baseball, each team will have its distinct sub-cultural practices. Within a 
community, each family will share a somewhat different culture, and each dyad 
within a family will develop their own unique practices and vocabularies. 
These two points -  that cultures develop through communication and that 
there are as many cultures as there are communities o f co-participants -  
suggest a re-thinking o f  the role o f  culture in individual development.
Cross-cultural psychologists are concerned primarily with understanding 
individual behavior and development. W hen culture is used, it is often 
objectively treated as an independent variable, one o f  many influences on 
the child. According to Gustav Jahoda,
Psychologists . . .  generally have no coherent concept of culture relevant to their
specific theoretical aims . . .  Their usage tends to be very loose, and culture often
includes ‘ecology’ . . .  For many cross-cultural psychologists, culture appears to
be a category conceptualized much like ‘social class. ’ 1
An alternative approach is to assume that culture is a system o f  meanings that 
mediate relationships between individuals and their environments. Culture 
is not a set o f  rules and tools, but the ‘totality o f  . . .  meanings maintained 
by a human population, or by identifiable segments o f  a population, and 
transmitted from one generation to the next,’2 or alternatively, ‘a system o f  
historically evolved and socially standardized cognitive processes that provides 
organizational frameworks for the life o f  human beings within their changing 
environmental conditions.’3 Culture is the active, interpretive process by 
which individuals create frames for meaningful relationships. Culture is 
created in the course o f  communication between the co-participants: meaning 
in a culture is just the extent to which communicating communities co- 
regulate stable themes o f  information.
Cultural themes and variations
If we think o f  culture as the frames and informational themes that emerge 
from a network o f  co-regulated relationships, then the analysis o f  cultural
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differences will follow along the same lines as the analysis o f  relationship 
differences and se lf differences. Co-regulation is the mutual creation o f  
action by a negotiated process o f  exerting and ceding control in which self 
and other are relational poles o f a dialogue.
Cultures differ in the perception o f  the individual’s control in relation 
to others, in whether they view the se lf as relational or as autonomous 
and individualized, and in the embodiment o f  information in particular 
sensorimotor systems.4 T hese differences are expressed in terms o f  beliefs 
and practices, narratives and myths, images and metaphors.
Generally speaking, Western cultures tend to perceive control as individualistic 
and autonomous, the individual as the center o f  activity. W esterners tend to 
think in objective terms, in what I have called discrete states and generalized 
objective selves and others.5 A similar theme runs through Tibetan Buddhism  
in which the ultimate goal is to understand that the world is created entirely 
in our imagination giving license for retiring from the world into more 
self-absorbed states o f  meditation.6
T h is view o f  a core objective se lf  is contrasted at the opposite extreme 
with the distributed or relational se lf  o f  the Eskimo culture that does not 
even have a word for self-reference. T h e Eskimo phrase tusarp-a-ra, 
m eaning ‘I hear h im ,’ is literally translated as ‘his making o f  a sound  
with reference to m e.’ ‘I am’ is uva-nga, or ‘the being-here m ine.’7 
T h e Japanese and C hinese cultures also define the se lf  in relation to 
others. T h e Japanese term amae and the C hinese terms sajiao (used  
for w om en and children) and laugi (used for men) express not only 
mutual dependency in relationships, but also the presum ption o f  mutual 
responsibility between partners.8 T h ese cultures make explicit recognition  
o f  interpersonal responsibility with rituals expressing deep gratitude to 
m entors and filial piety to parents.
According to Japanese psychologist H. Befu,
Telling children to ‘make up your mind’ about clothes to wear, or asking them 
to decide on the choice of an ice cream flavor even when children are too young 
is a common sight in America . .  . the final responsibility of making a decision is 
left to the person . . .  In reality, decision making is influenced by the views of 
many others, as we all know. If no one has given explicit input for a particular 
decision at least the decision is affected by the views and values of parents, peers, 
teachers and many others to whom one has been exposed through one’s life. 
Such influences in American culture, however, are discounted when an idealized 
American self is under consideration.9
T h e Japanese accept their duties to others from whom they have received 
some benefit. Americans, on the other hand, find it difficult to receive 
assistance, accept gifts or to allow themselves to becom e dependent upon 
som eone else. They may be taken by surprise, express embarrassment, or 
find it hard to think o f  appropriate ways o f  repayment.
With respect to the role o f  the body in cultural differences, for example,
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doubtful judgements about personalities in the United States are likely to 
refer to som eone’s head (I don’t know what he’s thinking; H e must be 
crazy), implying a metaphor o f  a central location in the body that is more 
important than others. Among the Gahuku-Gama o f New Guinea, the body 
is regarded as more o f  an integral part o f  the whole person and doubtful 
judgements may be expressed as ‘I don’t know his skin.’ Greetings typically 
contain earthy phrases like ‘let me eat your excreta (your urine) (your semen)’ 
som etimes with a gesture o f  an open hand going to the mouth, or by grabbing 
the genitals or buttocks o f  the person being greeted.10
As we saw with respect to the topic o f  embodied cognition, many cultural 
categories reflect the perception and action possibilities o f  the human body. 
T h e metaphors used in language often reflect body processes. Words for 
endearment to another person, for example, often contain references to 
temperature, with ‘warm’ words signifying more emotional closeness -  
attachment, attraction -  compared to ‘cool’ words. T he temperature gradient 
is related to the mutual regulation o f  warmth from tactile contact between 
individuals across a wide variety o f  animal species, and the historical 
association o f  affection terms with warm terms is found in the trees of 
several unrelated language families over the past 1,500 years.11
Cultures also differ with respect to the creation o f  tools and practices 
related to the performance o f  particular actions. T ools and practices are 
cultural frames that regulate action in a context. Thus, the quality and type 
o f  tools, for example, are likely to affect the types o f  actions found in the 
culture. T ools and other cultural frames, conversely, will be shaped by the 
perception-action systems that they serve and the culture’s preference for 
particular types o f  actions. Words must be created out o f  the phonological 
action possibilities o f  the oral articulators. On the other hand, cultural 
frames for particular kinds o f  body movement, including oral expression, 
may regulate the phonology o f  the language over historical time.
C u l t u r e  a n d  i n f a n c y
Macro-historical processes of cultural change
Cultural frames, practices, and tools often change but they may, however, 
remain stable over many years. I view these cultural frames in the same way 
as consensual frames in social relationships: as self-organized and created 
through co-regulation. As such, cultural frames are subject to innovation and 
change, rigidification and dissolution. Barbara Rogoff writes that individuals 
transform culture as they appropriate its practices, carrying them forward 
to the next generation in altered form to fit the needs o f  their particular 
generation and circumstances.’12 Similar points have been made by others. 
‘A tool creates its own environment and skills, which in turn reverberate
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on the tool itself and consequent effects on the society and environment it 
creates for its members.’13
Research on culture and mass communication generally support this 
conclusion about the role o f  innovation in cultural change. ‘Significant 
innovations create new industries, alter institutional practices, and restructure 
the patterns o f  life.’14 Once an innovation is introduced it is spread through 
the society via a process o f  diffusion. Diffusion rates depend on the similarity 
o f the innovation to existing practices, the skill or technical requirements o f  
the innovation, the degree o f  mass communication about the innovation and 
the extent to which recognizable and valued individuals adopt the innovation 
and thus model its effects for others.15 T his is true for innovations that diffuse 
through a single society as well as for diffusion to other societies, where the 
innovation may conflict with values and beliefs.
Innovations are more frequent in a society in which manufacturers o f  
tools can advertise them through the mass m edia,16 and when they are 
responsive to the needs o f  buyers and users o f  the tool based on feedback 
from market research. I found the following in the ‘Family’ section o f  my 
local newspaper.
A Foldable Baby Bouncer from Playskool Baby is a parent-welcome item. 
This convenient, comfortable bouncer has a distinctive feature that parents 
will appreciate -  it folds up for easy carrying and storage.
This sturdy, light weight bouncer has a flexible, smooth-edged metal frame 
which creates a gentle, rocking motion when baby is playing or when parents are 
soothing baby to sleep. Non-skid grippers on the bottom prevent the bouncer 
from sliding and a quilted Velcro strap closes tighdy to secure baby in place. It 
retails for about $30.17
T his product description suggests that innovations in cultural tools evolve 
with respect to the concerns o f  the users. N ote how the copy-writer appeals 
to values related to infant care in Western society by referring to the parents’ 
convenience (easy carrying and storage, helpful for getting the baby to sleep) 
and to the infant’s comfort (gende, comfortable, soothing). Safety is also a 
big concern for W estern parents who may leave the infant alone for brief 
periods in the bouncer (sturdy, smooth, non-skid). T his language is meant 
to facilitate the diffusion o f  the innovation in order to benefit both the seller 
and the buyer: a co-regulated relationship that develops over time.
Such innovations carry with them a distinctive set o f  user skills and user 
vocabulary. Unless you are an active participant in this culture, it is unlikely 
that you will understand the tool-specific words like ‘bouncer,’ ‘gripper,’ 
and ‘quilted Velcro.’ Innovations in culture, therefore, like innovations in 
relationships, push participants to new levels o f  learning and expertise. This 
is not because the participants are guided, but because they are informed 
about how the innovation can be used by themselves. Skill development 
is emergent from participation in the co-regulated relationship within the 
cultural frames.
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This example also suggests that there is not one culture, there are many 
cultures. There is a culture o f  infancy and o f  parent-infant relationships. 
That culture includes tools and practices for play, for caregiving (diapering, 
feeding, sleeping), for carrying and holding babies, and for clothing them. 
For each o f  these general domains there are entire sub-cultures creating 
and changing in the dialogue between users and manufacturers. Whole 
sections o f  shops are devoted to selling such merchandise and the products 
are continually changing, sometimes improving, som etim es disappearing, 
som etimes offering completely new items.
Occasionally, the user-manufacturer dialogue will becom e absorbed into 
larger social dialogues, ultimately changing the tool from some broader 
perspective. T his occurred, for example, in the controversy over selling  
infant formula to Third World countries, changing both the composition 
o f  the formula and local feeding practices. T his is a case o f  conflict between 
traditional cultural frames and foreign innovations. Issues have been raised 
about the ecological impact o f  soiled disposable diapers and plastic disposable 
baby bottles, about the shapes o f  nipples with respect to the growth o f  teeth, 
and about the safety issues related to the size and composition o f  toy materials 
and the use o f  car seats.18
T h e cultural frames for infancy also include infant care beliefs and infant 
care practices. Infant care practices are highly labile with respect to infant 
survival rates with more protectiveness and close contact in situations o f  high 
mortality.19 In First World nations with easily accessible sources o f  childcare 
information such as television and books, beliefs and practices change so 
frequently that they becom e fads. Parents quickly become overwhelmed with 
a large array o f  often conflicting advice, much o f  which fails to translate 
into situated action at the moment the infant is crying. An inspection o f  the 
historical trends in beliefs regarding infant care in developed countries even 
within this century reads like a cultural roller coaster, alternating between 
advice for parents to punish or to praise, to coddle or to confine, to respect 
or to remake the infant’s behavior.20 Because o f  this, diffusion o f  innovations 
regarding beliefs may spread more slowly than technologies.
Generally, the culture o f  infancy changes with respect to the participants 
in the culture (parents and infants), the strategies available for childcare 
(parents, siblings, relatives, out-of-hom e care), the ecological pressures on 
families (food sources, safety factors) and the econom ic roles in the family 
(gender division o f  labor, income, resources).21
T h e culture o f  infancy shows a fascinating variability if  one considers 
infancy on a world-wide scale. There is a surprisingly large amount o f  
research documenting cultural differences in infant care practices and in 
infant behavior. Cultures vary in the amount o f  touch and handling infants 
receive,22 in encouragement to explore, in access to the environment and 
to objects,23 and in the quality and quantity o f  social interaction.24 N ot 
surprisingly, the skills infants develop depend on the patterns o f  care, the
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tools and the infant’s access to them, and the sensorimotor modalities favored 
by the culture.
In Oxkutzcab, for exam ple, a town in M exico o f  12,000 com posed  
m ostly o f  Yucatec M ayans, there are poor sanitary conditions and the 
infant mortality is relatively high. Infants are kept quiet and sheltered  
in the early m onths. In the area designated for the infant in the family’s 
one-room  hom e there are no infant-specific tools or furnishings except a 
rough infant seat. Infants spend most o f  their time being carried and they 
have little opportunity to explore.
While mothers and other females provide very attentive care in terms of 
frequent feeding, body contact, quick responsiveness to distress, and absence 
of socialization pressure, such care does not include a great deal of the intense, 
vocal, affectionate interactional component that seems to be an essential part of 
‘good’ care to Western observers . . .  (Mothers) do not feel themselves responsible 
for the child’s characteristics; neither do they seek or feel able to change most 
infant and child behavior.25
Compare this to what has been observ ed in a city o f  similar size located about 
one hour north o f  Rome, Italy. Here, infants spend almost no time alone 
and are almost always in the company o f  more than one person due to the 
extended family structure and frequent visiting patterns between community 
members. T h e frequent social interactions
included vigorous handling as well as teasing, both of which often resulted in 
more tears than laughter on the part of the infant. Games of this type involved 
adults playfully but forcefully spanking infants or removing an object (such as a 
pacifier) from the infant’s grasp and holding it just out of reach . . .  in spite of 
the large amount of attention directed to the infants, play sessions as defined 
in U.S. studies (in which the child is in charge of the situation) were relatively 
infrequent. . .  play was initiated and terminated at the discretion of the adult.26
T h e Italian infants, like the Yucatecs, had few toys o f  their own.
Both the Yucatec and Italian cultural patterns evolved over centuries 
and continue to evolve via dynamic interactions that both stabilize certain 
features and elim inate others. H ow does this happen? Cultures evolve their 
frames as a result o f  adapting to the ecological dem ands o f  the physical 
and econom ic setting, as a result o f  the history o f  cultural narrative and 
belief, and as a result o f  the technologies available for the purpose o f  
infant care.27 Cultures also evolve with respect to the universal features 
o f  perception and action shared by virtually all adults and their infants, 
but these universally em bodied features m ust be placed in an ecological 
and historical context.
An examination o f  cultural differences in Baby Talk (BT) reveals some o f  
these competing sources o f  influence in the macro-history o f  a culture. B T  
has been found to have the universal features o f  exaggerated pitch range, 
especially toward pitches higher than in adult speech, a melodic rendering
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o f  intonation contours that emphasizes the meaning o f  the adult speech, a 
slowing down o f articulation with longer pauses between sounds, and a high 
repetition rate.28 T h e same pattern emerges even in tonal languages like 
Chinese and apparently is due to the perceptual salience o f  such speech  
to infants. Their changes in behavior encourage adults to continue the BT  
frame.29
Other studies have shown that although these non-semantic, more affect­
laden features o f  B T  are most influenced by infant behavior, the content and 
symbolic aspects o f  B T  are more likely to be influenced by cultural formats 
for communication and beliefs about infants.30 Sueko Toda, Masatoshi Kawai 
and I compared mothers’ speech to 3-m onth-old infants in Japan and the 
United States. Based on hypotheses related to adult communicative style in 
Japanese compared to English31 we found that the Japanese mothers’ speech  
was more affect-oriented and had a much larger collection o f  infantized 
words, as shown in Table 10.1.32 Affect vs. information salience has been 
found to differentiate B T  between other cultures as well.33
In Japanese, the linguistic form used differs according to the relative 
sex, age or status o f  the speakers. Infants are more indulged in Japan, 
and it is more natural in that culture for mothers to empathize with the 
infant’s needs by moving to the infant’s level. Japanese mothers do not 
expect their baby to understand them, and seem to be using B T  as a way 
to enhance their identification with the infant as shown by the higher rates 
in Japan o f  incomplete sentences, nonsense sounds, onomatopoeic sounds, 
songs and B T .34 Studies o f  historical writings on infant care in the Chinese 
and Japanese culture reveal a remarkable continuity over centuries. Although 
there is no concrete data on the persistence o f  B T  over this history, it is clear 
that Oriental societies have been slowrer to change their childrearing beliefs 
than has the W est.35
Table 10.1 Examples of Baby Talk in Japanese
English equivalent Adult speech Baby Talk Explanation
Are you hungry? Onaka suita? Onaka shuita Phonological change
Let’s play Asobimashoo Achobimachoo Phonological change
Please Doozo Doojo Phonological change
Eye Me Meme Duplication
It hurts Itai Itai-tai Duplication
Get up Okiru Okki Shortening
Hiccup Shakkuri Hikku hikku Mimic sound of action
Lamp Denki Denki-san Use of honorific
Dirty Katanai Batchii Entirely new word
Source: Toda, Fogel, and Kawai, 1990
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Micro-Historical Processes of Cultural Change
It is considerably easier to study the process o f  micro-historical cultural 
change, the development over rime o f  a single relationship system, a problem  
that I have discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 7. In those chapters, I spoke 
about the formation o f  dynamically stable vs. rigid consensual frames within 
a relationship. I did not, however, cast that discussion in terms o f culture, a 
topic to which I will turn in the remainder o f  this chapter.
Even for the same infant, the culture o f  infancy is not uniform. The  
cultural tools and practices change continually with respect to the infant’s 
development.36 One does not use the same toys, supports or furniture for a 
1-m onth-old as for a 1-year-old. In the space o f  several years, infants use 
and discard a series o f  cultural devices. Their parents change the balance o f  
caretaking and play. Culturally available games are appropriated by the couple 
for days, weeks or months and then dropped in favor o f  others. Infants move 
into and out o f different spatial locations and settings, expanding their range 
o f  endeavor from the bedroom to overtake larger areas o f  the household.
N one o f  these changes are as simple as they may seem . They are not 
straightforward extensions o f  infant developmental change independent o f  
anything else. They are not made possible because adults are following a 
curriculum for allowing infants to move into particular activities, nor because 
the label on a toy gives the suggested age range for its use. T hese changes 
are co-regulated between the infant, the family and the sets o f  tools and 
practices available from the society at large (the toys, games formats, furniture, 
childcare materials, and beliefs).
Take, for example, the issue o f  infant locomotor development. In some 
Mayan communities and other similar cultures, infant movement is restricted 
for several years until the infant is capable o f self-monitoring. In Western 
homes, where infant risk for health and safety problems is minimized, infants 
may be permitted to move about under parental supervision, but the areas 
o f infant travel are at first restricted. The expansion o f  the infant’s range is 
negotiated, sometimes with parents encouraging more movement and sometimes 
with infants demanding greater access. While this is going on the parents will be 
gradually altering the physical environment using culturally available resources. 
They may remove items that pose a danger and add others, pillows and climbing 
toys, that are not typically part o f  an adult household. They can purchase 
devices that ‘child-proof cabinets, stairways and closets. Before long, the spatial 
configuration and furnishings, and the access to that space by everyone in the 
home, has been changed through negotiation between all involved.
Barbara R ogoff uses the term appropriation to signify the child’s adoption 
o f  the cultural practice as part o f  co-participation with an adult.37 In early 
infancy, it seem s to me, the term may also apply to the parents in their 
participation in larger cultural frames related to infant care. There are many 
cultural frames and they are specific to their purposes. Households and other
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institutions are equipped by their users with the tools and practices that suit 
their purpose. A family with no infants or young children is not likely to 
have a store o f  infant-related cultural items. Parents-to-be begin to alter 
their homes and to acquire the culturally available items for a newborn. 
After the child is bom , they continue to change the home by acquiring 
infant-related cultural items that are appropriate for their particular child 
and family situation.
I concur with Jerome Bruner’s view that one o f  the adult’s roles is to 
supply frames in which the child’s actions can becom e meaningful.38 As he 
points out, the culturally derived frame is only the beginning o f  the process. 
T h e frame com es in a particular size, shape and color, a particular sequence 
o f  actions that are the standard cultural frames for play. One size, however, 
does not fit all infants and their parents. Once the item or practice is 
appropriated by the parent from participation in the sphere o f  infant-related 
tools and expertise, it must be made into action between the parent and 
infant. Infants do not like or use all the toys their parents acquire, nor are 
they equally pleased with all the day-to-day caretaking practices the parent 
has appropriated from participation in one or another source o f  cultural 
inspiration.
T h e cultural frame must be negotiated into the relationship via co­
regulation between the parent and infant. In the process, the frame changes 
in its structure and use by the dyadic process o f  mutual agreement to play a 
game, to use a toy, tool or word.39
T h e choice o f  the formats is not entirely prescriptive and certainly not 
automatic. As described by Jacqueline G oodnow,40 parental choice arises 
in an adult cognitive and social dialogical process o f  selecting from many 
alternatives the one believed to be most suited to the task. How does the 
parent know what to make, buy or borrow? T he parent must be guided by 
books, people with more experience, or commercial advertisements and shop 
displays in order to find just those tools and to develop just those practices 
that seem  to be required at the moment.
How can we explain, then, the cultural gloss on the adult’s B T  to the 
infant? Adults who vocalize to and with infants do not simply start out 
producing random sounds that are shaped like operants into particular 
patterns o f  pitch and intensity by the infant’s response. Nor is it likely that 
adults have a genetic program for baby talk, except perhaps in so far as the 
phonological range o f  vocal action encompasses many possible registers. It is 
more likely that adults have heard others talking to babies, raising their pitch 
and performing the usual patterns o f  infant-directed speech heard in that 
culture. They discover the format in these frames and through co-regulation  
with the infant the parents becom e skilled participants in infant-related 
cultural practices.
T he metaphor o f  transmission o f  cultural frames between generations is 
just not going to capture the complexity o f  this process. Culture is created
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as much by the parents as by the infants. The cultural frames are not rigid hut 
malleable; skeletons with Plasticine bones.
T h e metaphor o f  culture as cumulative and as leading to more and better 
things is only going to obscure the fact that the frames are specific to the 
situation and the task, that they are not necessarily ordered into a logical 
or useful sequence.41 In what sense is playing with a ratde preparation 
for holding a spoon, swinging a baseball bat or a conductor’s baton? -  in 
only the most trivial sense o f  using a manual grip. Stirring, baseball and 
conducting partake o f  different cultural systems. T he rattle may be useful 
and meaningful in the here and now as a cultural tool for a specific purpose. 
It does not have to lead to something else more grand or important. In fact, 
all during childhood, age-specific and culture-specific tools and practices 
are appropriated, negotiated and discarded.42 The cultural frames are not only 
malleable, theyr are disposable.
In summary, culture is introduced within relationships by framing and 
co-regulation. T h e frames are chosen, at first by parents and later by 
children, from the pool o f  cultural resources. Culture and communication 
are inseparable. Culture is never ‘in’ the environment, it has no objective 
specificity. It is always embodied and negotiated, a process through which 
individuals form relationships and in which selves emerge.
Culture and the self
T h e se lf  is the individual’s experience in actual or in re-created relationships. 
As they are used, cultural practices and tools expand the range o f  the self 
into innovative forms o f  relationship.43 Perhaps the salient feature o f  culture 
is that it carries tools and practices that create information related to actions 
that would not be likely to be discovered by the individual alone or within the 
local community. T hose tools and practices, as they becom e co-regulated via 
relationships, becom e part o f  the self.44 Our selves are defined by televisions 
and automobiles, for example, because these tools give us a sense o f  being 
meaningfully related to the actions and outcomes inherent in the use o f  those 
tools. A baby who is provided with a bouncer or a walker has a different sense 
o f  se lf than one who is carried everywhere and is not allowed free access to 
the environment at a distance from the adult.
Thus, even if  we use the cultural item entirely on our own, without the 
company or help o f  others, we are engaging in a socially co-regulated  
communication. T h e social co-regulation arises because the tool was designed  
by another person and it is both malleable and disposable. It is nearly 
impossible for me to imagine a situation in human development that is not 
in som e way mediated by social co-regulation, nor an environment in which 
infants live that has not been appropriated from some cultural resource. Even 
the choice o f  where to set up one’s tent in a nomadic population is guided 
by whether the physical setting -  the rocks, trees, grass, and natural shelter
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-  affords the culturally appropriate characteristics that meet the needs o f  
the group.
Because every action we make in the environment is in relation to the 
self, we will choose places, practices and tools that suit us, that stand in 
a meaningful and informative relationship to us.4S Should those criteria o f  
meaning fail to operate, the relationship with that tool, practice or setting is 
eventually abandoned. T his rigidification and dissolution process is identical 
in cultural frames and in consensual frames in relationships. Along with the 
companion process o f  innovation and creativity, we have enough to explain a 
good deal o f  cultural change and the macro-historical and micro-historical 
evolution o f  the self.
If transmission from culture to se lf is not an appropriate developmental 
metaphor, how are we to understand the process by which individuals 
participate in cultural practices and becom e skilled tool users? How does 
the se lf develop? I have already remarked that co-regulation and negotiation 
are more appropriate metaphors: they apply to the initial choice o f  a cultural 
frame and they apply as the frame is either put into practice or discarded. 
We don’t just copy models, we embrace them as parts o f  our participatory 
selves. Even if we do seem  to copy a model directly, as when a child dresses 
up in adult clothing and ‘goes to work,’ this imitation must be understood as 
a creative process o f  choice, effort and negotiation.46
Susan H olt and I have studied the cultural frame o f  a p eek -a-b oo  game 
when it is first introduced to an infant by the m other, using our weekly 
observations o f  m other-infant com m unication within relationships. In the 
first instance, the adult suddenly disappears behind her hands: what is 
this about? T h e infant waits. T h e adult pops up with a loud noise and 
a wide open mouth. T h e infant is puzzled, perhaps, or startled, but still 
attentive. T h e adult waits for the infant to assim ilate this, to re-settle, 
and then she hides again. T h e infant watches and waits. Perhaps the 
same thing will happen, and it does! N ow  isn’t this interesting. After 
several rounds the infant loses interest, the adult introduces a different 
frame.
Several days later the peek-a-boo frame is re-created by the mother. T he  
baby is again attentive. Perhaps this time he will lean over to the side to try 
to see behind the mother’s hands, but this is useless. T h e baby perceives that 
he has no immediate control over the revealing, but that it happens anyway 
and unexpectedly. After several more days or weeks o f  this, the baby may 
actually smile or laugh as the mother re-appears while smiling and laughing 
in a way that is co-regulated with the infant. T h e infant begins to experience 
the se lf as delightfully connected to the social process. W eeks later, the baby 
will laugh when the mother begins the game, when she hides. H e can now 
recognize the boundaries o f  the frame, and it has becom e part o f  him self 
related to mother via co-regulated perception and action.47
Still later the infant begins to assume some o f the responsibility and
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initiative for the game. H e may pull on the mother’s hands to reveal her face. 
H e may hide her face or his own, he may begin to use vocalizations similar to 
the mother’s at similar junctures in the game. We can now say that the infant 
is a full participant in the cultural frame and has defined him self through 
participation.
T h e infant is provided with the frame in a way that is made meaningful 
by the adult through co-regulation. T he infant does not perceive the whole 
frame at once, but only a small part o f  it, and each infant perceives a 
somewhat different aspect. Because the frame has a simple and compelling 
logic, the initial steps lead eventually to the child’s fuller participation as an 
initiator and producer.
One has to ask, why has this game lasted in the human culture o f  infancy 
for so long? T he answer is that it is particularly easy to grasp and play with 
only the slightest hints, those that a small baby can pick up and use. The 
crucial theoretical point here is that the cultural practice or tool -  itself a 
human creation, having been improved and re-m odeled over long periods 
o f  time, and haring passed through many capable hands -  has lasted in 
the culture precisely because it makes the creation o f  information through 
perception and action readily apparent to the user. T he tool or practice reveals 
entirely new possibilities to the user that are implicit in its structure and 
revealed through use. T h e game, therefore, is not entirely copied by the baby 
nor guided by the adult, it is re-invented through the various hints and clues 
the infant first perceives as meaningful and because the sequential patterning 
o f  the frame lends itself to spontaneous creativity.48
Andrew Lock illustrates the concept o f  re-invention with the example o f  a 
child learning the number system.
These numbers are a human construction, more importantly they are a construction 
of the child . . .  but they bring with them properties which only emerge upon 
their having been created . . . properties such as odd or even, perfect and prime 
numbers . . .  In order to progress to the adult form of speech the infant has to 
realize these properties for his own use . . .  he has to discover these new objects 
which are implicit in what he has already created . . .  to make actual in behavior 
those emergent properties of a previous creation, to give explicit form to their 
implications.49
According to Lock, the adult is just as involved as the child in creating 
culture, but once the child picks up some o f  the properties o f  the cultural 
practice, the rest may emerge through use and discovery, ‘through a process 
o f  guided re-invention.’so
T o  put it another way, cultural practices are initially invented and persist 
because they work. They carry -  and here’s the essential point -  a structure 
that enhances the probability o f  perception and action that creates information 
for the next user. Thus, cultural tools and practices are exacdy like persons: 
they are available for communication by virtue o f  their potential for co ­
regulation. T his is important because it means that neither the adult nor the
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child has to carry all the information required for infant development, part o f 
the information for developmental change is also in the network o f  relationships, 
tools and practices that are brought into the dyad’s communication process.
This model o f  re-invention has been applied to the development o f  
language as a cultural system o f communication.51 I will not review that 
work here, but I will point out some recent findings suggesting that language 
and its acquisition is always embodied in an infant’s perception-action system  
and is co-regulated with respect to the adult’s.
Language must be produced by som e part o f  the body, and to the extent 
that infants have the anatomical and motor systems, they can acquire 
language. Recent findings show that infant babbling demonstrates intonation 
and articulation patterns found in the language spoken in the home, and 
around the same age (6 to 10 months) infants lose their perceptual sensitivity 
to sound contrasts. A 3-m onth-old can perceive sound contrasts from 
many languages, but by 8 months their perceptions are primarily attuned 
to the native language. Thus, both perception and action are changing 
simultaneously and with respect to the speech formats found in the hom e.52 
In the second year, particular phonological patterns o f  action constrain the 
degrees o f  freedom on the forms o f  syllable and word sequence that can be 
spoken comfortably.53 In addition, words are distinctly related to the child’s 
current actions and to the tools that regulate those actions.54
Language as a cultural frame can be adapted to any modality o f  perception 
and action. Before normal infants can articulate words, they use their babbling 
and intonation contours in meaningful ways that reflect the adult usages.55 In 
addition, deaf children acquire a gestural language that is either spontaneous 
if  they are not exposed to a sign language, or the sign language used in the 
home. Remarkably, deaf infants exposed to American Sign Language will 
babble gesturally in that language and they will use exaggerated gestural 
contours to express themselves in communicative situations.56 Thus, the 
linguistic co-regulated perception-action system can either be auditory-vocal 
or visual-gestural.
A final piece o f  evidence regarding the embodiment o f  linguistic cultural 
frames com es from work on the social context in which language is typically 
acquired. Adults provide cultural frames that allow infants the opportunity 
for co-regulated re-invention, typically with games involving both action 
and speech. In addition, however, it appears that adult non-verbal activity 
while speaking is co-regulated with respect to the infant’s perception-action  
system. Thus, when adults label objects, infants are considerably more likely 
to acquire the word if  they are looking at the object at the same time. If, in 
addition to assuring joint attention, the adult points or gestures to the object, 
infant acquisition is enhanced.57
In general, this research suggests that infants play an active role, not only 
in perceiving language and producing it, but in establishing co-regulated  
frames with the adult that enhance the probability o f  the infant’s perception
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and action. Thus, while adults could be said to appropriate cultural frames, 
they must negotiate those frames into the communication process. They  
do this by making the frame perceptually salient to attentive infants and 
creating opportunities for innovative actions by the infants within the frame. 
T h e infants create information about the cultural frame -  the word, the 
gesture, the tool -  by virtue o f  their available perception-action systems. 
Cultural frames are used by parents and infants because they enable infants 
to discover, to re-invent, meaningful linkages between perception and action. 
Culture, therefore, never loses its embodiment, never exists ‘out there,’ never 
is separate from creative co-regulation.S8
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C h a p te r  11
Conclusions and 
implications
D e v e l o p m e n t a l  d e t e r m i n i s m  a n d  i n d e t e r m i n i s m
M ost relationships begin with a meeting, often by chance, o f  two individuals 
who are drawn to each other. According to psychologist Albert Bandura,
A chance encounter is defined as an unintended meeting of persons unfamiliar 
to each other . . . Some chance encounters touch people only lightly, others 
leave more lasting effects, and still others branch people into new trajectories 
of life . . .  The unforeseeability and branching power of fortuitous influences 
makes the specific course of lives neither easily predictable nor easily socially 
engineerable.1
Once a chance encounter occurs, however, the future course o f  events may 
be at least partially determined by the susceptibility o f  the individuals to 
each other and their openness to change. Within relationships there are 
processes that lead to the formation o f  stable consensual frames and those 
frames constitute a reduction in the degrees o f  freedom o f individual action. 
Creativity' and choice is possible, but within the circuit o f  the consensual 
frame. Thus, we may have historical determinism in particular epochs within 
the life course o f  an individual or a relationship. Alternatively, relationships 
may be partially indeterminate as they change by creative or fortuitous 
events that lead them into new stable frames, and indeterminacy arises in 
development as individuals enter relationships with others that begin either 
creatively or fortuitously.
In her biographical account o f  her own and her friend’s lives, Man' 
Catherine Bateson discusses the use o f chance opportunities and improvisation 
while living during a time when cultural frames for wom en’s roles are 
changing. She describes her book as
about life as an improvisatory art, about the ways we combine familiar and 
unfamiliar components in response to new situations, following an underlying 
grammar and evolving aesthetic . . .  A good meal, like a poem or a life, has a
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certain balance and diversity, a certain coherence and fit. As one learns to cope 
in the kitchen, one no longer duplicates whole meals but rather manipulates 
components and the way they are put together. The improvised meal will be 
different from the planned meal, and certainly riskier, but rich with the possibility 
of delicious surprise. Improvisation can be either a last resort or an established 
way of evoking creativity. Sometimes a pattern chosen by default can become a 
path of preference.2
T here is an apparent paradox in describing developmental change as both 
partially predictable and determinant, and partially fortuitous and indeterminate. 
How can humans develop similar global characteristics, yet their daily lives 
are often shaped by chance events that make them different from each  
other?3
My answer to the question o f the balance o f indeterminism vs. determinism 
is conceptualized within the frame o f  a continuous process model of 
relationships. Rather than thinking of some actions and events as fortuitous 
and others as determined or predictable, I believe that virtually every action 
and event is partly determinate and partly indeterminate. Events are partially 
indeterminate in the sense that the information we create about them is always 
changing, and partially determinate in the sense that they are perceived as part 
o f ongoing action within a frame that constrains our degrees of freedom.
Chance or caprice certainly occurs in development, as in suffering from 
a disease or having a serious accident. But research on adult life-course 
development has shown that fortuitous events, if they are to play a role in 
changing the developmental trajectory, must be assimilable by the individual, 
must be informative within some frame o f reference. Bandura describes how 
chemistry Nobel Laureate Herbert Brown decided to undertake his doctoral 
dissertation in the relatively obscure area o f boron hydrides.
As a baccalaureate gift, his girlfriend presented him with a copy of the book, The 
Hydrides o f Boron and Silicon, which launched his interest in the subject. This 
was during the Depression when money was scarce. She happened to select this 
particular chemistry book undesignedly, because it was the least expensive one 
available at the university bookstore. Had his girlfriend been a bit more affluent, 
Brown’s research career would in all likelihood have taken a different route.4
Now, if my girlfriend at the time of my college graduation had presented me 
with a book on boron chemistry, it is highly unlikely that it would have affected 
my career trajectory.5 T he gift Brown received was an innovation whose relative 
determinacy for subsequent events in his life has to be understood within the 
frames in which the book became informative. The book was adopted into a self 
fram e in which it had some perceived affinity. Brown was already interested in 
chemistry , and he and his girlfriend may have maintained a consensual fram e in 
which chemistry' was discussed. She bought the book at a university bookstore, 
one of the few places one could hope to find a specialized book on boron and 
silicon. In other words, the girlfriend appropriated part of a cultural fram e
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(the book and the bookstore) that she suspected would be co-regulated into their 
ongoing consensual frame (with gratitude perhaps and continued conversation 
about the topic) and possibly into Brown’s self frame.
An innovation like a book can be rigidified as a dust collector on a 
shelf, it can be dissolved from the frame at the next textbook buy-back at 
the university bookstore, or it can be elaborated upon creatively. Brown’s 
creative elaboration led to hundreds o f his own articles and the creation of 
innovative consensual frames of research teams with students and colleagues, 
and innovative cultural frames of new concepts and new techniques adopted 
by other chemists. T h e  examples I used in Chapter 2 -  of Laura, of infant 
crying, and of runners -  are essentially no different from this. They all 
show how innovations are incorporated into relationship frames and also 
how in the adoption process these innovations teeter between determinism 
and indeterminism, certainty and uncertainty.
Action is always partially determinate and partially indeterminate. Because the 
stability of a frame is created and dynamic, its future can never be entirely 
predicted from its past. Some frames indeed appear more stable and lasting 
than others, and to the extent that the frames are maintained by the creation 
of meaningful information by the participants they will have the appearance 
of a determined system. T here are, however, no frames in life that cannot 
be altered or eliminated.
Self, communication and culture are inseparable. Self frames are inherendy 
dialogical, between different action possibilities perceived in the present or 
between various imagined possibilities and positions. T he action possibilities 
and imagined positions are modeled after our experience in relationship 
consensual frames and in relationship frames with non-animate features of  
the environment. Those frames are virtually always centered within cultural 
frames of beliefs, practices and tools. Cultural frames are embodied with 
respect to the perception and action possibilities o f individual selves and 
are thus more easily taken up within self frames. T here is no beginning 
and ending point in this dialogical system of relationships.
Dialogue is all there is. T he dialogical process -  in which actions and 
events are informative in relation to the history and current actions of the 
participants -  occurs at all times within the self, between self and other, 
between self and environment, and between other selves that partake of  
the same culture. Life is a synergetic, multilayered process. An event that 
changes one’s life direction is not a beginning, it is an innovation adopted into an 
existing nexus of self frames that are shaped by consensual and cultural frames.
Dialogue creates patterns that individuals can perceive as invariants within the 
flow  o f  action. What I perceive as invariants within the dialogical process may 
not be the same as those detected by another individual. T h e theoretical 
model I have oudined here takes its particular shape in part from my 
perceptions o f this process, in part from the actions I can execute as a scholar 
and writer, and in part from the cultural tools (the scientific literature, the
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language, the print media, the static illustrations in two dimensions) by which 
a book can be informative. In a relationship, it is possible that each individual 
may have a different perception of what is creative and what is rigid, and each 
may derive a different meaning from the process.
F o r m s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n :  m o r a l i t y ,  a e s t h e t i c s  a n d  
a f f i l ia t io n
Relationships develop via dual processes of innovation and dissolution, by 
making and breaking frames, and by engaging in both creative and rigid 
dialogues. In this book I have so far avoided placing value judgements on 
these processes. I have not spoken of relationships as good or bad, adaptive 
or maladaptive, self-affirming vs. self-destructive. T hese values are relative 
to how the dialogue is framed. I have attempted, instead, to provide a general 
model o f relationship formation that can be applied to any kind of relationship 
process between any individuals, at any age, and in any species.
When one moves from the stance of observer o f relationships to the stance 
o f participant, that is, when one has a vested interest in a relationship -  with 
their children or parents, with their friends or mates, with their companion 
animals -  issues o f value inevitably arise. Participants in relationships create 
information that is not a cognitive content, but an embodied experience that 
meaningfully informs movements o f the body, thoughts, and feelings.
Jean Piaget also thought of life processes as a complex system of inter­
connecting relationships, although he imagined that this system converged 
over the life course toward some Platonic ideal fittedness to ‘reality’ in the 
form o f intellectual processes that mirrored the properties of the real world.6 
H e expresses his view of determinacy and indeterminacy in development in 
relation to this system as follows.
The concept of totality expresses the interdependence inherent in every organization, 
intelligent as well as biological. Even though behavior patterns and consciousness 
seem to arise in the most uncoordinated manner in the first weeks of existence, 
they extend a physiological organization which antedates them and they crystallize 
from the outset into systems whose coherence becomes clarified little by little.7
Piaget proposed that cognition, developed at first within physiological frames, 
created its own frames for logical thinking. Pure logical thought was conceived 
as an ‘ideal equilibrium.’ This ideal could never be reached, but it could be 
perceived by a participant in the system.
Piaget described the individual’s actual experience of perceiving the ideal 
equilibrium as the creation of a value. Value is
the expression of desirability at all levels. Desirability is the indication of a 
rupture in equilibrium or of an uncompleted totality to whose formation some
Developmental determinism and indeterminism 181
element is lacking and which tends toward this element in order to realize 
its equilibrium . . .  A good example is that of the norms of coherence and 
unity of logical thought which translate this perceptual effort of intellectual 
totalities toward equilibrium, and which therefore define the ideal equilibrium 
never attained by intelligence and regulate the particular values of judgement.8
H ere, Piaget is talking about the regulation of the self frame in which 
logical thought occurs with the cultural frame of the norms of logic. T he  
fundamental difference between Piaget’s concept of development and mine is 
that he believed individuals were regulated by the ideal, but never attainable, 
end state of perfect logical thinking. I suggest that individuals are co-regulated  
within self, consensual and cultural dialogues and that the developmental 
trajectories are creative and emergent from the dialogue and the constraints on 
degrees of freedom within the frame rather than by a Platonic ideal end state.
Nevertheless, Piaget and I are thinking about the same dynamic process 
o f action within a system of relationships. T h e information that one perceives 
as a participant in such a system has a value and desirability with respect to 
the frames of endeavor. 1 propose that there are three principal forms of 
informational values: moral, aesthetic and affiliative.
M oral information. Morality is the perception that some actions are better 
than others; that participation in some frames is more worthy than in 
others; that there is a choice one can make between good and not-so-good  
alternatives. Morality also refers to the demands one can make and the 
expectations one has from co-participants: the sense o f responsibility and 
sincerity in the relationship. Because action and perception are embedded 
in self, relationship and cultural frames, moral information is created by 
individuals in relation to those frames.
Aesthetic information. Not only is action perceived as good or bad, better or 
worse, it is also perceived as well-formed and not so well-formed. Piaget’s 
references to the cultural norms of coherence and unity in logical thought 
express aesthetic values. T h e artistry of performance is defined in relation to 
the cultural, consensual and self frames of participation. In some situations, 
such as in a business discussion, a more aesthetic social performance is one 
that is brief and to the point. In others, such as at a conversation over dinner, 
one expects elaborate stories with humor and contextual detail.
Affiliative information. All relationships have a dimension of liking and 
loving, attachment and dependency, anxiety, ambivalence or hatred. Which 
form o f affiliative information one creates depends on the frame. In some 
situations, as in the study of adolescent teasing reported in Chapter 2, a 
high degree of threat coupled with humor may lead to a strong attachment 
between the co-teasers. In other situations, as in the work place between boss 
and employee, or between male and female co-workers, such teasing may be 
perceived with contempt and hatred.
It is not my goal in this book to elaborate in great detail upon the forms of 
information created through participation. T here are vast literatures on each
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o f these topics and they deserve a separate and more complete treatment than 
can be afforded here. My purpose in discussing these topics at the end of this 
book and in so brief a form is to point out the incompleteness o f the ideas 
presented so far, and the realms of inquiry into which I believe those ideas 
may have something unique to contribute upon further analysis.
W hat I have to offer about these information themes is perhaps not new, 
but rather a way of thinking about them from the perspective of a principled 
and consistent theory o f relationships within the self, family and community. 
F o r me, the relationship processes described in this book are elemental 
components o f a theory of development. T h e relationship processes are 
the conflagrations out of which information is forged. Morality, aesthetics 
and affiliation do not exist in the Platonic sense before or after the dialogue: 
they emerge from its heat.
People often speak as if there are universal principles o f morality and 
aesthetics. T hese principles, however, are universal only from the perspective 
o f enduring cultural frames for morality, such as those found in legal codes, 
and cultural frames for aesthetics, such as in ritualized encounters like dance, 
athletics and warfare, and in art. T here are the moral principles of the 
T en  Commandments, of Confucian wisdom, and of a nation’s constitution. 
T h e beauty of the agon is embodied in M edea, Joan of Arc, or Martina 
Navratilova’s volley. These things are hardly permanent but none the less 
powerful and compelling images for some. These cultural frames for morality 
and aesthetics last over time because they are not only informative to an 
embodied perceiver with respect to their frames, but because they also allow 
for creativity and interpretation, for re-invention and elaboration.
M orality
Morality is part o f any activity that involves making a choice between 
alternatives, and alternatives are most clear within a frame in which many 
of the degrees o f freedom have been constrained. Since the nature of dialogue 
is the creation of new choices, inventing actions within a frame, it follows that 
all dialogue is a reflection of morality. It also follows that infants make moral 
choices, and that there is no social endeavor -  including science -  that is not 
morally defined.
In the conventional developmental view, morality is believed to begin in 
the preschool period, tied on the one hand to concepts o f right and wrong 
and on the other to behavior indicative o f social responsibility such as caring 
and altruism. T h e first moral emotions are thought to appear after language 
is acquired, when children remark upon things that are incomplete or broken, 
and when they act to restore things to completeness.
T here is a morality, however, even in very young infants who fuss when 
the nipple is removed before feeding is completed or who become upset when 
some routine sequence o f events is interrupted. W hat does the interruption
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mean to the infant? A common psychological account is to explain this as 
frustration due to a failure of expectations. This, to me, seems unnecessarily 
cognitive. It implies that the infant ‘has’ a generalized expectation based on 
a representational memory. Even so, why should the infant become upset 
at the failure o f expectations? Many presume that there must be some 
biological programming of negative emotion that leads to this more or less 
automatic reaction. And so discrete information is thought to flow from one 
representational unit to another to produce a response.
Actually, there is nothing particularly compelling about interrupting a 
sequence o f events for a baby. T here are some interruptions that mean 
nothing at all to a baby, such as a change in the family television viewing 
habits. T here are some that result in extreme distress, such as removing the 
nipple unexpectedly. And there are some interruptions that cause aversion 
but not distress, which is common in the ‘still-face’ research manipulation 
described in an earlier chapter, or when the mother’s interactive pace is too 
fast for the infant.
T h e interruption becomes a problem of moral choice for the baby only 
if it occurs in a frame in which the infant is used to having some choice 
and the interruption removes that freedom of choice. Infants don’t choose 
television shows, and they typically, at least under about 5 months, don’t 
choose to initiate play with an adult.9 But young infants have a lot o f choice 
with respect to sucking and eating: they are active participants in feeding 
interactions and the nipple is framed by a dynamic of co-regulation with the 
feeder. T he baby who gets upset when the nipple is removed is not saying ‘I 
didn’t expect that to happen,’ nor ‘This is interesting, I wonder what else is 
going to happen.’ T he baby is saying ‘I have the right to some control over 
that nipple and that right is being tampered with irresponsibly.’ T he baby is 
morally indignant because she has come to expect, not a sequence of actions, 
but a moral responsibility that the nipple will be provided in return for her 
responsible (i.e. co-regulated) temporary use of it.10
One could explain the infant’s distress on the basis o f a biological 
need/drive, rather than the arousal o f moral information. Infants, however, 
seem to have such reactions to almost anything -  not merely feeding -  that 
is meaningful to them at the moment, and for which they have played their 
part responsibly in an ongoing co-regulated relationship. I don’t mean here 
that infants have the same tug of responsibility toward many features o f life 
that adults have, nor that the infant understands these acts conceptually as 
moral. Rather, they are moral because of a breach, from the infant’s point 
of view, o f the sincerity the infant has perceived during prior encounters. 
If the infant is not genuinely hungry and the m other doesn’t tolerate idle 
play with the nipple, this is not cause for the creation o f moral indignation  
because the baby com es to recognize that the nipple is provided only 
when she sincerely requires it. Through these variations on the them e o f  
co-regulation with respect to the feeding frame and the self frame within it,
184 Conclusions and implications
the infant comes to refine the meaning o f sincerity as a responsible partner 
in this relationship.”
Morality, therefore, arises within a relationship as one form of information. 
T here are also more felicitous forms o f moral information, as in the pleasure 
o f being a responsible partner and the enjoyment o f something completed 
within the limits o f the frame. This is the sense of doing things right, the 
way they ought to be done, and what’s right is always defined by the scope 
of the frame. It is possible that each frame may create different information 
about the rightness o f a particular action.
In certain communities, premarital sex in adolescence may feel absolutely 
right in the consensual frame with the partner, categorically forbidden in 
the cultural frame, and completely wobbly within the endless dialogues of 
the teenager’s self frame. I’ve discovered informally that many parents in 
America bring their small infants into their beds with them at night, especially 
if mothers are nursing. This feels just right in the mother’s and infant’s self 
and consensual frames, but is nearly taboo in the W estern cultural frame. In 
Japanese and Mayan societies, on the contrary, it is considered immoral to 
let a child sleep alone.12
Perhaps the realms of discourse in which baby morality is created seem less 
important, from an adult perspective, compared to adult moral choices about 
life-and-death decisions, fidelity and infidelity, crime and punishment, war 
and peace. Certainly, removing a nipple from a baby’s mouth is much less 
destructive than pulling a trigger or denying a civil right. Yet, all these acts 
have moral consequences for the victims because what has been and should 
be co-regulated is now unilaterally regulated, imposed rather than negotiated. 
T h e morality of freedom and its loss is part o f all relationships.
Aesthetics
Aesthetics has to do with the form o f the action, rather than the freedom to 
do it or its consequences. With a few exceptions, the aesthetics of action is 
not taken seriously in developmental psychology. Aesthetics is not the same 
as creativity. T here is creativity in all aspects of relationships, including in 
morality and affiliation. One can create ugliness as well as beauty; it makes no 
difference from the perspective of creativity. Even when psychologists study 
children’s artistic productions, such as their drawing and musical ability, it 
tends to be from a purely sensory, motor or cognitive perspective.
Aesthetics, however, is an integral and enduring aspect of relationships 
in self, consensual and cultural frames. Aesthetic information is created when 
one performs an action or makes something that is somehow more elegant 
than similar actions intended for the same purpose. Aesthetic information is 
created in relationships when negotiations are abbreviated into frames, that is, 
when something more simple is made to stand for something more complex.
A line o f poetry is beautiful because o f the economy o f  its expression
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as well as because o f the flow o f it across the tongue. Beauty in art is a 
combination of movement and economy, flow and the ability to represent 
something much bigger than the work itself. A tennis stroke is beautiful 
when there are no wasted movements and the force of the whole body and 
the arm is communicated to the ball through the racquet.
T h e philosopher Kenneth Burke makes the case for what he calls a poetic 
psychology.
Since social life, like art, is a problem o f appeal, the poetic metaphor would 
give us invaluable hints for describing modes of practical action which are too 
often measured by simple tests of utility and too seldom with reference to the 
communicative, sympathetic, propitiatory factors that are clearly present in the 
procedures of formal art and must be as truly present in those informal arts of 
living we do not happen to call art.13
T h e quote from Mary Catherine Bateson presented earlier in this chapter 
suggests that developmental change is guided by a similar aesthetic. She also 
states that ‘composing a life has a metaphorical relation to many different 
arts.’14
In early infancy, after a period o f negotiation, infants begin to abbreviate 
their actions. For example, after months of negotiating mutual gaze, infants 
will use a brief glance at the mother to indicate a readiness to participate in 
that consensual frame. Why does the child come to use the more elegant 
form instead o f continuing to spend long periods negotiating who looks at 
whom and when? T h e infant probably wants to pursue other goals with the 
adult, and an aesthedc is required to simplify the communicadon system to 
make room for the innovations.
Take the example o f infant Hannah, discussed in Chapter 6. Hannah and 
her mother endured weeks o f laborious interchanges in which they both 
meant something different by their offers of objects. W hen Hannah finally 
‘got’ the point of the game, she handed the telephone to the mother with 
obvious delight. Now the offer meant a request to play the telephone game. 
A cognitive explanation views Hannah as having an insight, as having been 
guided into the frame o f the game and finally making it part of her own 
actions through advanced understanding.
My interpretation is that the offering was perceived, at that moment, as 
aesthetically pleasing. T here was, for both baby and mother, a certain beauty 
to be experienced in the frame: everything fitted together economically; there 
were no wasted attempts at communication and repair. They were dancing 
rather than stepping on each other’s toes.15
T h e evidence that infants can perceive the difference between the beautiful 
and the disagreeable is sparse, perhaps because few have looked for it. Some 
recent findings by Judith Langlois, however, suggest that infants in the first 
half-year prefer to look at faces that adults have judged to be attractive 
compared to unattractive faces.16
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Research on the expressive behavior o f preschool children by Alan Sroufe 
and his colleagues suggests that there is an aesthetics of communication 
processes that accompanies the aesthetics o f physical attractiveness. Linda 
was not as popular as she might have been because she displayed both 
appealingly positive as well as ugly negative expressions.
Linda was a beautifully expressive child. Her exuberance and flashing smile were 
unparalleled by any other child in her class. When she enthusiastically greeted a 
visitor with a ‘Hi! 1 haven’t seen you in a LONG time!’ (accompanied by her 
ear-to-ear smile), it is no wonder that the visitor was charmed . . .
Tracy, John, and Linda had been playing happily on a couch. When the three 
of them leave, Jerry climbs onto the couch. Linda returns to the couch and shouts 
at him ‘You get off my couch!’ She climbs on the couch and pushes him, trying 
to grab the pictures he is holding.17
John in the same class was judged as not being physically attractive based on 
ratings of photographs, and he scored low on tests o f cognitive function.
Yet he was rated high on social competence by teachers and was well liked by 
the children, having several close and warm friendships. His uniformly positive 
initiations and response to other children -  his ‘sweet nature’ as one teacher put 
it -  quite obviously played an important role in his social success.18
Children o f lower popularity in the classroom were less expressively attractive, 
either affectless or showing inappropriately intense expressions. T he impression 
that individuals are beautiful, lovely or sweet is a reflection o f aesthetic 
information created w hen communicating with or watching these individuals. 
W e know too little about the extent to which infants and young children 
perceive this dimension o f information and we have few techniques with 
which to study the aesthetics of action in everyday situations.19
It is not the case, especially for infants, that they know what is aesthetic in 
advance. Rather, they create it as perception and action within a frame. A 
child may recognize that mumbling a word is sloppy work if the communication 
and self frames provide constraints for saying it more beautifully.
Affiliation
Studies o f affiliation are plentiful in parent-infant and in peer relationship 
research, focusing on issues such as attachment, friendships and their 
variations. No one would deny, therefore, the importance of affiliative 
information in the development of relationships. Indeed, one of the most 
successful measures ever designed to classify individuals is Mary Ainsworth’s 
measure o f infant attachment using the Strange Situation T est.20 The  
research that has been done on infant attachment is very consistent with 
the relationship models proposed in this book, showing that attachment may 
remain stable under some conditions and change under others, leading to 
distincdy different developmental trajectories within relationships.21
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I say this in spite of my earlier complaints about the concept o f the 
internal working model, a discrete representational approach that derives 
from Bowlby’s attachment theory. I believe that data on attachment are better 
explained from the perspective o f information within relationship frames: 
forms of attachment represent different qualities o f affiliative information 
such as secure, anxious and resistant. This information is not, however, 
contained as a representation -  a working model -  within the individual 
infant. Rather, it is created in the dialogue of the m other-infant consensual 
frame, and is re-created in the dialogue of the self frame.
Research suggests that actions toward self and toward others during the 
preschool years are related to the security o f attachment with parents 
measured during infancy. Securely attached children, for example, more 
readily and correctly identify features of themselves and their mothers, and 
they are facile at creating pretend narratives in which dolls play the roles of 
mother and child. Insecurely attached infants tend to make more incorrect 
and negative attributions o f self and m other.22
I discussed earlier how increasing intimacy, a developmental change in 
a relationship toward new affiliative information, is created by the co ­
regulated constructions o f new frames for affiliation and their continued 
mutual elaboration. Assuming that the creation of affiliative information is 
pleasing and arousing, one does not need an internal working model to 
explain its developmental transitions. T h e frame constrains actions into 
increasingly closer spheres of intimacy, or out to increasing distance and 
disengagement.
Relationship development is not regulated toward some Platonic ideal of 
perfect intimacy, no more than intellectual development is regulated toward 
the Platonic ideal of perfect logic. Development is created out o f co-regulation  
in dialogue and converges toward information that is moral, aesthetic and 
affiliative within those frames.
In summary, the relational model o f development proposed here forces 
one to consider information in its holistic sense, not in its purely cognitive 
sense. How the information is created depends upon where one is situated 
in the network o f connected frames that comprise the on-goingness o f  life 
as a process. Life is the dialogue, stirred by creativity and warmed by the 
passions of participation.
R e s e a r c h  a p p r o a c h e s  to  r e l a t i o n s h i p  d e v e l o p m e n t
T o  study relationship systems one has to maintain a focus on the individual 
actors and follow them through developmental time, research that keeps life 
courses and relationship courses as fundamental units and that eschews 
group means. General or nomothetic principles are not going to be found 
in any collection of group statistics. According to Thorngate,
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It is tempting to equate the nomothetic approach with the analysis of averages. To 
do so is to equate statistical models of experiments with models of people . . .  To 
find out what people do in general, we must first discover what each person does 
in particular, then determine what, if anything, these particulars have in common. 
This implies that we pay more attention to case histories, find or develop models 
sufficient to account for each, then examine the models for common themes or 
elements.23
Esther Thelen proposes the following.
When considerable individual differences are expected in the outcome, it is even 
more crucial to use individual developmental trajectories as the primary data source. 
Once individual developmental paths are identified, it may then be possible to 
cluster subjects, not on the basis of outcome, but on the basis of route. This 
means that detailed longitudinal studies are necessary to capture the dmes of 
stability and change.24
I have made similar points.
Typical developmental methodologies that seek independent measures of mother 
and infant assume that a rather sharp line can be defined between the 
individual and the social environment . . .  When investigators reify the boundary 
between organism and environment, they mask the dynamic processes of self­
organization that constitute developmental change. When organism and environment 
are conceptualized as distinct for the purpose o f measurement, one cannot reconstruct from 
those measures alone the dynamics o f the developmental process . . .  Given repeated 
observations on the same subjects, and contextually appropriate measures, analytic 
approaches can be applied that preserve the integrity of the individual’s life history 
in order to construct generalities of developmental change. It is only when a 
sufficiently large sample o f individual case histories are collected that longitudinal process 
research can be generalized to the population . . .  To study development as a dynamic 
phenomenon, we must observe the system in the process o f changing, and not simply 
before and after the change takes place.2S
Susan Oyama proposed that rather than measuring and ranking, correlating 
and predicting, developmental research should
show us about the timing of events, the susceptibility of processes to various 
kinds of perturbation and the manner in which the regulation is achieved, if it 
is achieved . . .  what is needed to enable a particular developmental sequence 
to proceed, what will induce, facilitate or maintain such a sequence, how does 
sensitivity to these factors change with developmental state, what degree of 
specificity is evident in these interactions, what is the relationship among events 
at various levels of analysis?26
Research, in other words, should be open to the contingent and creative 
processes by which relationships form and change, that is, to the possibility 
for both determinacy and indeterminacy. It should be designed to see 
the whole elephant, not just its tail. Experimental studies have a role in
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process research, but only when perturbations of ongoing process can reveal 
something about branching developmental pathways. T hus, one would want 
to preserve as much as possible about a relationship frame while perturbing 
selected elements to observe the effects on the self-organization o f the whole 
system.27 Studies that compare the formation o f relationships under different 
naturally varying conditions are also useful, especially if each relationship 
system is observed relatively frequently and the samples are matched on all 
dimensions except for the particular disturbance or difference that is being 
compared.28
T he problem of research on relationships for the investigator is to enter 
into frames o f co-participation as an outsider and to preserve as much as 
possible about the evolution of the process without distorting it beyond 
recognition. This research is time-consuming because one has to wait for 
development to occur with a watchful eye and most human relationships 
can’t tolerate that degree o f scrutiny without disturbance. Nevertheless, I 
have found that it can be done with an appropriate measure of sensitivity 
to the participants, respect for their courage to allow scientists to examine 
their secrets, and recognition of their pride that comes from collaborative 
participation in scientific frames of discourse.
I have felt humility and gratitude in the company of the infant and mother 
life histories we have collected for ongoing study. From  them I have created  
time-lapse films, assembling a picture of relationship development by taking 
ten-second clips o f a mother and baby playing with the same toy each week 
over a six-month period. This is probably not very scientific, at least not yet 
-  not until I can afford the technology and expertise to couple these video 
images with computer imaging and simulation in as sophisticated a way as 
the local meteorologist on the evening news. But like the time-lapse films of 
cloud formation and flowers blossoming that I saw as a child, I watch in awe 
at the beauty' o f social systems being created, blooming and changing. I think 
we know less about what is between us in our everyday relationships than we 
know about the austere space between stars in a galactic frame.
N o t e s
1. Bandura (1986, p. 33).
2. Bateson (1989, pp. 3-4).
3. Bandura (1986); SamerofT (1989); Sroufe (1989); Thelen (1990).
4. Bandura (1986, p. 33).
5. 1 was, as I mentioned earlier, majoring in physics and mathematics, but I had 
an active dislike for chemistry that my girlfriend would surely have known 
about. We have been together since that time, possibly in part because she did 
not buy me a chemistry book, which would have shown a lack of sensitivity to 
my interests.
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I chose the example of Herbert Brown because 1 was working at Brown’s 
university, Purdue, at the time he was nominated for the Nobel prize. He 
became an instant celebrity at the university, in the community, in the state 
of Indiana, and indeed in the nation and world. In addition to reading 
weekly and sometimes almost daily articles in the local newspaper about the 
legendary graduation present and other stories about him, I remember being 
struck by how much the Nobel prize itself changed his life. For most of the 
next year and beyond he spent much of his time with interviews and phone 
calls, appearing on talk shows, giving presentations at community functions, 
travelling everywhere, and just generally coping with being famous outside 
the academic frames in which his earlier notoriety had been managed. The 
sudden opening of new frames can be just as important in the life course as 
any particular innovative event or action.
6. Haroutunian (1983).
7. Piaget (1962, p. 10)
8. Piaget (1963, p. 11), italics are mine.
9. Kaye 8c Fogel (1980); Cohn 8c Tronick (1988).
10. Cavell (1979); Heame (1987); Winnicott (1971).
11. Sincerity is one of the maxims that Grice (1975) proposes as a necessary 
component of discourse: that speakers should treat each other’s utterances 
as truthful and genuine until proven otherwise. Sincerity may be violated in 
consensual ways, as in humor and play.
12. Morelli et al. (1992).
13. Burke (1954, p. 264).
14. Bateson (1989, p. 4).
15. Others (Stern, 1985; Thoman 8c Browder, 1987) have used the metaphor 
of dancing in a different way, to mean something more like swaying 
together to the same body rhythms rather than to refer to the aesthetics of 
the movements. Dancing to the same rhythms can be beautiful or pitiful, 
depending on how it’s created and perceived.
16. Langlois el al. (1987; 1990).
17. Sroufe el al. (1984, pp. 306-7).
18. Sroufe el al. (1984, pp. 306-7).
19. Burke (1954).
20. Ainsworth el al. (1978).
21. Sroufe 8c Jacobvitz (1989).
22. Pipp, Easterbrooks & Harmon (1992); Suess, Grossmann 8c Sroufe (1992).
23. Thorngate (1987, p. 75).
24. Thelen (1990, p. 39).
25. Fogel (1990a, pp. 343-4 , 354).
26. Oyama (1985, pp. 160-1).
27. See, for example, research in which the mother-infant interaction is preserved 
while specific aspects of maternal action are changed (Cohn 8c Tronick, 1983; 
Fogel el al., 1982; Fogel, Dedo 8c McEwen, 1992; Tronick el al., 1978).
28. In infant development, for example, research comparing relationship 
differences in depressed vs. non-depressed mothers (Bettes, 1988; Field et 
al., 1986; Fleming et. al., 1988; Gelfand & Teti, in press; Jameson el al., 
1991); comparing relationships in other forms of maternal psychopathology
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to normal mothers (Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1991; Main & Solomon, 
1986; SamerofF & Emde, 1989; Sroufe, 1989; Stem, 1985); comparing 
mother-infant relationships between pre-term and full-term infants 
(Barnard et al., 1984; Branchfield, Goldberg & Sloman, 1980; Crawford, 
1982; Easterbrooks, 1989; Oehler, Eckerman & Wilson, 1988; van Beek 
& Geerdink, 1989); comparing mother-infant relationships between 
handicapped and non-handicapped infants, as in Downs’ vs. normal infants 
(Cicchetti & Sroufe, 1978; Jones, 1980; Stevenson, Leavitt & Silverberg, 
1985); and comparing mother-infant relationships in infants with varying 
degrees of psychosocial risk (Rutter, 1987; Wachs & Gruen, 1982; Werner, 
1979).
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